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Amos A. Smith

NEW AND EXTENSIVE
ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION
OF THE
ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE:

CONTAINING

EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENCE, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
ELEMENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDA-
TION OF MENTAL ACTION, AND ELEMENTS
OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUN-
DATION OF MORAL ACTION.


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DESIGNED FOR STUDENTS, SCHOOLS, SEMINARIES, AND COLLEGES.

BY

REV. MOSES SMITH, A. M.

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"KNOW THYSELF."



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NEW AND EXTENSIVE

ANALYSIS OF THE
B.F. 111
362

ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE

CONTAINING

NUMEROUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE TWO SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE TWO SYSTEMS OF PSYCHICS
AND THE TWO SYSTEMS OF PSYCHICS

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P R E F A C E.

THE design of laying this work, in abridged form, before the public, is to present the Philosophy of Mind in a clear light, and adapted to the demands of the present age. The topics and arguments are very numerous—the latter, brief, plain, and freed from many and long-existing embarrassments. This volume is intended to contain at least one-third more items and arguments, immediately connected with the science, than any other work of the same number of pages extant; embracing those most important, and in their appropriate order. The examination, unlike any other, embracing the whole field of mental analysis, leaves the various powers entirely unincumbered by any law of fatality; and clearly evolves the difference between elements lying at the foundation of mental action, and those lying at the foundation

of moral action; which is indispensable to a correct understanding of the science. The arrangement is convenient for a text-book—adapted to general use, and is auxiliary to the investigation and knowledge of truth.

THE AUTHOR.

INTRODUCTION.

ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SCIENCES COMPARED—ELEMENTS OF MATERIALISM CAREFULLY EXAMINED.

SECTION I.

1. MAN, in the very *essence* or *nature* of his being, has been left *without power to doubt* the reality of self. Being conscious that *self* is *real*, doubt in regard to such entity is utterly impossible. Positive knowledge is the end of all controversy. We know that we are not non-existence, for nonentity can have no knowledge of reality. 2. If he looks out upon the varied and extended creations of God, contemplating the reality, amplitude, and grandeur of visible existence, or turns perception upon the mingling harmony of all the rolling vast of universal being, together with the purity and powers of imperishable mind, he is compelled to regard *all* as composed only of SPIRIT and MATTER. These constitute the universe, and in regard to the same all cogitation, or mental action, is restricted, however free in progressive research and power of knowledge. 3. He *exists*, moving with *freedom* over

the earth; has been called the noblest work of God, and lord of this world. He has been styled a compendium of creation, standing midway the kingdom of nature and that of immortal spirits. He studies to know every thing below himself—the earth, compounded of its various qualities, and all appertaining to it. He desires and labors to comprehend all unexplored laws connected with zoölogy, vegetation, and crystallization. Looking abroad upon yonder heavens, he traces the rolling orbs of the vast universe—watches tempest and calm, rain and drought, heat and cold, seed-time and harvest. Why, then, should he not go still higher, and study to know himself? 4. His being is *indestructible*, and can never be discontinued by annihilation. The very nature and action of all elements of mind are averse to any thing like a return to non-existence, or any idea that we shall ever cease to be. We can have no conception that an all-wise Being could or would create us for the purpose of causing our non-existence. This conclusion can be sustained by the indestructibility of matter. 5. Matter may be decomposed, the elements united or consolidated; may have the laws of affinity and power of adhesion suspended or destroyed; but we have no evidence of any *possible annihilation* of properties.

SECTION II.

1. Man is *compounded* of *spirit* and *matter*; these united constitute but the one being. The ties of

affection connecting the two natures seem to be so arranged, that when severed by death, the soul sustains no perceptible loss, either of faculties or true knowledge. The body without the soul is lifeless clay. Therefore, it is incapable of containing any power of action or item of knowledge. If the soul is possessed of powers and knowledge before death, it has them afterward, unless death has annihilating power, which is contrary to all evidence. 2. The spirit contains the *animating principle*, or is the principle of *life*. The science of psychology can not be untrue; for the soul is indispensable to life and knowledge of self. 3. The soul of man is the *intelligent* part of his being. Reason, judgment, and knowledge can not be matter, nor a result of material elements. 4. It is an *immaterial* or spiritual existence, as a whole, one and indivisible. It can not be inert, neither is it ponderous, or capable of annihilation. 5. It is immortal—limitless in duration. Its faculties are very numerous, vivid in action, and powerful in conception and demonstration.

SECTION III.

1. *Matter is distinct* from mind. Anthropology can furnish no material element which, in quality or essence, can be called mind in whole or in part. Matter is divisible, tangible, and ponderous—possessing density and extension, with gradations and dissimilar organic properties. 2. Matter is said to be *inanimate* when insensible and inactive within

itself. Inert elements act only from impinging causes, and in conformity to the law or force of gravitation, but they can not possess any self-power of action. 3. It is *animate* when it possesses sensitive motion or action within itself. But the animating principle is not matter; for then all matter would be sensitive, and have action and life. Sensitive action belongs to that which has life; but matter may have motion or action, without having sensation or life.

SECTION IV.

1. *Mind is not matter.* It is an internal and intellectual power. It must either act itself, or act from impinging causes. The natural tendency of matter is to inactivity, and its nature is to be and remain at rest. If moved by any external cause, rest is restored so soon as the impinging agent is wholly removed. Having no action within itself, it is impossible for it either to act or cause action. 2. But the mind *acts independent* of remote, contingent, or intermingling causes. It has power to understand, conceive, judge, reason, and feel. 3. The *term mind* is applied to a combination of faculties, or an internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and wills. It is known to us by these faculties, and they are made known by our consciousness, the affirmations of which we can not doubt. 4. The *essence* of mind has been referred to something back of these faculties, or forming a still deeper foundation of their being. We can have no clear concep-

tion or certain knowledge of such occult qualities. To advance in search of such elements, would only plunge us into darkness and doubt. All such speculations would be uncertain, from our ignorance of the subject; therefore, it is useless to try to decide upon uncertainties, and such process would add nothing to true science. 5. *Imagine* that we remove consecutively all faculties of the mind, and it would be very difficult to conceive of some remaining something called essence. And if we could, how could we analyze it, further than call it the power or influence which affinitates, in common, all functions constituting the soul? Though this subject has been the origin of many speculative arguments, and in a way it is not capable of, words can not define or make it known to us. It exists in facts or truths wholly the objects of consciousness.

SECTION V.

1. *Knowledge*, the result of *reasoning*, is not so clear, strong, and unerring, as that arising from *intuition*. The latter is the only primary source of receiving facts as facts, without either proof or disproof. In argumentation, an appeal to consciousness may be the last acknowledged resort, but is the most conclusive and certain. Finite objects of the external world, which strike the sense, can never vie with this internal influence or power, nor be the anterior cause of its existence. 2. *We feel intuitively* a power within entirely distinct from all prop-

erties of materiality. This combination of elements or internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and wills, can not be questioned or doubted. Yet we have real knowledge of such elements only by consciousness. Matter combines properties which are solid, ponderous, extended, and divisible. They are known to us as such, by our senses. 3. If the *power* constituting the faculties of mind, or of blending them together in action, be matter, how could it act within itself in recalling the past, and in contemplating the future—the events and occurrences of the one, and the objects and hopes of the other? And how could it act in examining the nature and properties of tangible existences, and the design, as evidenced in the symmetry and harmony naturally adapting them to the purposes and ends of their being? Could it send out pioneer thoughts through unexplored creation and interminable duration? How could it examine the properties and laws of existences, and reason from nature up to nature's God? 4. If the principle within us which *thinks and acts is matter*, we are plunged into total darkness, and are entirely ignorant as to the power of perception, or knowledge of the existence of any fact; for that which thinks is known to us only by thinking. Matter is known by solidity, weight, and extension. The former is known by properties entirely different from the latter. Matter contains no principle by which we love, hate, fear, triumph, rejoice, sorrow, and suffer remorse or despair.

SECTION VI.

1. *Matter is not mind.* The substances composing the material universe are severally ponderous, divisible, possessing density and extension; also existing in liquids or air form. The principles of these existences are known as principles of matter and not of mind. All properties of matter are naturally inert. There are no elements or atoms belonging to the science of physics which can have action within themselves, or self-action. All action or motion produced in them by operative causes, tends to inertness or rest at the suspension of the power of those causes.

2. All material elements *tend naturally to rest.* And rest, or that which is at rest by natural tendency or law, can not originate action, neither can it pervade with action either rest or a series of entities at rest. But mind at rest has power to act within itself, and to cause action in insensible bodies, by voluntarily causing them to be impinged while at rest, and by accelerating or counteracting their inertia.

3. The *essence* of matter is difficult to define. That properties exist is clearly demonstrable; but to go back of these in search of some occult principle or essence, would be attended with difficulty, and add confusion to true analysis. Yet the mind should be tested to its utmost power in trying to trace properties back to essence, or in discriminating between them by distinguishing their inhesive affinity in the union of compounds, which, if dissevered and all clustering properties

removed, there is something remaining as unknown or imaginary, to which the term essence may be applied. But we can have no satisfactory knowledge of any thing in physics anterior to, or, more correctly, primary than properties. 4. If the ideas of *materialists* be true, that there is nothing but *matter* in the vast universe, and that, at farthest, the soul of man is only the result of a particular organization of matter in the body, we have no reasons favoring the knowledge of any existence. 5. For inert properties can have *no knowledge* of their own existence, nor of external existences. But we can not conceive of an immensity of space filled with nothing. Nonentity can have no perception or knowledge of non-existence, neither can it have knowledge of entity. Then there must be an existence capable of thinking and knowing, and something capable of being the object of thought and knowledge. 6. If all bodies consist of unextended atoms, *moved only* by some law or influence of attraction or resistance, how could we account for the existence and action of that law or laws? If law can not think, reason, and act within and of itself, it is clear that there can be no power to think and act contained in inanimate and inert atoms of matter. 7. The *non-existence* of matter is more reasonable than that nothing exists but matter; for if nothing exists but matter, we have seen that there could be no knowledge of any reality; and if nothing could be apprehended or known, then if there could be existences, all knowledge of them would be lost in non-existence.

SECTION VII.

1. If the soul is matter, it has *power to think and act*. Then it follows that all matter has power to think and act, which is absurd. If some definite portion possesses this power, the difference is the result of the different modifications, magnitude, figure, or motion of some parts in respect to other parts, or to the mass, or the power of thinking and acting must be given to some systems of it and rejected from others. 2. If all matter is *cogitative*, it is contrary to all experience and knowledge we have of its nature. And if so, our senses and faculties are formed only to deceive us. A rock possesses no sign or evidence of either cogitation or sense. The head is the great battery of thought, and there all the ministers of sensation make their appeal; but if all matter be cogitative, the feet would contain proportionably as much thought as the head, and there would be as much in the mountain rock as in either. Matter is not self-operative but inert, and is no more than substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. 3. Materialism, in more recent and *modified forms*, maintains that mind is a result of organization, or a function of the brain; that the physical and mental faculties co-inhering the same primary substances, grow, mature, decay, and cease together. If the brain is only the organ of the mind, it can not be the mind itself. It may form the center in which exists that influence on which depends sensation and motion. This organ is

delicately connected, to a limited extent, with the mind's states and developments. Chemical analysis will show that all nervous matter in the entire system possesses precisely the same properties as that of the brain. Then if mind be matter, or the result of that kind of matter, it would be located all through the system; and if we could live we could have knowledge, to a proportionable extent, as well without the head as with it, or as well without it as without a hand or a foot. 4. The *various diseases* of the brain often modify, impair, or destroy the manifestations of mind. This sequence, if uniform, would not make mind to be the result of material elements, but would prove the brain to be the organ through which the mind acts and has access to external things. An object reflecting light to a perfect eye can be seen; but without light sight would be lost—one of the bodily senses is suspended; yet the mind has power still to retain a knowledge of the object seen. Therefore, the power of the mind to act is not limited to the senses, for it can act when they are suspended.

SECTION VIII.

1. Mind is *independent of matter* as to existence, and as to properties or essence; but is dependent in the origin of its knowledge in regard to them.
2. Matter can exist and be matter without the *power to either think or act*. Mind without these ceases to be mind. If we are wholly material, and matter can think as matter, then we must continue to think

always, and in proportion to the number and size of the particles contained in each compound. Then a large body can think more and more powerfully than a smaller one; and both must continue to think on forever. 3. If matter can not be *annihilated*, then materialists *are immortal* unawares and contrary to their purposes and desires, but in perfect accordance with the premises of their own assumption. At least they must have a conscious state of being as long as there are any elements of the body existing after death. Therefore, embalmed and petrified bodies must have consciousness, thought, and action for ages and cycles of ages unnumbered. 4. If matter *thinks through the future*, it must have *always thought in the past*, and there has been no time of our actual physical existence when the mind was not active and thinking. 5. What principle of materiality can possess *sensation within itself* or in common, or can constitute that which loves, fears, joys, and sorrows, and is capable of being ecstatic with hope, quickened and excited with enthusiasm, or plunged into remorse or despair? In perfect health passion, anger, regret, and remorse may fill the soul; and peace, tranquillity, and hope often possess the mind when the body is suffering intensely or is even dying. 6. The septennial revolutions, or renewing of the system by the changes of its particles, does not *change the identity of self*, nor the one continued being in which man lives, and which he feels and knows to be himself. If self-action, self-consciousness, and thinking constitute the ele-

ments of matter, or are essential to them, all elements of matter, abstractly or combined in every system must contain them; and then they would be impossible to any, for every system of materiality would possess self-action and a consciousness of its own existence individually in self-thought or thinking; and no self-consciousness or thought of an individual property can exist in common with other properties, or of the compound. Then no element or atom of matter in the vast universe could have knowledge of the existence of any thing besides or beyond itself. 7. If impressions made upon *material organs constitute the knowledge* of existence, the occurrences of early life could not be commanded or recalled in old age; for the particles of the system so often changing, and being incapable of self-action, could make no transfer of their knowledge to those succeeding them. Then all knowledge of the past would cease to be, and we could know nothing back of the present moment.

SECTION IX.

1. Mind is *dissimilar and distinct* from matter, or even a result of materiality, only so far as matter may be the organ of the mind, or through which it holds intercourse with the external world. Thinking can not arise from the figure, size, or motion of the properties which think; for this would only result in gradations of size, or as to the appearance and celerity, which would differ from thinking. 2. The human body is *incapable of annihilation*. So far as we can

analyze and understand, it appears that temporal death has no power to annihilate the constitutional elements of the body. The earth, air, and water consolidated in the forest oak, may be decomposed or separated by fire; yet not one element or particle of the primary principles can be utterly destroyed. Death sunders the ties of affection connecting the soul and body, and the effect of the change in the body appears to be no more than the change of the arrangements of its essential elements. 3. We have no evidence of the *annihilation* of any existent, and our conception of such a result is impossible. There is no evidence of such a possibility in physical analysis, or taught in revelation, and our experience and belief are against it. 4. The accumulating *weakness of age* and the very *decay* of the body indicates no annihilation of matter, but a change in the affinity and position of its elements, and is an additional proof of the continuation of the soul; for this decay is continued existence in change and under a new form or abstracted entities. The term resurrection does not convey the idea of a new creation, but a resuscitation of the very identical body that went down to the grave, in the recalling of the primary elements to their wonted affinity and order in the new organized body; thenceforth their union will be unbroken.

SECTION X.

1. Though we do not know matter to be *eternal in duration*, yet we have no evidence to believe that its

properties will ever be annihilated. Then, if matter will exist in some way forever, it follows that there is something connected with animal life and motion which is superior in nature to mere matter, and is of a mental character and nature clearly distinct from matter, and must be called an immaterial or immortal principle; and we have as little or less proof of its pending annihilation as we have of the final non-existence of matter. 2. The soul is superior to matter in the *knowledge* it has of *its own existence*, and of the *existence of matter*, and its power of self-action. These distinct differences show an immaterial independence, and its states and manifestations are incomprehensible—almost an infinity of meaning within itself. There is an internal spiritual dominion or umpire principle, in which thoughts arise and are commanded, and by and from which they are sent forth through limitless creation like exploring lights, dispersed all abroad. The materialist has this power, and is conscious that he can employ his thoughts voluntarily about any business he may choose or desire. 3. To hear of or to see suffering will *naturally move* the feelings of the soul, and words written often create joy or excite alternately weeping and laughter. The self-inactive characters on the paper can not mechanically or naturally move the observer in any way. If words are spoken there can be nothing in the simple pulsations of the air that can effect matter creating self-motion, neither to effect in any way the feelings or knowledge. That power which perceives

and apprehends the force and sense of these things is far different from any principle of matter. Articulated sounds can awake sensibility and arouse the soul in feelings or passion; and they can produce mirth, tranquillity, or gloomy despair. These results can not be the physical effects of the terms used, else the effect would be the same and as extensive if not understood as though they were. It is wholly the sense conveyed, or supposed to be conveyed and received, which is immaterial in itself, that excites the soul and influences physical action. 4. He who believes that matter possessed *primarily causation*, or that it can of itself come out of nonentity into self-existence, coalesce its particles and then live, think, and act by any process of reduction or arrangements of elements, possessing figure, or is excited to motion by laws of affinity or of repulsion, should first discover and define the degree of fineness existing in a divided hair, and be able to tell all the points of intersection, angling the directions of their localities respectively. Then should he proceed to define the alteration in the situation of the particles of matter in which they begin to breathe life from naught, live, act, and cogitate. 5. The self-power of particles to *change* to or from each other, or in degrees of difference, is impossible; and if they could, it would still remain, that form, figure, and magnitude are all material accidents. The substance is matter, and, in this respect, can not differ in parts one from another. Then if one part can think and

act, all matter can think and act. Therefore, all particles of matter possess causation and action, and must be cogitative. And if there is such a thing as matter thinking, that influence or power must be superadded which implies a principle differing in essence or nature from matter, and can not be a result of it, but must have been conferred by a superior or an omnipotent cause. 6. No *accident* of matter can produce *action* or *cause cogitation*, either regularly or irregularly; and it can not superadd that influence or power, for matter is divisible, and that which thinks must be one, or of parts united, so that the action is one. But matter is not one and indivisible. However closely the particles adhere together, they still exist as particles and without self-motion, and are powerless in adhering to or in penetrating each other. If the power of thought existed in those particles, it would exist whether they were in contact or remotely located; and if these are divisible, or are capable of being sundered and scattered abroad, there must be as many minds as there are particles in matter. Then the mountain, the globe, the sun, moon, and stars are all built of mind, or of a combination of innumerable immaterialities, which is absurd. 7. On the other hand, if it requires a *union* of the elements of matter in order to constitute a power to think and act, there would be no power to classify these elements, and it would require all the material elements in the vast universe to form one mind or soul. Should there be some influence or es-

sence in which they unite or center, so their action or thoughts may be but one, that influence or power is not merely superadded, but is an existent superior to and independent of matter.

SECTION XI.

1. Matter can not contain abstract *ideas* of any thing, for the particles could not *reflect* upon what passes within themselves, much less contemplate that which was beyond; for within themselves they could find nothing but limited material representations or impressions, and these could not form ideas, neither could they be formed by ideas, abstracting themselves; nor have they self-power to form themselves into trains of thought and metaphysical argumentation. 2. Matter, within itself, possesses no power capable of *correcting appearances* or *impressions*. In seeing the topsail of a ship, far away at sea, the natural idea would be like the appearance, the existence of something very small; but as it is, there is something within which forms a more correct idea, bringing into consideration the rotundity of the sea and the feebleness of sight. 3. Man is *conscious* that he *lives* and has *liberty* of motion, in thought and in changing position of place, and by an instantaneous thought change his course or purpose, and counteract, in some instances, the laws both of capillary attraction and gravitation. Inert elements can not of themselves voluntarily suspend the operations or arrest the tendency and action of the laws of nature.

4. The soul is not a *faculty* of the body, nor a *result* of matter, but dwells within the body, and governs it in whole or in part, as the hands, feet, eyes, and tongue. That which governs the body is not the body nor particles of it, neither is it a superadded materiality or accident, but a superior spiritual power or soul. 5. The soul is *incapable* of annihilation, as it is distinct and superior to matter; the latter is imperishable, or its elements can not cease to exist in some way. We know nothing of the nature or the essence of either mind or matter; and to try to define them, or the nature of their mysterious union, would be fruitless. 6. We have no evidence that any *existent* can or will ever pass into *non-existence*. If the elements of matter are imperishable, and the immateriality of the soul is established, which would render it more incapable of non-existence, so far as our knowledge of its elements and being can extend, how can we deny an unwavering belief of its immortality? The soul has naturally an indisposition to tarry with the present moment and circumstances; there is ever a disposition to pass on to the future, and a desire for immortality. It can now feel an awe of the future and of God. This varies with its shades of conscientious rectitude or sense of wrong. We look to the future with fear or hope, according to our sense of guilt or innocence. 7. Conscience has *power of self-action*, and is often impinged or influenced to action by some unseen cause, both in accordance with and contrary to our will and natural desires. He

who follows its dictations, and he who repels them, are both compelled to acknowledge its quickening influence and power. In contemplating the infinite future, the righteous rejoice while the wicked sink under feelings of remorse.

SECTION XII.

1. The soul has a *conscious knowledge of self* with its continued being, while in health or in the wane of life. There is no condition of helplessness or suffering, this side death, while reason remains, but that the soul feels its nature and being to be immortal. The immortality of the soul is reasonable, from its vast capacities and dread of annihilation. It is evident from its great improvements, boundless desires, natural dissatisfaction with time and things present, a desire for the future and for some kind of religion.

2. The *high moral obligations* resting upon a rational, immaterial, and immortal spirit, are clear and of boundless importance; for the real existence of the human soul is beyond all possibility of doubt; and in the acknowledgment of the great government of an infinite Creator, we are necessarily compelled to acknowledge that all elements and existences should be adapted to the claims and purity of the same, and all that is impure must be rejected from the limitless purity of God in the future world.

3. One great object of our being is to *cultivate* the powers bestowed upon us for *usefulness*, *subjecting them all* to the will and service of God. There are impressions connected

with the consciousness of every rational being, assuring him that the soul must live forever. We have power to deny this, but there is an internal voice ever arising from intuitive authority, thundering in affirmative appeals of truth, reversing all such false assumptions; and it can never be silenced by any confession or avowed faith to the reverse. 4. It is more reasonable for an atheist, skeptic, or materialist *naturally to believe* in Revelation, the immortality of the soul, and that that immortality of being may be pure and holy, than it is to reject them as false. For as Revelation is the only system claiming Divine origin on earth, should it be false, we can lose nothing by believing it, as the same and *common lot* of man will be ours in the future. But if we reject it, and in the next world it proves to be true, then we are lost forever. 5. As matter belongs to *physical* science, we now close this part of our inquiries, and refer the reader to that part of this work devoted more exclusively to the philosophy of mind, where the powers of the student can be fully tested in examining mental elements. He should study to define clearly as possible the existence and office of the various properties of mind. It will increase his confidence in the true existence of immaterial elements, the self-power of the soul to act, and of its immortality. His belief will be established as to the existence and limitless power, wisdom and goodness of the great First Cause. As standing midway the ascending and descending realities ranging two worlds, he should rejoice in try-

ing to contemplate all demonstrable truths. Though willingly employed with the majesty of facts and mysteries interwoven with infinite creations, yet duty is submission to God, as we wonder and adore, love and praise.



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.



PART I.


THE ELEMENTS OF MIND

WHICH

LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION.



"THE SOUL SHALL LIVE FOREVER."



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

DIVISION FIRST.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT.

SECTION I.

1. THE *mind* of man is truly and clearly a spiritual existent, immaterial in essence or nature, and unending in duration. 2. In the philosophy of mind there are *elements* which may be called mental elements. These elements lie at the foundation of such philosophy, are the sources of mental action, and without their existence such action is inane. 3. If *moral* feelings can exist in the mind, and if moral action can proceed from it as an entity, or from its states or motion, there must be elements of mind connected directly with the origin of moral influences, or no moral feelings could ever exist as appertaining to or as a part of self; neither could we ever be capable of moral action.

SECTION II.

1. Those powers which lie at the foundation of *moral action*, or are connected with the origin of

the moral influences of the soul, may be called *moral elements* of mind. 2. If there is neither mental nor moral elements in the mind, there can be neither *mental nor moral science*, which can be known to us as such. But mental and moral science are acknowledged to exist and to be true; hence, there must exist in the philosophy of mind both mental and moral powers, when we compare the nature of the actions which proceed from them; otherwise the idea of the power, or the existence of either mental or moral action, is absurd; for an effect to exist without a foundation or cause is utterly impossible.

CHAPTER II.

INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS.

SECTION I.

1. THERE are *various orders* of mind. Finite minds, from the lowest to the highest intelligence, are responsible to the authority of the great infinite mind and sovereign Ruler over all, to whom we should ever be wholly submissive and obedient in adoration, service, love, and praise. 2. The inferior *orders* of animated and self-acting beings possess something of the phenomena of mind. These properties, if they be only called instinct, are properties entirely dissimilar to and differing from those of matter.

SECTION II.

1. Matter has neither *conscious sensation* nor *self-motion*, but has inertness, which is essential to its nature and existence, and without which it ceases to be matter. 2. *That* which is analogous to the states and manifestations of mind in beasts, birds, and fish, if perceptible at all, may be called instinct; yet instinct alone is imperishable, from the fact that it is distinct from and is superior to matter; and we have no evidence to believe that any properties or particles of matter will ever cease to be. Hence, the

intellectual and immortal powers of the human mind are now prominently before us, and form the true objects of our inquiries.

CHAPTER III.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND
NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND.

SECTION I.

1. MIND is *immaterial in nature*, and exists in essence, or, as to elements, dissimilarly to that of matter, and has a continued being, which is independent of any essential loss or elementary destruction by temporal disease or death. 2. It is not constituted by thought, feeling, or any emotion or act, but is *that* which feels, thinks, reasons, and acts. Though we examine severally the elements or properties of mind, it can not be regarded as divisible, but is one in essence or nature, and the union of properties in its existence is forever indivisible. 3. Our knowledge of the existence of mind or of self, independently of demonstration, falls back upon *intuition*, and is knowledge, known to be true, in an unerring assurance received and fully tested by self-consciousness. If the power of knowing existing facts be not referred back to innate elements as truths or axioms, which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind; and if they be not the primary source of the knowledge of all real entities to us, all our knowledge would be inane, and all entities non-existences. 4. *These results*, which are of the oper-

ation or motion of the mind, are not the primary knowledge of its existence, else the whole mind would exist in motion, and motion can not exist where there is no power of self-action, or cause capable of moving. But the power of knowing all these acts and results falls back upon self-consciousness and intuition. 5. In matter such essences as possess solidity and extension, or that which is essential to its entity, are called primary properties. But contact with a smell or odor awakens a *conviction* in the mind that there is somewhere an unknown cause of this known sensation. This, with color, temperature, and taste, have been styled secondary properties of matter. Yet these are only the effects or results, as proof of primary elements. 6. If a *knowledge* of mind, as an entity, is wholly and only known by *its motion*, then any knowledge of it is an accident; for motion or action may or may not exist. 7. Any speculations as to the *cause* of mind are far beyond philosophical inquiries. It is not the cause of its own existence, neither can entity be a result of non-existence. 8. The *nature* or *essence* of mind is *unknown* to us. We know nothing of the essence of either matter or mind; yet we are certain of the reality of that mysterious principle within us, which is a permanent existent of various phenomena or properties.

SECTION II.

1. Philosophers generally agree with Mr. Stewart, that "we are not *immediately conscious* of mind's

existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills." To what extent we are immediately conscious of its existence, anterior to the mind's operations, is difficult to define with words. But to say that the power of self-consciousness can extend no further back, in any way, than the consciousness of sensation, thought, and volition, and they admitted to be mere operations of mind, is absurd. Operations of mind are no more than the original power or primary elements in motion. It is impossible for those operations, which are only sequences or results, to derive no power from the primary cause and supporter of such operations; otherwise the operations or acts of the mind would be the only primary principle or elements of its being. Then, whenever the mind was wholly inactive it would be annihilated, or, at least, we could have no certain knowledge of self, as the mere operations of mind may or may not exist; but if they can "imply something which feels, thinks, and wills," they imply a power which is capable of being the origin of the conscious knowledge of all the acts of the mind; otherwise an effect must be the origin of the cause itself. 2. *Axioms*, in numerical science, may, in some respects, represent axioms in the philosophy of mind. The whole of mathematical demonstrations or calculations can not be known to us as certainly true or false, were it not for the fact that they are based upon self-evident facts or truths

called axioms. We are compelled to admit that things which are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. If equals be added to equals the wholes are equal. All right-angles are equal to one another. A square block is a square block. Two added to two make four. We know all these to be truths or facts; but it is an absolute impossibility for us, by any process of reasoning or demonstration, to prove them to be either true or false. And without axioms there can be neither mathematical demonstrations nor science. 3. How can we *know* such truths to be self-evident facts? No power can receive them as facts, independently of all proof, but the intuitive, self-evident axioms which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind. The innate principles of the soul form the final and conclusive source of appeals, and are the primary test of the knowledge of facts to us. 4. Why may not these self-evident facts, or axioms of the mind, have *knowledge* of their own existence? The origin of the power of knowledge must exist in and arise from the innate elements of mind; otherwise an effect must be the primary or antecedent cause of itself.

CHAPTER IV.

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. OUR inquiries as to the phenomena of mind are more properly confined to *properties* or *elements*. The origin and nature or essence of mind is beyond the limits of philosophical demonstrations. There is not so much mystery connected with the examination of the elements of mind. 2. The mind is capable of a *threefold division*. (1.) Those which are clearly *mental* elements. (2.) Those which may be called *moral* elements of mind. (3.) The *manifestations* or acts of mind. Mental elements are connected with all *mental acts*, and without their existence mental motion or action can not exist. They are the foundation or origin properly of such action or character of action. *Moral* elements of mind are connected with the origin of all moral action, and without such for a foundation no moral action can exist. 3. The *operations* or acts of the mind have hitherto been regarded as involving, (1.) Our *duties to God*. (2.) The duties we owe to *ourselves*. (3.) Our duties to *one another*. All these have been claimed as the principal embodiment of moral philosophy.

SECTION II.

1. To every philosopher it is clear that the present *order* of works on mental and moral science is incorrect; for the natural character of the elements of mind, according to the books, without any sufficiently clear distinction, has been lost sight of from the fact that they have been called only mental elements. No separate work has been arranged exclusively upon mental action, further than is found in connection with the examination of the mental elements; while, on the other hand, the action of the mind has been, by common consent, called moral action, connected with moral duties as contained in moral philosophy. But we should bear in mind that there are elements of mind which may be called moral elements, growing out of their relation to, and influence or position in, the mind. 2. The mind, so regularly and naturally arranged, contains within itself *immediate power to know* and to extend knowledge by examining elements, laws, and affinities of existences. This is the comparison of phenomena, and the discovery of their agreement and disagreement. Though we can not arrive at the nature of the essence of mind, yet we are certain of something existing within, exhibiting a permanent subject of certain varying phenomena, of which we are conscious, and to doubt it would be impossible.

CHAPTER V.

SENSATION.

SECTION I.

1. SENSATION is the mind's reception of an action *felt* and *known* to exist, or is an impression made upon it. The senses form the medium through which such an effect is realized. In another point of light it may be regarded as a simple state of the mind, in a peculiar way, and connected with action. Abstractly it is incapable of self-action, and must be, to a certain extent, a result of some influence or impingement, which may arise in different ways. 2. It may be *connected* with the *change* or influence of some one or more of the organs of sense, or in being closely accessory to the change of the physical powers. A change in the internal state and condition of the body may awaken the sensation of fatigue, pain, or heaviness. 3. Sensation can not *be separated* from the mind. All sensation is in the mind, and is nothing more nor less than the mind itself in a certain state. Our sensations are diversified and are almost innumerable. The body has parts, and can exist with the loss of some of its members; but the mind and sensation are forever indivisible.

SECTION II.

1. In another shade of meaning sensation is *feeling awakened* by objects of the external world. The knowledge it gives of external objects is quite imperfect. It requires a combined action of several faculties in conveying to us a general idea of real existences. The various senses, acting separately, can give us no correct idea of existences, nor of the properties of compounds. Sensation can convey to us a result of a known or unknown existence; but of itself can not give us a knowledge of either the essence or properties of existences. 2. Sensation may be a *state of internal feelings*, capable of being excited by spiritual influences, or by sensations of humility and awe in the presence of the great God. It can be realized in the bare remembrance of startling events in the past. 3. In receiving impressions from external objects, we are to bear in mind that our sensations are not the *appearance* or *images* of those entities, for the true place of sensation is in the mind. No external property can form any part of sensation, neither can it be added. 4. The connection between *sensation* and the *physical organs* is involved in mystery. External objects make an impression or they affect the physical organs, and through the medium of the senses awake sensations in the mind. To explain the change effected in those organs, or to define their connection with the senses, is impossible. 5. As sensation is in the mind, and is the mind, in a certain way,

we are compelled to acknowledge its *connection with the primary* elements; for sensation can not exist only in connection with the existence of mind.

CHAPTER VI.

SENSE.

SECTION I.

1. SENSE, as connected with the human mind, is that principle or faculty which has power to *apprehend* the existence, and, to some extent, the qualities of external objects. 2. It appears to hold a midway relation between the existence and change of the *physical organs* and the existence of real *sensation*. 3. In this position only it is *immediately succeeded* by sensation, being the medium through which impressions from external objects wake up the power of sensation in the mind.

SECTION II.

1. Sense, at least, *apprehends* some of the qualities of the substances which cause sensations, such as possess hardness, extension, and weight, which comes in contact with physical organs. 2. Its simple state is *spontaneous*, and its action may be wholly voluntary, as well as a result of either voluntary or invoked causes. 3. It may be regarded as the *perception* of the senses, or is that influence or motion immediately successive to impressions made upon physical organs toward the reality of that which is felt ere sensation

refers it to the consideration of the mind. 4. It may, in another point of light, be regarded as *the discernment* of the senses, which takes place on contact with an object, and in relation to the real existence of such object, almost at the same time the beginning of the impression thus made is realized.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SENSES.

SECTION I.

1. THE senses connect, in one respect, the *sensations* of the mind with the *organs of sense* in the body, and have power to report to us the existence of external things when they come in contact with the physical organs, and can convey a knowledge of their properties in connection with the action of other powers of the mind. 2. The *connection* existing between the senses and the organs of sense in the body can not be defined. 3. We are *wholly dependent* upon our senses as the medium through which we have knowledge of external things. While they apprehend external things, and are a source of knowledge, as to their real existence, yet we have other sources of knowledge; otherwise the senses would be the embodiment of all the faculties of the mind.

SECTION II.

1. We are dependent upon the senses only so far as relates to existences in the *external world*, as the primary medium of access in knowing their existence to be real. Abstractly, we can not call the senses the knowledge of external things. They are only

the knowledge of external things in connection with other powers of the mind. 2. The *importance* of the senses as a source of knowledge in regard to external objects is *indispensable*. If we were deprived of smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight, it would be utterly impossible for us to know any thing of external physical existences. 3. Yet the *loss of all these* could not annihilate the mind, neither could they deprive it of sensations within itself, nor from other spiritual influences or existences. 4. We are now about to enter upon the order of the *five senses*. In examining them as they occur in their order, it is not intended that we should define their power, as they exist in the mind, disconnected with the physical organs, but to define, as far as possible, their office and power in their mysterious connection with the organs of the body.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SENSE OF SMELL.

SECTION I.

1. THE *organ of smell* is said to consist in the extension of nerves to every part of the delicate mucous membrane, with which the cavities of the nostrils are lined. These are connected to the sinews, and extend up to the brain. So that by real physical entities, the organ of smell is delicately and sensitively connected with the brain, which is regarded as the organ of the mind. 2. The sense of smell is clearly *connected* with the *nerves*, and can not be separated from them only in the destruction of the physical organs; then that faculty may remain inactive, so far as it relates to the power of apprehending external objects. 3. The *substance* of the nerves contains precisely the same properties as that of the brain. That part of any nerve which has been severed by disease or violence, loses all sensation, and is doomed to perish. If all the nerves of the system are sensorial, and are connected in some way with the brain, then all physical organs of sense are connected with the brain. And the senses are inseparably connected with the nervous system. 4. The *nasal nerves*, or organ of sense, may be

affected by the odor of a rose, and simultaneously is, or exists, the sense of smell. The nerves and the sense of smell are not one and the same; yet to define the connection is impossible. Sensation is immediately successive to the sense of smell, and conveys to the mind the impression of external objects, apprehended by the organ of sense.

SECTION II.

1. The *sensations* of smell are received by means of the organ, which is the mind's primary, yet the remote test in apprehending the existence of external things. 2. The nature and elements of *that* which affects the organ may *elude our knowledge*, as to a correct understanding of the manner of the operation; yet there is a state of mind produced by it, varying, in a great measure, voluntarily with the nature and elements of that which produced the impression. This peculiar mental affection is invariably successive to the organic change. And the nature of the connection blending the two in one action is beyond all explanation. 3. We can not *classify*, but to a limited extent, the sensations received by the sense of smell, for they are numerous and diversified. We may use such terms as sweet, sour, and musty; but as a general rule, they are classed, being distinguished by their connection with the object which causes the sensation, as the smell of a peach or an apple. The sensations received through the organ of smell are naturally pleasant or

disagreeable. Some of the objects which produce them throw off an effluvia which is delightfully exhilarating, and others produce death. 4. The sensation of smell, through the means of the organ, has an *important influence* upon life and health. It aids in the right use of medicines, detecting the harmless from the poisonous. It detects poisonous odors emitted from objects, or destructive vapors in the air. It aids in the selection of the right kind of food, as well as to impart to us a knowledge of thousands of sweet odors wafted upon the winds of heaven. 5. It is the *properties of external* bodies which produce these sensations. Odoriferous effluvia, or small particles, are emitted from certain substances, and are diffused through the atmosphere. The air drawn through the nostrils is impregnated with these particles, and brings them in contact with the organ of the sense of smell.

SECTION III.

1. The "*perceptions of smell*" are not in distinction from sensation; for perceptions of smell can not exist. Smell, within and of itself, is incapable of perception. We can have perceptions of *that* which is the object of smell, and we may have certain perceptions of or in relation to the condition and existence of the organ or sense within or of themselves, but not as many writers define perceptions of smell. 2. The argument must differ from former writers; for there can be no sense of smell

till that organ has been *affected*. The action, then, which is sensation, conveys the impression to the mind. Till that action reaches the mind, there can be no perception. If we can have perception of smell, then perception must precede sensation, which is impossible. There can be no smell, known to us as such, till the organ is affected. Then if perception precedes sensation, it must act without direction to any definite object. Sensation within itself is not the perception of itself, or of the cause of its own action. 3. We can have perceptions of *objects* which are the cause of the action of the sense of smell, and these perceptions are in distinction from sensation.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SENSE OF TASTE.

SECTION I.

1. THE *organs of taste* consist of nervous papillæ, covering the surface of the tongue, and particularly that of the apex and sides. It exists also in the mucous membrane, which lines the palate and cavity of the mouth. The entrance of the alimentary canal is so guarded that the suitableness of every thing which enters into the stomach is fully tested by the organ of taste. 2. The sense of taste *is realized* when the organ comes in contact with substances of different natures or qualities of properties. These effect a change in the organ, which is immediately followed by a corresponding influence of mind. 3. To the sense of taste is connected *the sensations* of taste, conveying to the mind, to some extent, something of a corresponding impression arising from the qualities of properties, or from the nature of the external motive cause. 4. If any faculty or faculties have power to convey to the mind any thing of the qualities or nature of objects causing sensation, why may not *sense* and *sensation influence* the mind in regard to the cause of sensations, and favorably to apprehending the qualities of the same? for they are by nature adapted, as the inlet of the mind, to the real-

ity of such existences, and are designed to be more closely connected with such objects than any other faculty or power. 5. The doctrine that *sense* and *sensation*, which are more nearly and more closely connected with the causes which affect them than any other power, can not influence the mind favorably to the qualities and nature of such causes, is too absurd to require refuting arguments, and especially so, when all ever said to the reverse consists wholly in assumptions. 6. The nature of the sensations of taste are *known*, and are items of experience. The mind having been impressed by sensation, the affections are immediately moved in search of some cause.

SECTION II.

1. The *modifications of taste* consist in its power to change, or inclination of the organ to adapt itself, or to be adapted to the nature of the various qualities of sapid objects. There is hardly any quality of objects of taste so disagreeable but that use can make them to be endured, and, perhaps, finally agreeable. And on the other hand the pleasurable may lose its agreeableness by continued use. 2. The properties of bodies which give rise to the sensation of taste are called *effluvia* or *flavors*. The nature of the essence of these flavors is unknown to us; yet we know that such flavors exist. 3. Immediately upon the sensations of taste a state of mind ensues which *refers them* to the external cause, and, in part, correspondingly to the peculiar quality of some sapid object; like unto those which are acrid, sweet, or bitter.

CHAPTER X.

THE SENSE OF HEARING.

SECTION I.

1. THE ear is the *organ of sound* or of hearing, with location convenient and wisely arranged. Its projection forms an external koilon, suitable to the gathering of every pulsation of air wafted from every direction. The internal cavity consists of circular winding passages. These are partitioned or divided by the tympanum, which is a delicate membrane, called the drum of the ear, and has a nerve delicately and beautifully spread out upon its internal surface. This is called the auditory nerve, connected to the brain. 2. The sense of hearing consists in the *power* or *influence* which is principally and mysteriously connected with the union of the tympanum and the auditory nerve. This is affected by the action of the atmosphere. The undulations, waves, or pulsations of the air move upon or impress the tympanum. 3. The sensations of hearing are *realized* when the vibrations of agitated air are transmitted through the labyrinth, impressing the transparent membrane or drum, affecting the auditory nerve connected with the brain. The sensation is almost simultaneously conveyed from the organ, when

affected, to the mind, which is followed by a new state, in which we have perception, and an inquiry as to the external cause.

SECTION II.

1. The *varieties* of the sensation of sound are almost innumerable. It has been said that the ear is capable of detecting about five hundred variations of tone, and as many variations in strength. We are informed that when these are combined they number about twenty thousand, varying in simple sounds, degrees of strength, and difference of tone. Many human voices may sound the tone represented by three in the octave or stave, and each one will differ from all the rest, though sounding the same tone. Fifty different instruments may sound the same note and the ear be capable to distinguish a difference in all of them. A difference can be detected which may arise from light or heavy atmosphere, the good or bad repair of the same instrument; also of the voice in sickness contrasted with the same in health, and pleasant with an angry mode, or age with youth. 2. The cause of these sensations is *remotely* in the *object* or agent which produces the vibratory state of the atmosphere, as the air has not irregular self-motion. A sonorous body, when struck, agitates the atmosphere around it; this agitation recedes from it in all directions in wave-like undulations, resembling concentric encircling waves on the surface of water at rest when ruptured by a

falling stone. Yet the air in motion may be regarded as the *operative* and *impressing* cause of the sensations of hearing. 3. The knowledge which simple sounds convey to the mind is *not intuitive*. The power of sensations of sound belongs to intuition; but the knowledge we receive of the existence and properties of external objects, as a sequence of impressions made by sensations, is aided by other faculties in connection with experience. The new state of mind consequent upon the action of these sensations, is that in which we have perceptions and full knowledge of the existing cause. 4. We can not tell the direction of sound, neither the distance from us, nor the qualities of the cause *wholly unaided* by other faculties and experience. But in gaining a knowledge of the direction, distance, and existence of the cause, we can and must depend, to a considerable extent, upon the sense of hearing, more than experience.

SECTION III.

1. To have *knowledge of sound* it is indispensable that we be in the direction and under the influence of the waves of air as they strike the ear. The natural course and motion of sound is always from the cause. There can be no sound without a motion of the air, and motion recedes from the cause. If we depend upon experience for direction and location, we can arrive at them amid high and strong winds as though all were calm. But this is absurd. 2. We

gain our knowledge of location principally from the *direction of the motion* of the undulations or pulsations of air which strike the ear, producing a corresponding sensation; also of distance by the peculiar modifications of strength or force of such pulsations; for if there be nothing in the sensation corresponding or agreeing in any way with the properties or nature of the cause, then it follows that the mind, in trying to determine the true cause by perception, acts without a guide, and the result is wholly accidental; for no faculty is calculated by nature, or has more power to give correct direction to the perception of cause than sense or sensation affected or created by it.

3. Further proof that we are in a degree dependent upon the peculiar manner and way in which sound strikes the ear in *determining the cause* and its *location*, is found in the fact that when we have a confused idea of the direction of sound we intuitively turn the head in different directions to get the direction of the waves of air on the tympanum, in order to know the true direction of the cause, and from the peculiar modulations and force of the sound thus conveyed we judge of the distance to the object.

4. The sense of hearing is of *great importance*. By it we are made acquainted with the music of nature, the melody in the discordant sounds of instruments and of the living voice. Music has charms which are exhilarating and soothing. Verbal language is wholly dependent upon this sense. Articulated sounds or speech in the reciprocal expression of feelings, fears,

and hopes, forms one of the principal mediums and sources of human happiness. For such inestimable gifts praise should ever redound to the great Creator.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

SECTION I.

1. THE *organ of touch* may be said to be blended with and exists in the muscles or papillæ, extending over the whole surface of the body. The hands and fingers have been regarded as the principal organ of touch; but it is not clear that there is naturally much more minute delicacy or acute sensations in the tendons, fibers, nerves, muscles, or skin of the hands and fingers, than exists internally and over the entire surface of the body. Very much depends upon the frequent use of the hands and the concentration of faculties to their use in realizing sensations. 2. The sense of touch is far *more extensive* than the other senses we have just examined; for in one sense it includes them all in itself, possessing the surface of the whole physical frame; yet a distinction can be made and does naturally exist in the senses. 3. It is not the *essence of properties* which compose the nervous system; but is that power or influence of the mind mysteriously and inseparably connected with the tendons, fibers, nerves, and muscles, extending its connection with them to the very apex of the papillæ spread over the surface of the body. Here it comes in contact with and realizes the existence of external objects. 4. The sensations of touch constitute *that*

which conveys to the mind impressions of objects which affect the physical organs. Consequent upon these sensations is a new state of mind which has perceptions of the cause. But to define the mysterious union of the power of sensations of touch with the physical organ, or nerves, is utterly impossible.

SECTION II.

1. The *extent and variations* of the sensations of touch differ from those senses we have noticed. By the sense of smell we acquire a knowledge of the effluvia or odors of external objects. By the tongue and palate we gain a knowledge of tastes; and by the ear we hear sounds. The knowledge gained by these senses is restricted to the single medium of appropriate operation peculiar to each one. But by the sense of touch we acquire knowledge of various objects and of different qualities, such as solidity, softness, hardness, roughness, and smoothness, and such as heat, cold, extension, and form. 2. The *influence of the qualities* of external bodies upon the mind, through the medium of the sense of touch, may and does, to some extent, impart a knowledge of those properties corresponding to the peculiar nature of their existence. This can be tested by contact with hardness, extension, and form, solidity, softness, roughness, smoothness, and motion. 3. Whether these properties be of primary or of secondary knowledge, in whole or in part, does not prevent them from producing, when brought in contact with the sense of touch, an *inter-*

nal sensation or feeling corresponding, to some extent, with the peculiar condition, state, or nature of the cause. 4. Knowledge in the mind, which arises from these sources, can not be perfect, received only through the medium of *any one of the senses* without the aid of other faculties. All sensations are in the mind; and the idea that they have no power, when produced by external objects, to influence the mind in any way or to any degree, as to the nature or properties of the affecting cause, is contrary to true analysis and our conceptions of truth. 5. Connected with the sense and sensation of touch is the origin of our knowledge of the *temperature* of bodies. When heat and cold affect the organs of the sense of touch, the sensation may be capable of a corresponding action in the peculiar state, nature, or modulations within itself. And with the nature of its action upon the mind is the origin of the idea of the qualities causing action; for without the medium of the sense of touch we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 6. The sensation is *not* within itself the *idea* or the *knowledge* of the existence of heat or cold; but connected with the sensation is the origin of the idea of such existences; for if the origin of such ideas be not connected with the sense of touch, then we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold.

SECTION III.

1. A sentient being may know that heat and cold *do exist*, but as to the qualities of realities which are

called heat and cold we know nothing. There is a difference between a sensation and an idea. A sensation may be immediately antecedent to an idea, and we may form an idea of the cause of a sensation after the sensation is gone; yet the origin of the idea may be connected with sensation, though that idea or notion may be matured after it is gone. 2. That the *origin* of the idea of external qualities which affect the sense of touch, is *connected* with the sensation of touch, has been acknowledged by all the leading philosophers of past time; but many of them contradict their assumed premises in the conclusion of their own arguments, by denying the origin of our knowledge of any external substance as being connected in any way with the sensation of touch. They have fallen into this error by trying to keep up a logical distinction between the elements of mind, severing the affinity of their united being by wild, abstract analysis. 3. This sense can not, within itself, convey to us a *matured knowledge* of external existences; yet the sensations may be affected by the qualities of their cause, sending them, with various modulations, to the mind, and varying in degrees of strength. How far these can impress the mind in regard to the qualities of causes we can not tell; but connected with the sensations of touch is the origin of our knowledge of the cause of such sensations.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SENSE OF SIGHT.

SECTION I.

1. THE eye is the *organ* of the sense of sight. Its location is wisely arranged for convenience and usefulness, and where it can be most readily defended from harm or danger. It consists of transparent substances. The humors are of various refractive powers. They are called the aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous humors. The first refraction of the rays of light takes place when they fall upon the convexed surface of the cornea of the eye. This exterior surface receives the rays of light and transmits them to the aqueous humor. This transparent fluid exists between the cornea and the crystalline humor. The pupil is the center of the iris, and is the avenue to admit, and is for the transmission of the rays of light passing from the aqueous humor to the crystalline lens. It is maintained that here they are re-refracted and transmitted to the retina, which is surrounded by the vitreous humor. 2. The *retina* is a delicate membrane, which lies at the bottom of the eye, and contains upon it the expansion of the sensitive optic nerve. Rays of light affect the sense of vision while passing through the eye, and are un-

dergoing several refractions; but they produce upon the retina or optic nerve the true image of the object which reflects the light. This sensitive organ receives the image of the external object impressed upon it, and this impression is the origin of vision. The primary power of vision is connected with the optic nerve, and connected with it is the origin of the sensations of sight which report to the mind. 3. The *importance* of the sense of sight to our happiness and knowledge is self-evident. We can not fully estimate the true value without supposing ourselves to have been always deprived of it. Yet in that case we could depend upon others; therefore we must try to imagine the condition of the whole world without the power of vision. One glance of vision can survey hill and valley, mountain and lake, the verdant plain and rock-bound coast, flying clouds and rolling seas. In an instant of time it traverses a great variety in terrestrial existences—matches the flight of the vast globe, then ranges amid the revolving orbs of the planetary universe. But in the absence of vision these might exist and move, yet all would be night.

SECTION II.

1. The *mysterious* arrangement of the internal structure of the eye, in adapting it to the effects produced by it, displays a design, skill, and wisdom infinitely above the power of atheistic arguments; for it is conclusive evidence of an omnipotent Creator, who fashioned it according to his infinite wisdom. The

rays of light are refracted to a proper point by the different coats and humors. The muscular tendons command the action of the ball in turning the pupil to the desired object. A circular, prominent, and strong orbit is set for its defense. It is protected by lids, lashes, and glands, secreting tears which promote its lubricity, supplying moisture, and, after washing the eye, the fluid passes through the outlet into the nose. This exquisite, mysterious, and successful arrangement can not be a result of accident or chance.

2. The sense of sight must be *connected* with the retina or optic nerve. It is not the nerve within itself, neither is it the object of vision; but its origin is with the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. 3. When we consider the *acute sensitiveness* of this nerve, if rays of light reflected from objects paint or impress it with the images of such objects in order to be seen, may they not, in part, be felt by the optic nerve when seen? 4. The sensations of sight are *awakened* when rays of light from the object affect the retina or optic nerve. These sensations impress the mind. A state of mind ensues in which we have perception of the cause of such sensations. 5. What modern philosophers mean by "*the perceptions of sight*" we can not understand. If they mean that sight has perception of objects within and of itself, we beg leave to differ, as that would be utterly impossible. And if they mean that we can have perception of the origin of sight, by which we see an object, then sight would be a sequence of perception, and dependent upon it

for existence, which is not true. Therefore, there can be no perceptions of sight, but we can have perceptions of the objects of sight.

SECTION III.

1. *Colors* have been regarded as the principal cause of the sensations of sight. But as to how they are produced, or as to where they have their origin, is left in obscurity. They may arise partly in the essence or qualities of objects seen, as well as from the various refracted rays of light reflected from those objects, and which fall on the power of vision. Some bodies, and even some properties, possess power to reflect rays more abundantly than others. That light within and of itself consists of rays of different colors, unaffected by contact with other existences, is very doubtful. Light passing through a glass prism presents different colors; why can we not have the same result when it passes through prisms of other transparent substances? 2. We find, to some extent, that colors vary with the essence and qualities of the objects *refracting* and *reflecting* the rays of light. They may possess naturally a difference within themselves, but if so we have no knowledge of the fact. It is more reasonable to believe that color arises from the nature of the objects which reflect the light to the eye, or results from a modification of the principles of attraction, adhesion, density, or repulsion of such objects. 3. It is *light* reflected from external objects which affects the fibrous expansion of the sensitive optic

nerve, and awakens sensations which extend to and impress the mind of the existing action of the reflected light, together with the images of the objects which cause such sensations. The modulations or change imparted to the rays of light by the objects which reflect and refract them is carried by them to the sense of sight, and a corresponding sensation extends to the mind. This is reasonable, unless we deny that sensations are capable of change or modulations.

SECTION IV.

1. We have power to *modify* or *change* the rays of light which come from visual objects by intervening transparent substances, and correspondingly our notions of those objects. Though light is the primary object of sight, yet, in order to see external things, there must be objects from which it is reflected, and the change and modulations of the reflected rays carrying with them the image of such objects to the power of vision, or the eye of coats, humors, and retina, or optic nerve. To define the precise office, nature, and powers of any or of all these is beyond human wisdom or philosophical analysis. 2. The *knowledge* we receive through the sense of sight, can be affected by graduated rays of light and shade coming from an innumerable variety of objects and qualities. At once we see the relative position of bodies, with their magnitude, figure, distance, and color, aided by perception, suggestion, association, and experience. To say that the sense of sight, within itself, has power to im-

part to us a full knowledge of visual objects is absurd. And to say that within itself it has no power to aid in arriving at a knowledge of such objects is false; for our knowledge of visual objects, as such, has its origin with the sensations of sight. 3. Our knowledge of color is derived from the sense of sight, and the origin of this knowledge is original with the power of vision. No one of the other senses can be involved in the primary detection of color. Color may be a property inherent in light, consisting in a difference or condition in the rays of light and shades, refracted and reflected, or are so changed, which is a result from contact with the bodies the appearance of which they present or impress upon the optic nerve. If white is not to be called a color, it may be regarded as the primary quality from which colors gradate, as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. These are imparted to the mind by the sensations of sight only.

SECTION V.

1. The idea of *extension* as visual is not wholly original from sight, but is dependent upon it for self-correctness. Light is the primary object of vision, but is not the only object of vision. The modulations and inherent nature of its refracted and reflected rays present the appearance of objects to the sense of sight. If the power of vision extends no further than the retina of the eye, and that vision consists in the first contact of light with it, then when the image of an object was impressed upon the optic

nerve, it would continue to be seen, though the object should be intercepted with a cloud or darkness. 2. If a solid body can present to the eye *nothing* but *colors* and *light*, will that prove that there is no connection existing in any way between those colors and light, and the object which causes them to fall on the power of vision? We can see the effect of a strong wind, but we can not see the element itself. But it is different with a solid body; it is the cause of a peculiar light and color as the effect upon the eye; these are continuously supported there by the object; hence, the light and color either see for us the cause which continues their stay, or the eye can see, first, the primary objects, light and color, and, secondly, by means of these the real objects. If the optic nerve has power to feel the action of the rays of light and the image impressed upon it, may it not have power by means of them to feel the object which causes their action upon the nerve, and continues it as long as the eye is directed to such objects? 3. Our *knowledge* of objects, through the sense of sight *only*, is limited and confused. It has been ascertained by removing the cataract from the eyes of adult persons, that at first visual objects appeared to be touching the eye; and it requires the aid of some of the other senses, and of the action of the mind, to correct these appearances. But as all our senses and faculties are improved by action or use, so is sight, and it tends to correct itself in regard to visual objects.

SECTION VI.

1. If the sense of sight has *no power*, in any way, or to any degree, of receiving visible extension, length, and breadth, we can not tell how we are to judge of the real size of objects, as we can do but very little in association and in comparing distant objects by the sense of touch only. 2. In judging of the *magnitude of visual objects*, we are much influenced by the peculiar nature and way the modulations of light strike the organ of sight, and in comparing such objects with other objects, the size of which is known. Objects, in a murky atmosphere, often appear larger and nearer than they would in clear air. This may be caused by their dim appearance, and the refraction of the rays of light passing through a denser atmosphere. The sun and moon appear larger in the horizon than they do in the zenith. The principal cause of this is, that the rays of light coming from them strike the atmosphere obliquely, and the oblique portion of the atmosphere, which refracts the rays, occupies an enlarged space in the field of vision and subtends a greater angle at the eye. The refraction makes the appearance of the sun and moon greater than they really are, and this difference increases in proportion as the rays pass parallel with the earth's surface in the denser part of the air. 3. The *purer* the atmosphere the more accurate is our estimation of the distance to objects. And an object upon a smooth plain or a ship at sea, where there are

no intermediate objects, always appear to be nearer to us than they really are. 4. Our perceptions of distance, through the medium of sight, are principally *acquired*. 5. Though the *above position* is correct, yet we find, by correct analysis, that the primary power of our perception of visual objects and of distance is original or intuitive. Take a child, before it can reason, place a candle near its face, and its hand will be but partially extended in order to grasp it. But turn its face to the moon or some distant object, and intuitively the arm will be extended at full length.

CHAPTER XIII.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF
KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I.

1. THE senses may be regarded as a *secondary source* of knowledge, when compared with knowledge direct, or imparted to the mind or spirit as the result of the mind's own internal action, or is received by a superhuman spiritual influence without the medium of physical organs. 2. If matter has no *self-power* to impress or move material entities, only when connected with spirit, then it follows that self-motion belongs to spirit, and that spirit can impress or move spirit independently of material organs. Therefore, the internal feelings, influences, and impressions, imparted by the Infinite Spirit to the mind, may be regarded as knowledge direct, or that which comes to us independently of any feeble, diseased, and perishable material organs, which, from their nature and condition, are liable to deceive us. Then that which we experience from imperishable sources is not only knowledge direct, but are primary sources of knowledge, and worthy of far more confidence and belief than any fact or knowledge received through the medium of the senses, connected with diseased,

deceptions, and perishing physical organs. 3. According to the preceding argument the senses may be regarded as a *secondary source* of knowledge. And the order of this world is to rely upon the senses in testing the reality and nature of external things with the highest degree of confidence or belief, while knowledge direct to the mind is often disregarded and rejected as worthless. 4. The senses can not, in connection or abstractly, give us *a perfect* knowledge of external things; otherwise each power of the senses would be a perfect mind within itself. But they are limited in conveying a knowledge of external objects, which, however, is perfected when brought under the inspection of the mind. The deception exists wholly in the nature and condition of the physical organs.

SECTION II.

1. Spirit being imperishable, is incapable of *disease* destroying its action or of *decay*; but the physical organs are subject to be enfeebled or rendered inactive by disease, or may be entirely destroyed. While under the influence of disease we can not depend upon them with much certainty. The correctness of their reports is accidental, and the mind often has great difficulty in correcting wrong impressions made by them. 2. Our reliance upon the senses, and our power to believe in the correctness of their reports, does not arise in the *existence* and *nature* of the senses, but has its origin in connection with an *internal conviction* or consciousness that what they

report is true. But as no one is disposed to doubt the testimony of the senses when they are free from the power of disease, we will not spend time in proving the necessity of greater confidence in them.

3. The skeptic professes the most *positive belief* in the existence and nature of facts tested by the senses, while he rejects internal convictions and moral demonstrations. A correct knowledge of external facts reported to the mind depends upon intuitive power. We can have no knowledge of external facts, as such, but for the presence of intuition, to which all facts may be referred in order to be fully known and the mind satisfied. If internal affirmations and convictions of truth are to be wholly rejected, then it is utterly impossible to have knowledge of any existent in the external world.

DIVISION SECOND.



CHAPTER I.

PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. PERCEPTION is that faculty of the mind which has power of *perceiving internal and external* changes and existences; and in action has power of perceiving and of receiving a knowledge of external objects by means of the impressions they make on the senses, or it leads to the full action of the mind in arriving at a knowledge of real existences. 2. Sensation and *perception* are regarded as the properties of mind, by which we arrive at a knowledge of external things. Sensation refers to the physical organs and their mysterious union with the immaterial sensibilities, and perception refers to the power and action of mental influences and elements. Perception has been regarded as an association formed between the impressions made upon the organs of the senses and the external substances which are the cause of such impressions. But the acting power of this association is connected with the primary elements of mind. 3. Perception is immediately successive to the action of sensation, or arises with the new state of mind

which follows the impressions made by sensations. Sensation within itself can have no perception of its own existence, nor of the cause of such an existence; but impressions made through the medium of sensation are followed by a peculiar state of mind, in which we have immediate perception of the affecting cause. 4. Whether perception is a *sequent* of impressions conveyed by sensations to the brain we know not. The inlets of the mind, for comprehending external things, appear to be mysteriously connected with the entire nervous system. The nerves are connected with the brain, and thence receive their influence. But this great medium may not require sensations to go from the extremities to the brain before there can be any action of perception. The mind may have power to perceive the affecting cause upon its action on the organs of senses; but to determine the precise mode of operation is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. Perception may be regarded as a *voluntary act* of the mind. That aggressive influence or power which strikes out in maturing a knowledge of external objects, requires an effort in order to a full degree of perception which can be retained. 2. Sensation is not *necessarily* followed by perception. We may be employed in thought or in conversation, while a numerous variety of objects pass through the field of vision and none of them be retained in the mind. This results from a want of the perception of those

objects. We may have experienced the sensations, but no effort was made in retaining the impressions of them; for the mind must attend to what is passing in order to a real perception of external objects.

3. To a limited extent perception may be regarded as *involuntary*. We may open our eyes upon a beautiful forest; the first tree seen may claim our attention till we suddenly turn away; yet we may have faint perceptions of other trees which are still retained in the mind, and were not voluntary objects of either sight or perception. If we cast our eyes upon a canvas of pictures and fix our mind upon one of them, so that all the rest are almost as though they did not exist, yet they are unintentionally seen, and our perception of them is involuntary. In leaving our room in eager quest of some object, we pass two men in descending the stairway, one small and the other large—the perception of the difference in their size is wholly involuntary. 4. But *voluntary* perception involves an act of the mind in attending to the cause of sensations; and connected with this act or action is our perception of external substances and qualities.

SECTION III.

1. Perception makes us acquainted with *external* things, and has its origin in a peculiar mental state, in which the influence or action refers to internal affections of the mind, and also to external causation. It carries the mind out of or beyond the

existence of self, and introduces us to the external world. It has power to cause external things to pass in review. Perception is not the only medium through which we are made acquainted with external things. Our knowledge of them commences with sensation, and sensation is a sequence of the impingement or of contact with external things; and perception following sensation fully presents to the inspection of the mind the cause. 2. Our *perception* of primary properties of matter differs from that of *sensation*. Primary properties are essential to the existence of all material substances, and are known to be such as solidity, extension, figure, and density, with divisibility. These qualities belong to all real material bodies; but as to their essence we know nothing. 3. Sensation is a *result of contact*, in some way, with external substances, and implies their existence as the cause of such influences. Perception *refers* or *leads* the mind to a knowledge of the cause of a known sensation. 4. We have perception of the *difference* between *primary* and *secondary* properties of matter. The latter are such as hardness, softness, roughness, and smoothness, smell, taste, heat, cold, sound, and color. These may cause certain effects in the mind, or awaken sensations which are immediately followed by perception, bringing the affecting cause under mental inspection.

CHAPTER II.

FALSE PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. FALSE perceptions take place when there are no external *objects corresponding* with, and which are the cause of them. When there are no external causes, we are left to conclude that false perceptions exist within ourselves, and in the mistake which the mind makes of its own perceptions. 2. False perceptions can arise *first* in the *organs* of sense. They can be affected in various ways, and the succeeding sensations are followed by perception, as to the act of the mind, when there are no external substances as cause of such sensations, or as objects of perception. These organs can be changed or affected so as to produce the appearance of realities by disease or by excitement, fear, or grief. And they change within themselves, affected by age. 3. Again: false perceptions may exist in connection with the *changes* in mental *states*. The mind is capable of an internal error or delusion in believing in the existence of objects as real when they are not. It can be deceived in its own conceptions of real existences. 4. *False* perceptions, which arise in connection with the organs of sense, are caused generally by bodily disorders. These per-

ceptions may be corrected, as we shall notice in the order of the following section.

SECTION II.

1. By the *concentrated action* of the mind, as affected through the medium of the other senses. Corresponding sensations, resulting from affecting causes upon the organs of sense, contribute, in their united appeals to the mind, toward correcting false perceptions. 2. False perceptions can be corrected by *comparing* our perceptions of objects we suppose to exist or exist in a different way from their appearance, with the perceptions of others in regard to them. The deliberate decision of several persons, by means of the same organs of sense, while in health, and at the same time, will not mislead. 3. A correction can be made by a proper *exercise of judgment* in comparing with some known object. 4. If we have perception of *two* or *more* objects of the same or differing in kind, we can turn to some one we know to be single, and if there appears to be more than one, we know our perception in that respect to be false. But in correcting all false perceptions we are dependent upon a correct exercise of the judgment.

CHAPTER III.

PERCEPTION AS CONNECTED WITH SMELL,
TASTE, HEARING, TOUCH, AND SIGHT.

SECTION I.

1. WE will now turn attention to our *perceptions of objects* which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of smell. The origin of our knowledge of the existence and difference in odors commences with the *sensation of smell*. 2. If it is impossible for sensations to *affect* the mind in any way *corresponding* to the object and qualities of the cause, then there is no connection between the action of sensation and that of perception. Then when we receive sensations from the smell of a rose or jasmin, we would be as apt to have perception of a rock or mountain as the object as any other existent; and our perception as to the true cause being wholly unguided, would be accidental in results. 3. If there is no *connection* between sensation and perception, it would be true that when we have sensation we may or may not have perception; and if, in any case, perception is immediately successive, it could only be regarded as an accident. Dr. Abercrombie mentions a blind philosopher who could distinguish a black dress by smell. The origin of this knowledge did not commence with perception, but with sensation. And the sensation of smell, in this

case, appears to have impressed the mind with a knowledge of the object and some of its qualities unaided by the other senses. Mr. Stewart speaks of James Mitchel, who was deaf, speechless, and blind, yet by smell he could detect the presence of a stranger and give the direction to him. This knowledge commenced with the sensations of smell, and without the aid of other senses. In this case the mind must have been influenced to correct decisions, in some way, by the peculiar nature or character of the sensations of smell.

SECTION II.

1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind, through the medium of the *sense of taste*, should be carefully examined. It has been said that sixteen different simple tastes exist. In the different combinations there are almost innumerable modifications, as in the degrees of strength, intensity, and weakness, quickness, and slowness. The properties of external substances which affect the organs of taste, awakening sensations, are called flavors. 2. *Habit*, in relation to taste, enables us to distinguish differences by repeated or continuous efforts. In this way the epicurean distinguishes the flavor and qualities of the luxuries of the table to a degree which would pass unnoticed by others; and the physician, the difference in drugs which are similar in appearance, and also in taste, to one not accustomed to them. 3. *Under the law of habit* some wine-dealers distinguish the flavor of one wine from that of another, and tell where each

or all were made. 4. The *proper direction* of the action of perception toward the cause must be, to a limited extent, dependent on the nature or modulations of the sensation received; for if there is no connection in any way, our perception as to being immediately successive to sensation, and in bringing the true cause to the attention and inspection of the mind, would be wholly an accident.

SECTION III.

1. The perception we have of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the *sense of hearing* is worthy a passing notice. The sense of hearing is more acute in some persons than in others, yet the power of discriminating sounds and the difference in tones or modulations may be cultivated. 2. The sound of a cannon produces a *stronger sensation* than that of a rifle. Who can say that perception receives no influence as to the cause of sensations, from the peculiar way they affect the mind? If mind was divisible, then this might be impossible. But the elements of mind can not be abstracted, like blocks of marble, from the same mountain, and examined by the rules of superficies and solids, and the laws governing inert elements. 3. The application of *habit* to the sense of hearing renders such power more acute as repeated efforts are made. There are instances of blind persons who can call the names of others from the sound of their voices, though they may not have heard them for years.

Others can tell when they are approaching a precipice or wall, by the peculiar sound of their feet upon the ground. 4. If there is no connection in *any way between* sensations produced by sound and our perception of the cause of such sensations, then our perception of the true cause may be accidental.

SECTION IV.

1. We *experience perceptions* of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of touch. And in proportion to the increase of the exquisite acuteness in detecting and reporting external substances to the mind, is the clearness and proper action of our perception in bringing such substances before the mind. 2. *Blind* persons can, with greater safety, pass all through a house in a dark night than any one who has the power of vision. Some of them can tell the distance to a burning fire by the action and degree of heat, and also of approaching contact with external bodies by the peculiar action of the air. And by the sense of touch they can be taught to read by means of large raised letters. 3. Our knowledge of *that* which affects the touch commences with sensations, and is more fully developed to the mind by the action and power of perception.

SECTION V.

1. Our *perception* of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of sight is worthy attention. Expansion of surface and color have been

regarded as primary objects of vision, but that of distance and magnitude have been rejected. Yet it is maintained that we judge of limited distances by sight alone. If we can judge of small distances by sight alone, why not, to some extent, judge of greater distances, aided by the same power? 2. The inclination of the *axis of vision*, which directs both eyes to the same object, and the peculiar way in which the reflected rays of light fall on the eyes, appears to give rise to an influence which affects the mind in deciding upon the true distance of such an object. To touch any object immediately before us with one eye closed is accidental, but certain with the aid of both. 3. A child, before it can reason or compare, shows an intuitive knowledge of *distance by sight*, in extending its hand no farther than the desired object when near, and at full length when distant. Our knowledge of the distance and magnitude of visual objects commences with sensations of sight. 4. *Habit*, in relation to the power of vision, renders it acute in detecting the existence of objects. And in proportion as we try to discriminate, will we have clear perception of objects which affect the organs of sight. By continued effort the mariner can discover a ship as it nears in the distance, when it can not be seen by a person not accustomed to maritime observations; and he can call its name when nothing more than a blur can be seen by the untrained eye upon the surface of the ocean. Under the law of habit there is a quick

and vigorous action of the power of vision, and in proportion to its improvement is the clearness and power of our perception of visual objects.

DIVISION THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTINGENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT.

SECTION I.

1. It has been said that the phenomena of mind *consist of certain thoughts and feelings*, and that the true inquiry is as to the order in which they arise, and of what these elements are constituted. Though they are of great importance, yet we can not imagine that within themselves they constitute all of mind.

2. We can not doubt the *real existence* of thought in connection with the mind's states. Of the existence and action of thought we can form some idea and have a satisfactory knowledge. The nature of elements, which have been called the original elements of thought, can not be clearly defined, though they must have their origin in connection with the existence and action of primary mental powers.

3. Thought is *that* which the mind thinks, and may be said to be *that*, in part, which acts in thinking. And it is *that* which is prominent and leads in cogitation, reflection, contemplation, and meditation.

SECTION II.

1. Thought is not only real within and of itself, but expresses *action*, as in thinking. It is the act or operation of the mind when attending to any particular subject as existent, and in another sense it may be regarded as the idea consequent on that operation.
2. Thought can not exist as a part of the mind if *separated from it*. Hence, our thoughts are nothing more than the mind itself in a peculiar way or in different states; yet their proper office has been defined.
3. The importance of *thought* to our *being, knowledge, and happiness* is forever beyond all power of description. By continued thought the student ever expands the powers of his mind with useful knowledge. Think, think, always thinking, is the motto of true greatness. It leads to the possession of that true eminence where the mind, with triumphant composure, scorns the perishable glory of earthly fame.

CHAPTER II.

IDEAS.

SECTION I.

1. THE term idea, as that of notion, applies to *that* which perceives or observes in the mind; hence the form or image of any thing in the mind possessed by it for contemplation or inspection. It exists in the mind, and can be a result of mental action. 2. Our ideas may be said to *vary with* or correspond to their objects in regard to their nature and mode or condition of existence. 3. Our idea of physical existences may be regarded as *contingent*, from the fact that it is natural for us to have conceptions of them as mutable, and that it is possible for the power that made them to cause them to cease to be. 4. Our idea of physical entities may be said to be *relative*, as the very notion of *that* which has bounds or finity will suggest the opposite, which is infinity or non-limitation. 5. Our idea of duration may be regarded as absolute. We know that duration is and must continue, and that its annihilation is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. Our idea of space has been said to be *necessary* or *absolute*. To conceive of the annihilation of all

physical entities is possible, but to conceive of the annihilation of unbounded space is utterly impossible. Hence, the idea of space is necessary; for we can have conception of the real existence of the object of such an idea, and to try to conceive of the non-existence of space is beyond our power. 2. Our idea of *space is absolute*, which arises from the condition of its existence. We are immediately impressed with the fact; and our belief is unwavering that space must be, and that it can not cease to be. 3. The idea of *space* implies the *absence* of *limitation*. We can not conceive of it only as real and infinite. Our ideas of material elements, or of the finite, are contingent and relative; and those of space, or of the infinite, are necessary and absolute. These exist in the mind, and are distinct in their orders. 4. If the idea of space and of the infinite is *necessary* and *absolute*, so may we regard the idea of cause. Therefore, it is reasonable for the atheist, when looking on the works of nature, which are sequences, to intuitively infer a cause of their existence, and to believe that such cause is all-powerful and all-wise, from the vastness and skill evidenced in visual and tangible existences.

CHAPTER III.

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY.

SECTION I.

1. THE *primary elements* of mind may be regarded as axioms, or self-evident truths, within themselves, which are the foundation of mental philosophy. That they have a real existence, and are true within themselves, is knowledge which we have no power to doubt; and the primary elements are truths, the reality and correctness of which are incapable of either proof or disproof. 2. There is no possible way of *proving* the axioms or self-evident truths, which are the foundation of mathematical science, to be either true or false, yet we receive them as truths. The power to do this is not contained in those axioms or truths, but lies back of all these, and can only exist in the intuitive elements. Therefore, it is more reasonable for us to regard the primary faculties as self-evident truths; for our knowledge of them, and of all other facts or objects, turns upon their intuitive power to know them to be true, and to reject that which is false. 3. The *primary elements* of mind are truths known to be true only from the fact that we know them to be such; and all the power we have of knowing any

thing of their existence, nature, action, or of any other truth or fact in the vast universe, arises in connection with and from the existence, nature, and action of these original elements.

SECTION II.

1. We can not arrive at a *knowledge* of their existence by any form of argument or from any external testimony. They are their own witnesses, testifying within, of, and to themselves, of their own existence, which is knowledge. 2. With *them is the origin* of the power to receive within and of themselves the knowledge of their own existence. 3. With *them is the origin* of the power to arrive at and to know the truth in regard to external things, either without or from testimony.

CHAPTER IV.

KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY.

SECTION I.

1. WE have an *intuitive* power to arrive at a knowledge of facts and truth from testimony. The immediate self-knowledge we have of external things is tested by and received through the medium of the senses; but the greater part of our knowledge, in regard to such existences, is obtained from other persons upon the evidence of testimony. 2. *Testimony* is a solemn declaration or attestation made for the purpose of establishing or making known some fact. It is the *declaration* of a fact, and evidence is the *effect* of that declaration on the mind, or the degree of light imparted by it. Facts are received by us from personal observation far more readily than from the declaration of others. We must first have confidence in the ability and veracity of the narrator in order to give full credence to the facts revealed. If what he says comes true, we believe him more readily at another time; but if once deceived, his future testimony is apt to be rejected. We can believe the statements of a tried friend more readily than those of a stranger. 3. Our *intuitive power*, in the reception and belief of external facts, is influenced by the corre-

sponding agreement of such facts with those already known. We should look well to the evidence upon which we receive facts, and to the capacity of the narrator. A weak mind is apt to have boundless credulity, and seldom ever thinks or reasons for itself. The contracted mind is generally captious, skeptical, and always inclined to reason from imperfect premises, and arrives at false conclusions. An ignorant mind or person rejects the testimony of all philosophers. He believes the earth to be flat and its position fixed immovably. He gives only one foot diameter to the sun, and drives him through the heavens. 4. When we are *limited* in our views and requirements, there is a tendency to *rely* on our experience, and to reject all knowledge for which we have not the evidence of our senses. A proper understanding of self, and of the true method of arriving at a knowledge of external facts, will remedy false perceptions and conclusions.

SECTION II.

1. A well-regulated mind is *influenced* by the recollection of facts, which appeared at first to be deceptions or even false, but subsequently prove and are known to be true. Hence the conclusion that there may and does exist many elements and facts, decidedly marvelous or appalling to us at first. 2. We have power to arrive at a *correct knowledge* of facts from testimony; and have power to discriminate credible testimony from that which is not, by contrasting the manner, the arrangement of parts, or the con-

dition. When a sufficient amount of the right kind of testimony has been received, we feel an internal satisfaction in relying upon it without doubt. 3. Infidelity assumes that we can not *believe testimony* which differs from our uniform experience and the uniform course of nature; but we have seen already that this position is false. The influence or power sustaining and containing the elements of our belief in regard to testimony, has its origin in intuition. To receive proper testimony is natural, but to conscientiously doubt it is unnatural and impossible. 4. To arrive at a distinct belief of a *miraculous* interposition or *act*, requires something more than to give credence to facts which are in accordance with the uniform laws or course of nature. 5. *Miracle* we understand to be *that* which takes place in violation to, or deviating from, the established course of nature, and that which is contrary to our uniform experience. If miracles exist in violation of, or deviating from, the regular course of nature, their existence can not be a result of this uniform course of nature, nor of the laws governing the material universe. Then, if miracles exist, the cause of their existence must be distinct from and superior to the course of nature. Therefore they exist by a direct interposition or act of Divine Power. 6. Divine Revelation is regarded as a *miraculous gift* of Heaven, and, as a result, clearly demonstrates or proves an adequate cause of its existence. All miracles recorded in the Bible aid in proving the existence of Deity and his power to establish laws and

suspend them at pleasure. If he has power to order and arrange common events, which are called natural, he has power and does order uncommon events, called miracles.

SECTION III.

1. Infidels assume that events *happening contrary* to the course of nature and our experience should be rejected, and that it is more reasonable for men to lie, and that several concur in propagating the same lie, than that a miracle should take place, according to their testimony, which would be a result contrary to the course of nature and experience. The rejecters of the Christian system hold and teach that the uniform course of nature is true, and that it is the unerring truth of the universe. 2. Mr. Hume says, in regard to the *resurrection* of Christ, "I must admit one of two things—either that twelve men agreed to tell a lie, or that a man arose from the dead. It is more probable that men should lie, than that one should return to life again." That is, if Christ rose it would be contrary to the uniform course of nature, which course of nature he regarded as infallible truth. He then asserts that it is more reasonable for men to lie than that Christ should arise from the dead. According to his own premises, arguments, and belief, such a lie could not be a part of the course of nature, which is truth, neither a result of it in any possible way. Hence, such a lie being contrary to truth, is contrary to the uniform course of nature, which is truth. Then, according to his own creed and belief,

this lie would be a miracle ; yet he regards it as *that* which is the most reasonable, and adopts it as the foundation of his faith and future hope. He then tries to disprove the miracle of Christ's resurrection by assuming, in lieu thereof, the existence of another miracle, according to his own faith and teachings, which miracle, he says, is more reasonable, though he acknowledges it to be a lie. And, of course, if in this respect the foundation of his faith or belief be a lie, all arguments and conclusions drawn from it must be wholly and forever untrue. 3. And as this is the *only* argument which has ever been referred to, which can have any claims to be an argument against the resurrection of Christ, it is, therefore, true, that Christ rose from the dead, and the truthfulness of our holy Christianity is forever incontrovertible, notwithstanding the great and celebrated argument of Mr. Hume.

DIVISION FOURTH.

CHAPTER I.

CONCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. CONCEPTIONS exist in connection with *peculiar* states and operations of the mind, by and in which they appear to arise. 2. Conception of and within itself is the *power*, and acting is the *act* of conceiving and of receiving, or of admitting facts to the inspection of the mind. It is closely connected with our sensations and perceptions. When we have conceptions they are revived and followed by certain mental states, in which present or past ideas, sensations, or impressions can be and are examined. 3. In a *certain sense* we may have conceptions of ideas, images, sentiments, and thoughts. And in another sense it may apply to *re-occurring facts* and to re-existing emotions and sensations, which we, at one time, had realized. The mind, in the peculiar states with which they are connected, is moved and influenced in reference to both external facts and internal feelings and sensations of the soul.

SECTION II.

1. Conceptions in *nature* and *action* appear to differ from sensations and perceptions. Perception is

characterized by an egressive action, or by its striking out in apprehending objects, while conception is more passive, with internal power to be revived or awakened as an inlet to the mind of existing facts, and of the re-occurring of facts, feelings, and ideas which had been real in the experience of the past. 2. Conception *differs* from memory and from the action and objects of remembrance. The causes and objects of conceptions are absent, which is not true with sensations and perceptions. Sensation and perception act from and in reference to their causes and objects; but we have conceptions of truths in the remembrance of past feelings and ideas, when the causes and objects are not taken into the account. In this way we may have conceptions of any thing within the control of memory, independently of time, condition, or place. Our conceptions of past occurrences take no account of the time when their causes were present; and the regulation of them is influenced by the power and laws of association, and can arise under the action and controlling power of volition. 3. Conception is not confined to our impressions of *past time*, but can be connected with our feelings in regard to *present* existences. We can not only have conceptions of present and real existences, but we can have them in connection with peculiar mental states or conditions, upon which depends the peculiarities of illusions, dreaming, and partial insanity, though they may be misguided or be entirely false.

CHAPTER II.

MEMORY.

SECTION I.

1. MEMORY is that faculty of the mind by which we retain the knowledge of past events, or ideas which are past. It is the *power* of retaining impressions, facts, or events; and remembrance, or recollection, is the *act* of recalling them, and of presenting them, by a voluntary effort, to the mind for inspection. By conception we recall perceptions or the impressions of scenes or events without reference to time, causes, or objects, but memory retains past ideas or events with but little effort in connection with time, causes, and objects. Ideas, facts, and events seem to be spontaneous or abiding realities in the existence of memory; but remembrance, or the act of recalling past events or ideas, is controlled by an effort of the will. 2. Memory is that power or susceptibility of the mind which *contains* and *retains* ideas or events without any special, voluntary, or involuntary action. Within itself its capacity or power contains facts in connection with either active or inactive states of mind. It is the *retentive* power of events or realities which become the objects of thought and of knowledge. This power, in vigorous and voluntary action,

calling up past events or truths, is remembrance, or recollection. Memory is not the origin of knowledge, but is a source of knowledge, in connection with other mental powers, and is essential in forming ideas of realities. 3. The existence, nature, and power of memory are *closely connected* with those of conception, perception, suggestion, association, and imagination. 4. When we speak of an object of memory, we have *immediate conceptions* of its appearance and qualities. 5. In *remembering objects* which afflicted us in the past there is an immediate recalling of *perceptions* or impressions, in regard to which we have perceptions of the relation of past time. 6. It is common for us to say, when we think of a fact within the compass of memory, that it *suggests* to us another fact, perhaps from the similarity or their nearness in the order of time. 7. Memory has been called a department of *association*, or, under and within the extent of its power, there is an affinity of ideas or events, forming a chain or association, in which they naturally recall each other. 8. Imagination is *dependent* on memory in forming new combinations of ideas from materials stored up in the memory.

SECTION II.

1. There appears to be *original differences* in the power of memory. Some persons have remarkably strong and retentive memories, which are essential to a rapid and extensive acquisition of knowledge; but when memory is very prominent or predominant, it is

seldom connected with a properly-balanced and well-regulated mind. The strength of the endowment of such minds depends principally upon what has been seen and heard, as they are apt to be very much limited in originality, yet quick and untiring in the pursuit of an object, with but little caution or judgment. Some have been known to repeat almost any number of words they had heard without any connection or meaning. One writer speaks of a man who could repeat the entire contents of a newspaper, and of another who could retain words spoken to the number of six thousand, while their other intellectual powers were of an inferior order, though this is not universally true with persons of such remarkable memories.

2. Memory *founded upon* and embracing real *analogies* is an element of mind more important to true mental cultivation and the acquisition of knowledge, than that which remembers facts only in the order in which they occurred. The former is an important auxiliary in forming and arriving at intellectual attainments and character, while the latter is connected with but little judgment; yet appears to be more sprightly, attended with show, and embraces that class of facts in common demand. 3. We have *embraced* and *implied*, in the nature and power of memory, in its peculiar connection with the action of the intellectual principle, (1.) A *sensitive impression*, or a certain mental state, resulting from contact with some previous existent, and synchronizing with the perception of the cause recalled. (2.) The *involun-*

tary recurring of internal impressions and feelings, or of those which may arise from their similarity to some existent of present knowledge. (3.) An *involuntary recurrence* in the mind of some previous existent related to the object or cause apprehended in close affinity or order of time. 4. It not only implies suggestion, but *conception* of past events with the *perceptions* of epochs in past time.

SECTION III.

1. *Local* memory, which refers to and has power over local entities or facts once known, existence either in matter or mind, is generally combined with but little caution and judgment. It merely remembers facts or events in the order of their occurrence, resting upon local or incidental relations, especially in regard to place, order of priority, and aposteriority. 2. Memory contributes to *true* knowledge and the belief of truth. If its power to retain and remember facts be removed, our knowledge of past events is swept away. 3. There are *degrees* in the power of memory in different persons. There are some who can not retain facts in the mind for any length of time when compared with others. Some recollect that which they have seen, but soon forget that which they have heard. Others recollect that which they have read or heard, but can not remember objects of sight. Some of the greatest and most affecting orators known in history could write in two hours more than they could memorize in a week. It

is true that some persons can give a long chain of facts narrated by an author, only in the author's words; while others can give all the facts, only in their own language. 4. *Philosophic* memory embraces general principles and universal truths. General principles are of more importance than minor items, and also the facts appertaining to and which are explanatory of such principles. This description of memory is sustained principally by the relations of cause and effect, resemblance and contrast. Thus, our inquiries extend to the nature and origin of existences, scanning their analogies and oppositions, causes and results.

SECTION IV.

1. A *ready* memory embraces qualities, resemblances, and rules of progression with ease, and without any special process of exploring and of understanding the truths or facts illustrative of general principles. 2. A *retentive* memory is connected with that species of memory called philosophic. It is supported by facts and realities, connected with general principles, and in remembering any fact the action is apt to be prolonged by recalling the general principles with which it is connected. Though it may be slow, yet it is generally progressive and irresistible in conquest. 3. *Artificial* memory is cultivated and attained by connecting things easily remembered with those not so readily recalled. This operation is connected with and is dependent, to some extent, upon

suggestion in a modified form. The whole system of mnemonics principally depends upon suggestion, as when in recalling two synchronizing objects, with one and the same state of mind, the object of easiest recollection exciting the mind in recalling the other of more difficult remembrance. 4. An *efficient* memory has power to retain facts, with vividness of action in recalling them. There is an acuteness and peculiar quickness of retentive power connected with the memory of some persons which is not exercised by others. A good memory is not only tenacious and quick in the reception of facts, but retains impressions or ideas with a great degree of freshness and vividness amid the crumbling of mutable elements and the blight of time.

SECTION V.

1. The memory of persons at advanced age is not *efficient* as in earlier life. There is an apparent weakness in the retentive power, and an inability to recall ideas and facts. The loss of this power and activity can not be regarded as wholly arising within and of itself, but is principally attributable to the state or condition of the medium through which it acts. 2. It is *dependent* upon *perception* for facts with which it is stored, only so far as perception aids in such bestowment. But it can not be regarded as dependent upon it for retentive power, nor for its action in the recalling of ideas or facts. 3. Memory may be weakened by *defects* in attention from its

close connection with it; for with attention there is an emotion of interest which is not so acute and tenacious in old persons; yet it is necessary to implant facts upon the mind so as to be readily remembered. 4. The faculty or power of memory, in aged persons, is *not capable* of any *diminution* or loss within and of itself. The defect is attributable to the change and enfeebledness of the organs or medium through which its manifestations are realized. Otherwise the mind of an aged person would be annihilated in proportion as it ceases to be developed. But this is contrary to experience and knowledge. The memory of the aged can retain the events of early life so that they can be correctly rehearsed, while present events or truths are forgotten by them in an hour. This shows that the original power within itself has suffered no elementary loss, and is free from any annihilation. 5. He who fears to *trust* memory will always feel embarrassed in delivering what he knows. In order to conquer and feel at home on any or all subjects, we must make memory responsible, and freely throw ourselves upon it. 6. It should be constantly *exercised* and burdened only with the most important facts. 7. We should receive the impressions of things to be remembered in *their natural order*—from premises to relations and results, from elements to manifestations, and from causes to effects.

CHAPTER III.

REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE
DURATION OF MEMORY.

SECTION I.

1. REMEMBRANCE is the *retaining* or the *continuing* in the mind ideas or facts which have been present at various mental states, or it is an idea or impression previously received from some object recurring to the mind at a subsequent period without the presence of its cause. 2. Remembrance *implies* the *occurring* of ideas or facts to the mind spontaneously, or with but little mental effort. 3. The ease, distinctness, and readiness with which we remember an impression or fact, is proportionably to the *tenacity* with which they are received. Deep impressions are lasting, and are continued as property of the mind without any special voluntary mental effort.

SECTION II.

1. *Recollection* is the act of recalling impressions or facts which have been the objects of memory at some former time. 2. Remembrance *differs* from recollection. The former implies that an idea or impression occurs to the mind spontaneously or with but little voluntary exertion. The latter implies not only the power, but it is

the *act* of recalling ideas or facts which do not spontaneously recur to the mind, and with seemingly voluntary efforts. 3. Recollection, in one sense, is *voluntary*, and in another sense it is not. We can not remember because we merely choose to remember. To will to remember any fact or facts, implies that such facts were once the objects of memory, and that they are still in the reach and subject to the power and the act which recalls them. 4. *Memory* may be said to be the power which receives and retains ideas or facts. *Remembrance* appears to preserve facts once known from passing away from the mind so as to be utterly beyond recovery. *Recollection* is the act of recalling facts, once the objects of memory, for the inspection and use of the mind.

SECTION III.

1. The *duration* of memory is clearly evidenced in its power to recall and present to the mind the events of its past experience. Memory, within itself, is absolutely imperishable, and thoughts which are the objects of memory are indestructible. If the impression is revived with which any thought in time past was connected, the thought itself can be reproduced. The reviving of any impression once realized necessarily involves the presence and the action of a power which can affect the recalling of thoughts coexisting with it. 2. Thoughts and feelings, which have been forgotten for years, often *recur* unexpectedly. It is believed by some that the mind possesses within itself

power in its different states, and while affected alternately by innumerable existences and influences, to recall, at different periods, all the events and feelings which have ever been the objects of memory. 3. It can be and is *affected* by the physical organs, when those organs are under the power and influence of disease. There is a connection between the mind and the physical organs, in which each exercises a reciprocal influence. The action of the mind may be increased or diminished in proportion to the manner and intensity of the influence of disease upon the body. Accordingly as the body is affected the mind may be retarded or quickened in action. 4. Memory may be impaired from *injuries* of the head or *affections* of the brain. An Englishman has been mentioned who was in a state of stupor, the result of an injury of the head, who, when reviving, spoke only in Welsh. He had been thirty years from his native country, and previous to the injury had forgotten his native language, and when restored to health he recovered the English language again and could not recollect Welsh. This was evidence that the power of memory had not been destroyed, and that its inactivity in recalling facts can not be attributed to any defect within and of itself. A Frenchman on going to England when quite young, lost the power of speaking French; but while suffering from an injury of the head he spoke only French. 5. When the body is *affected* in *different ways* the effect upon memory differs. A boy has been mentioned who seemed to be insensible under the operation of

trepan for fracture of the skull, and when he was restored to health had no recollection of it; but during the delirium of a fever eleven years after, he gave a correct description of the operation, and of the persons present. An Italian gentleman, when first attacked with disease of the brain, spoke English; as the disease progressed he spoke French, and for some time before his death spoke only Italian. These facts, with many others, show that diseased organs have an influence over memory, and also that memory must be imperishable. 6. Often when the mind appears to be in an *inactive state of coma*, the result of violent fever, the powers and action of memory are not wholly suspended. There are instances of persons thus affected, and supposed to be perfectly unconscious, who, on recovery, have had a perfect recollection of the events and conversation which took place. 7. Truths, which are the *first objects* of memory with the young, are those which are of most importance. Though they are the first received, yet they are the last forgotten. Those things which we learn first are generally closely connected with our education, and they greatly influence our course in life, and aid in forming our characters for eternity. 8. In view of the judgment of the great day, what manner of persons ought we to be? Memory will then and there present to the mind all the impressions, ideas, feelings, and acts of our whole lives. All, all will be remembered.

CHAPTER IV.

ATTENTION.

SECTION I.

1. ATTENTION is that faculty of the mind which has power to *attend* to or *heed* any reality. 2. By general consent it has been defined to be the *action* in, or the *act* of attending to objects or facts. 3. If it has power to act, or be *acted upon*, then it is a real entity. And if real, it must be capable of being called an element of the mind. 4. If an *element* of mind, it can not be a result of any other element or elements. 5. The strong efforts made by some to prove that it is not an *original power*, has convinced us that the reverse is true, from the fact their conclusions failed for want of correct arguments. 6. *Attention* expresses not only the state of mind, but the *act* by which it is directed to any object or fact, to the exclusion, for the time, of all other considerations. Though closely connected with perception, yet we may have perceptions of objects, to some extent, before the attention is directed to them. The musician can perceive the order of the bass of a piece of music which he is playing on an instrument, while his attention is at the same time upon the air he is singing. When our attention is steadily fixed upon an

object, other objects may pass within the field of vision unheeded till our attention is withdrawn; then, without difficulty, the mind can be directed to the object which had received no previous notice.

SECTION II.

1. Attention is said to be voluntary when under the *power* and *action* of the will. An object may have our attention so as to lead to a general examination of its appearance; but we can determine to attend to the nature or elements of such object or objects, upon which a penetrating investigation takes place. 2. It is said to be involuntary when *suddenly arrested* and turned to an unexpected object before the consent of the will is obtained to forsake an object of previous pursuit or investigation. 3. Intense and successful attention depends upon our determination to *thoroughly investigate* and understand the objects or facts to which the mind is directed. 4. Memory is *dependent* upon attention. In proportion as our attention to facts is intense or slight, so is our remembrance vivid and of long continuance, or brief and imperfect. That which receives our undivided attention becomes the object of remembrance. If the peculiarities of a tree in the midst of the grove receives our undivided attention, it will be remembered, while all those which surround it, with equal peculiarities and within the field of vision, if remembered at all will be as almost indistinct entities. 5. Bodily diseases, in most cases, seem to *affect* this fac-

ulty of the mind first. And as disease advances its victim becomes so far incapable of exercising attention that present occurrences can not be remembered. When the mind is so much affected by disease that we are incapable of receiving correct impressions from external objects, and we begin to regard the objects of our thoughts as real existences, we are in the first degree or state of delirium. 6. Fever, intemperance, and old age so affect the body, that in the majority of cases attention can not be *concentrated* upon a long chain of arguments, neither can it be fixed for a long time upon any one object, yet the power of attending to facts is in the mind, and is incapable of any essential destruction or annihilation within and of itself.

CHAPTER V.

ASSOCIATION.

SECTION I.

1. THE *power of association* is in the mind. This power has its origin in connection with consciousness, original and relative suggestion, and by it the objects of their action seem to be blended for the inspection and use of the mind. Its action is the associating of ideas where two or more constantly or naturally follow each other in the mind, so that one almost infallibly produces the other. 2. The *act* of associating is sustained by a remarkable tendency, in which facts or conceptions, having been contemplated together or in immediate succession, become so connected in the different mental states, that one of them, at a subsequent period, recalls the others, or introduces a train of thoughts which succeed each other in the order of their original association. 3. Association may be regarded as *voluntary*, to a certain extent. There can be a mental effort made in calling up ideas or facts which have been associated with those which are clearly the objects of volitive action. 4. But we are led to regard association principally as *involuntary*. It is spontaneous when any fact present to the mind suggests another resembling or having some kind of

affinity to itself; this may suggest a third, and so on till many arise.

SECTION II.

1. If association *consists only* in the adhering, natural affinity and the blending of our ideas, or thoughts, or feelings, then philosophers have argued cogently and effectually. But if "resemblance, contrast, contiguity, in time and place, and cause and effect" are primary laws of association, we can not understand their undefined definition of the primary power of association. If there is a power in the mind capable of associating ideas, that power lies back of the act of associating them; and if the act is acknowledged, the cause of that act belongs to and is in the mind. It is impossible for the original power of association to be a result of the action of one or more elements of mind. No primary element has power to form itself, and consequently can not, by mere action, form a power which fills the office of a mental faculty. 2. It is not contended that the *associating* of ideas or facts, as a result, is an original element of mind, nor that it is any thing more than an ultimate existent in mental phenomena, but that the power which *acts* is in the mind. 3. Association is *furnished* with materials in the occurrences and facts which are connected with the laws of cause and effect, resemblance, contrast, and contiguity in time and place.

SECTION III.

1. Objects which are connected, or those which sustain to each other the relation, to any degree, of cause and effect, do *suggest* each other as objects of the power of association. 2. *Resemblance*, in the form or qualities of objects, will mutually suggest each other to the mind, and the objects of facts thus presented are the property of the power of association. 3. *Contrast* appears to contribute to association. A very large man suggests the idea of a dwarf, the rivulet a river, and a lake the ocean. 4. Association is aided by facts connected with the *law of contiguity* of time and place. The nearness of time in which facts occurred or feelings existed, and the close connection of localities or places aids the power of suggestion and contributes to association. Some parents can always tell the ages of their neighbors' children by recalling the birthdays of their own, which are near, in time. When we think of the cities of London and Paris, we immediately think of the countries where they are located. 5. *Natural* association takes place when any fact, which is the object of attention, is by the mind associated with some fact of previous knowledge to which it has a resemblance or relation. In this way associations may be formed. The referring of facts to some principle or subject, which they are calculated to illustrate, fixes them in the mind, and the association is easy and natural.

SECTION IV.

1. The calling up of facts is *voluntary* when we direct the mind to a particular train of truths or thoughts best calculated to lead to those who wish to command. We may have an impression of some item of knowledge which we have been in the possession of, and from the present knowledge of a portion of facts belonging to a certain class, be enabled to recall all others of the same association. 2. Associations recur *involuntarily* when the mind is turned to some subject which is calculated, in nature, or by its elementary existence or tendency, to lead to them. The mind can pursue trains of thought without any volitive effort, and often without any consciousness of its action, till some object arrests the attention. 3. *Casual* associations are formed only in connection with persons, incidents, or place. An idea or thought is associated with the source it was received from; the person, the book, or the place, of whom, or of which, or where we came in possession of any truth or fact. Such truths or facts are recalled in the mind whenever the source is thought of, seen, or mentioned. If we think of a certain city where we have been, the mind is immediately presented with direct facts, incidents, or occurrences in connection with it to almost an innumerable extent. 4. Facts or occurrences *associated* with places or localities are *revived* when we think of or visit them. The Christian loves to revisit the place where his manner of life was

changed, and think of and review the associations connected with it. And on the other hand, the murderer dreads to think of or revisit places of his dark criminal deeds, and shudders in dwelling upon the associations which there arise as portentous of wretchedness and woe. 5. Associations formed in connection with *localities* seem to impress the mind with facts almost independent of memory. In some instances occurrences, which have been experienced in connection with certain locations, have been entirely forgotten till the place or places were revisited, when the facts associated with them were revived and recalled.

SECTION V.

1. *Intentional* association involves a volitive mental action. The truths associated are not connected so much by the external relation they sustain to each other as that existing in the states and action of the mind. We can establish a connection between the thing we wish to remember and some other known object, which may have no relation to that which is to be remembered. 2. Often, when persons go in the pursuit of two or more objects, and fearing that some one will be forgotten, they select some familiar phrase, carry something in their hand or pocket, only as realities, to prevent *forgetting* the object desired. 3. The principle of *intentional* association is further illustrated by the way in which the mind is affected in regard to the real existence of the Christian system and the truths connected with it. Infidels who

have urged that the common course of nature is the only truth universal and infallible, have, on the other hand, denied that human testimony is sufficient to establish the events connected with our holy religion. Though this is a sophism, yet it should be met. If we had no means or way to judge of the lapse of time, or of the remote ages of the world, than the testimony of inert elements as found on the face of the globe, or those which are now regarded as being contained in the stratified archives of its own periods and ages, we would as readily infer that the existence of the earth was an accident of recent occurrence as to have any other supposition. 4. A proper belief in the arrangements and occurrences of such facts depends upon human *testimony* and experience in relation to the chain of associated truths in the past. By means of traditional and written testimony we are led to the belief that the earth is more than five thousand years old; but without this testimony it would all be in the confusion of uncertainty, and in darkness. 5. The commemorative rites or periodical observances, can be transmitted from age to age by traditional *testimony*, or that which has been written by many individuals, and at different times, during the lapse of thousands of years; yet there is the regular return of the fact, the occasion and the day associated with them, the unbroken series which carry us back to the time of the original events, and the persons who witnessed them. Hence, we have as much faith or belief in the real existence of such facts as we have in the

series of years which have marked the course of time and the existence of the globe. 6. By the *association* of events and facts connected with these observances we are freed from every impression of false testimony, from the fact that we are conducted back by regular steps and periods to the time of the original events. An impostor can not fabricate a system of theology which can be even the object of investigation till it is marked with rites, periods, and events; then the harmony and regular occurrence of them would be of the utmost importance. But such a system as this, bearing sufficient resemblance to the Bible to be believed, has never been known; while the Bible has them in series of facts extending through the past and described as pending in the unbounded future to a degree and extent infinitely beyond all other books, systems, or facts ever known.

SECTION VI.

1. The true analysis of language will not allow the terms "*law or laws*" to be applied to the principle of association, nor to those principles or existences closely connected with it, only as such connected entities are clearly contingent in nature or relationship. 2. Truths may sustain such *relations* to one another as to mutually suggest each other; this relationship can not reveal the law or laws of the principle of association, but is *that* by which objects suggest each other upon the ground of a common influence or impression made by them upon the mind. 3. A *variation* of the

associating principle may be found in, and in connection with, the original difference in mental powers. It may arise from the difference in primary elements and their action, all of which may affect the associating principle. One mind may differ from another by possessing one or more faculties of a higher order than those corresponding to them in the other mind. The action of many minds differ, and these differences influence the associating principle. Three men of equal minds in strength journey together; one is naturally inclined to notice the face of the country, a second the road and internal improvements, and a third the manners and customs of the people. All these different objects give rise to corresponding associations. 4. The associating principle varies with the *energy* and *strength* of the emotions. Objects which cause or have in connection with them realities, giving rise to intense feelings of sorrow, are readily recalled; as permanent columns, amid ruins, they stand out, the enduring objects of memory, while facts connected with slight emotions are soon numbered with things that were. 5. The influence of the lapse of time *affects* the existence and action of the associating principle. Facts occurring last evening can be recalled with clearness and far more readily than those of many years' standing, from the fact that there is no perceptible loss in the strength of the connection by which the facts thus associated revive and restore each other. 6. Mental associations may be under a *direct* volitive power and action. By voluntary action

we can not create associations nor the facts entering into such combinations. And we can not will the existence of truths to be associated without first having some idea or perception of those things we wish to have exist; but we can will that facts or trains of thought may be present with and under the full inspection of the mind; and we have volitive power to retain them as objects of such inspection. And on the sudden perception of some unpleasant reality we can instantly divert the attention and refuse to contemplate it, or the facts which may be associated with it. 7. Associations can be and often are under *indirect* voluntary power. A volitive power may be regarded as incapable of creating, by direct action, either mental associations or the facts thus connected. The skill and design interwoven and connected with the works of nature *lead* us to think of the great First Cause. Here we pause as though we would wish to comprehend the infinity of such power or Being; yet the regular course of such thought is no sooner checked, than silvery trains of innumerable rolling worlds he has made, fly through the field of mental contemplation, ever burning with the glow of imperishable light.

SECTION VII.

1. The influence of association upon our ideas of *correct taste* is worthy of notice. Great care should be observed in receiving truths according to the rules of correct taste. Orators famed for wisdom, a ready and forcible delivery, often indulge in imperfections

as to language, gestures, or manner of delivery, which would be regarded as revolting and disgusting but for the influence associated with the speaker. Though such defects are noticed at first without pleasure upon the part of admirers, yet in course of time such defects, being associated with the man and his zeal, are regarded as marks of great distinction. Hence, such defects are copied and imitated, while traits of true excellence pass unnoticed. 2. Our ideas of *fashion* vary with the influence of association. The odd insignia or the peculiarity of the escutcheon upon which is emblazoned the glory of some great warrior, however ludicrous they may appear within themselves, are soon regarded as tasteful and glorious from their connection with such personage. This is true, to some extent, in regard to almost every extravagance in dress. 3. *That* which would be *abhorred*, if introduced by common persons, can be introduced by others, and be extolled by almost universal consent, only from its association with such persons. When the multitude lay aside any extravagance, should any one perpetuate it they are regarded as being destitute of refinement. It would appear that any person ever conforming to the rules of a correct taste and fashion, independently of the varying influence of association, would be regarded as a wonder in the earth, being unworthy of imitation. 4. The tendency and effects of *improper* associations are worthy of notice. They may descend in degrees from those of simple error to those of vicious and malicious tendencies and results.

Many descriptive writers associate with wicked tendencies, deeds, and events, language full of imagery, exciting the feelings with sublimity, beauty, grandeur, and delight, till that which is sinful can be contemplated without any feelings of abhorrence, and the mind becomes inclined to crime. This course once entered, without almost a miraculous interposition of Divine power, the immortal soul is soon entangled and black with crimes, attracting the electricity of unending wrath. 5. We here close with the tendency and results of *correct associations*. That which is pure within itself becomes the object of pure mental action. A pure mind appears naturally so corelated to objects that if some were not of a high order of purity, yet the associations, if permitted to be formed, would be pure and harmless. 6. He who wishes to succeed in any branch of science must know that he has first *correctly* fixed the primary principles, and then associate with them those truths which are naturally adapted to and are connected with their existence, in order to arrive at and clearly comprehend correct results. We can not speak of all the endlessly-diversified applications of the associating principle, yet their existence is indispensable in the acquisition of knowledge.

DIVISION FIFTH.

CHAPTER I.

MENTAL STATES.

SECTION I.

1. A SIMPLE mental state may be regarded as only expressing the presence of one thought or object, which appears to be disconnected and indivisible. Such state of mind seems to be natural; for a simple notion, feeling, or idea is indivisible; yet they can be the object or objects of mental states. 2. If two or more elements or existences, collected or connected together, enter into mental states, such states are not simple, but *complex*. 3. Though simple mental states *can not* be defined, yet, like axioms, they may be regarded as self-evident truths, always to be known as real entities within themselves. 4. Our *belief in* and *reliance* upon them as real may be with boundless confidence; for there can be no imaginary existent in a single idea, feeling, or fact abstracted and indivisible. Here is natural truth, in which we can trust without fear of deception. 5. Simple mental states may be regarded as *preceding* those which are complex. A simple idea, feeling, or fact must first enter into mental states and be known, in order to the

knowledge of the relationship of many truths in the existence of complex states.

SECTION II.

1. The existence of *complex* mental states may be regarded as affected with the presence of a collection, assemblage, or a complication of ideas, feelings, or realities. If we think of any external existence, as a tree, mountain, lake, or river, there are properties and qualities embraced in the action of the mind in relation to each or all of them. 2. Our thoughts and feelings may arise from many objects or causes, but all *unite* in the soul under the immediate inspection of the mind, which can take into the account the oneness severally in their origin. 3. Our mental states are *complex* in contemplating external objects. We form an idea of the existence of ice from its properties, and we describe it only by giving those properties weight, friability, color, and hardness. Similar complexness exists in regard to any other combination of properties. 4. Complex mental states may exist in relation to *that* which is connected with external objects, differing from abstract elements. In connection with qualities there may be presented to the mind tendencies, appearances, and influences. And we may be ready to acknowledge an essence or foundation without being able to define it. The only way we can study the existence and nature or essence of material compounds, is by their elements and inertness. And the only way that we can study the

nature or essence of mind, is by its elements and action. 5. Complex states of mind are often the result of *internal* influences or realities. As a lake receives from tributary streams, on every hand, so the mind may be regarded as the receptacle of knowledge, being affected by almost innumerable influences and impressions. We can judge of these as correctly as we can of those arising from external existences.

CHAPTER II.

ABSTRACTION.

SECTION I.

1. ABSTRACTION is the act or operation by which elements are separated from each other and examined individually. The original power of such action, and by which it is known to exist, is in the mind. It may take place when the mind is occupied with separated facts, or when we contemplate some particular part or property of a compound, or of a complex object, as disconnected from other existences of such combinations. 2. By the mental *exercise* or the *acting* power of abstraction, we can examine many objects, selecting definite properties in which they agree and can be classified. And it can be still more comprehensive in selecting a property or fact which is common to an extensive collection of adhering or complex entities. 3. An abstract notion or thought may *arise* upon the ground of detected resemblance and difference in objects or properties, and in the special notice or attention given to them individually. In the presence of compounds we can have conceptions of density, form, or friability without the introduction of other properties. Properties may be so separated from the combination as to be the objects of abstract

thought, and any element may be so contemplated in its separation as to be the object of special observation. If I say this apple is red, the color only may be the object of abstract thought. 4. Mental *operations* in separating facts, or in abstracting certain ideas, is worthy of a passing notice. The power of abstraction is in the mind. If the mind has the power of motion, and if it does act, we must admit that notions or ideas arise in connection with or in such action. In the origin of our ideas they may be simple, or may exist separated from each other. There appears to be a natural tendency uniting them, giving rise to complex mental states. If this union is formed of many simple ideas or truths, the power in the mind, or that is connected with mental operations, which is capable of separating these united facts, in whole or in part, may be called abstraction. The union of ideas forming complex mental states may be either intentional or involuntary; but the separating or abstracting of them appears to be voluntary. 5. We may be said to have *particular* abstract ideas on the presentation of an object to us having color, fragrance, form, density, and extension, when the mind is so entirely occupied with some one of these qualities as to be almost insensible to the existence of the others. The particular abstraction takes place when the action of the mind is limited to one quality. When any object or quality existing in a state of combination is separated by a mental process for inspection, the idea we form of it may be said to

be of particular abstraction. This may take place in the mind either with or without a real separation of the combined entities.

SECTION II.

1. *General* abstraction may apply to classification when we examine one class of objects separate and apart from other classes. Objects classified under the terms of genera and species, may be contemplated or examined under the law of general abstraction. When a variety of objects are before us, it is easy and almost natural for the properties or qualities of agreement and disagreement to be presented to the mind, giving rise to associations or classes. These classes of many objects may be represented by a single term, and any one of them become the object of mental action separate or abstracted from the others.

2. *General abstract ideas* will apply to almost innumerable classes of objects—the different orders or classes in zoölogy, ornithology, vegetation, and crystallization. 3. The *process* of abstraction is essential to a well-regulated mind. Without it we can not proceed correctly in analyzing the qualities or elements of objects; and we could not control the attention, concentrating the action of the mental powers in the examination of any one object separated from the thousands bestudding the field of vision, or that are present with and are contained in the mind. 4. It is *influenced* and affected by the power of disease, and can be so impaired or weakened, as disease

increases, that all objects are in a state of confusion to the mind, and it naturally varies as to degrees of acuteness and power in different minds.

CHAPTER III.

IMAGINATION.

SECTION I.

1. IMAGINATION is that power or faculty by the action or exercise of which we form new combinations within the mind, gathered from real elements, scenes, or facts. It is that which forms new associations of ideas from the truths which are the property of memory, being subject to its power. From the materials stored up in the memory it produces new combinations, on the one hand, more pleasing, more brilliant, or more sublime, or, on the other, more awful, more terrible, or more horrible. 2. Imagination has been regarded as an *ulterior* element of mind, or that it is a result of certain primary elements when in action. If its origin and existence wholly depends upon the action of certain primary elements, then when those elements are inactive the power and action of imagination would be annihilated; and if ever its being and action are recalled they would exist by the creative action of those primary elements. That primary elements have such creative power is absurd. 3. Imagination is *closely connected* with the power of the understanding and our conceptions and perceptions of objects and facts. Under its influence and action

we are enabled to combine objects and qualities of which we have conceptions, and extend our thoughts to the contemplation of similar ones, or of other facts as real, though unknown to us before, and we can imagine such existences as being more pleasing or awful than any fact of real existence in nature. In some instances we can pursue and describe them to a greater degree of clearness, beauty, and grandeur than is contained in any similar fact or object of materiality. 4. Imagination may *extend* to the operations of apprehending and contemplating the arrangements, qualities, resemblances, or influences connected with objects of mental action, and the extension of our thoughts in the formation of new ideas beyond those which may be regarded as primary ones, together with the relative position and influence of the same to and upon each other, and to the original ideas. It recombines our ideas of the relative condition of things, and influences mental states in relation to the beautiful, grand, and sublime, which transcends the original ideas as our thoughts pass beyond them and ascend higher. 5. It *influences* mental states, in and by which the mind conceives and forms ideas within itself, and of real and supposed external objects. It assembles images and paints them upon our minds and on the minds of others. By it we can go beyond all these in adding ideas and thoughts to those already in the mind, and in adding any image or reality necessary to fill or complete the scene or process of apprehending till the mind is satisfied, or there is

a suspension of further action. 6. Imagination leads in *blending* elements of diverse existences. Those which belong to widely-diversified scenes can be combined into one beautiful conception, presenting to the mind that which is beautiful, grand, or partakes of true sublimity.

SECTION II.

1. The operations or exercise of imagination may be said to be *involuntary*, when there is action without any volitive effort, and such action can take place when we are not immediately conscious of the fact till some object or fact arrests our attention, and we recall beautiful combinations. 2. *Intentional* imagination involves artificial combinations, by means of which the mind acting passes on, while extended thoughts and facts arise, forming new objects of contemplation. 3. *Fictitious* delineations are dependent upon imagination for transactions, scenes, and imaginary facts. 4. *Productions* of the imagination are chaste and of a high moral character in proportion to the moral principle, taste, and habits of the author. 5. The *combinations* of images, elements, or facts which are produced by the imagination being vile, demoralizing, and destructive in their nature and tendency, correspond with the bad motives, the corrupt principles, and the perverted habit of the author. 6. Imagination differs from *fancy* in forming new combinations from the materials stored up in the memory, graduating them from the beautiful to the sublime, or from the awful to the more terrible. Fancy is that by which

the mind forms images or representations of facts or existences, while imagination is the power of combining and increasing, or of diminishing the interest of mental states. 7. Imagination differs from *admiration*; for the latter is no more than wonder mingled with emotions of love or veneration, or of that which is novel or great. 8. It differs from *fictions* in the results of its action. Fictions can only be regarded as fictions; but imagination blends elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity into one grand conception. 9. There is a difference between the imagination and *bombast*. The former may command, combine, and blend elements into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, while the latter consists in high-sounding words in an inflated style. A speaker, while enforcing the truthfulness and claims of his theme, had moved his audience with a general feeling of excitement under his thrilling eloquence, and closed with great applause and triumph in the following manner: "Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains; thrusting my tongue into the thunder's mouth, I would proclaim these truths to the ends of the world." Subsequently a young speaker attempted to use the same while delivering a discourse in a loud tone of voice and with great confidence: "Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains, and I would thrust my tongue into the thunder's mouth, and I'd, I'd, I'd howl like a wolf." Here is

evidence that the action of the imagination was imperfect, and that at first he had but a meager conception of what he wished to say. Bombast is without a correct blending of the beautiful, and without the proper presence and arrangement of ideas and thoughts.

SECTION III.

1. Imagination differs very much in nature and action from that of *burlesque*. The solemn thoughtfulness or real nature of the latter is only feigned for the purpose of exciting amusement or laughter by ludicrous images or representations. 2. Imagination differs from *sarcasm*. The latter may abound with imagery or beautiful language, but at the same time there is an ironical signification or expression. Though there is a granting of the claims of any person or people, yet there may be a keen, reproachful expression or satirical remark, with an influence, expression, or feeling of scorn, while imagination must be regarded as free from such peculiarities. 3. Feelings of *sympathy* are not wholly dependent upon imagination, though they may be aided by it. Though sympathy can and does not originate with or from it, yet a quick, active, and powerful imagination can and does combine images of suffering, gloom, and despair. A man whose moral sensibilities are still alive to action always has sympathy intuitively on the presentation of any object of suffering. But his feelings are much increased when he begins to imagine himself in like condition. 4. The imagination can be exercised in

works of fiction without injury *only* when such fiction is immediately connected with *truths* or *facts* in *nature*, and possessing the high moral character which Infinite Wisdom has connected with all he has made. 5. The *influence* of fictitious writings upon an active imagination is decidedly injurious. It weakens mental action in the examination of real and important truths, tends to fickleness and whimsicalness of mind, instability of character, and often leads to certain ruin. The Divine Being has filled an infinite space with an eternal range of existences or facts, so that the immortal mind can dwell on real facts or truths without number, and to endless ages increasing in majesty and glory. 6. The *utility* and *importance* of the imagination must be regarded as of no ordinary character. In neglecting the cultivation of this noble and important faculty of the mind, is to impede the power and action of the whole mind. 7. A *vigorous* and active imagination, in conveying our thoughts, or in describing facts in writing, is of great importance. To present imagery, or to correctly delineate scenes, facts, or transactions, or to paint them in their combinations and qualities, is effected principally under its control and action. 8. An active imagination is *essential* to true oratory. To conceive of a speaker's power to excite, move, and thrill an audience without such aid, is utterly impossible. True, affecting, and exciting eloquence can never exist in connection with that mind destitute of an active imagination. Under its combinations and blendings, derived from the language

of trope and metaphor, the orator may launch thunder-peals, startling the feelings or emotions of all around him. 9. The combinations, blendings, descriptions, and painting of the poet are without any *pleasing interest* unless the action of the mind is pervaded by an active imagination. 10. The sculptor's chisel can not trace upon the marble the living and desired expression or features of a friend if destitute of its power. It is this which enables him to render every form graceful and beautiful. And it is this faculty which causes others to admire the work when completed.

SECTION IV.

1. The *development* or *improvement* of the imagination can be secured by attending to the manner of its exercise or action, by continued efforts to extend its power and influence. 2. The influence of *disease* may affect the imagination; its action may be directed to an improper object or in a wrong channel. 3. It can lead us to *misconceptions* and improper action unless controlled by reason, motive, and virtue. We are apt to imagine that great warriors or statesmen, who have left the world, have died happy and are gone to heaven, when they have not, at any time, given one clear and conclusive evidence of such result, as required by the Gospel law. 4. It will *lead* to *deception*, if allowed to wander uncontrolled amid myriads of imaginary beings, or scenes of wealth and pleasure. It soon tends to abstract the mind from real existences, and causes it to dwell on the beautiful forms

of fancy, which are false, and upon the most whimsical speculations. It ceases to contemplate real existences at hand as worthy attention. It soon withdraws from all objects of worth and dwells in a world of conjecture. When the mind advances to this point it is midway from a rational state to that of insanity.

5. A continued *love* of and an *untiring pursuit* of *fiction* often diseases and sends out the entire desires of the mind upon the wing of supposition—feasting such desires with inaccessible enjoyments and perishable glory. Finally the mind becomes wearied with the staleness of all demonstrable truths, and fictions appear as realities. The sympathies and affections of the heart become cold and die for want of real and accessible objects upon which they can act. Often false opinions and lies become the dreams of life, an additional gloom in death, and the bitterness of eternal remorse. It would be far better to suffer, if possible, a thousand temporal deaths, than for the immortal soul to perish with invoked madness. Never dwell too long upon only one and the same idea if you would be sane on all points.

DIVISION SIXTH.

CHAPTER I.

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN AND INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN.

SECTION I.

1. THE powers of mind *arranged* under the preceding divisions of this work, or the greater number of them, have, by common consent of many writers, been arranged under the general heading of "intellectual states of *external origin*," and faculties, the defining of which we are now commencing, have been arranged under the heading of intellectual states of *internal origin*. In this arrangement there appears to be a distinction without a philosophical difference. 2. We object to the doctrine of intellectual states of *external origin*. They may exist as results of external causes; but for intellectual states to arise in the external world, or out of or beyond the limits of the mind itself, is clearly incorrect, and this is a philosophical deduction from the heading referred to. 3. If it is impossible for *intellectual* states to have external origin, then it is more absurd to regard the faculties or powers of the mind couched under such heading, as

having their origin externally or in the external world. There are external causes of mental states; but mental states and faculties can not have external origin till they arise out of the mind, which is impossible. 4. If we should say that any element or power of mind was of *external origin*, as to either its existence or action, would it not convey the idea that the origin, or commencement of its being was in connection with some inert element or existences of the external world? 5. If we say that any *mental state* is of external origin, would it not convey the idea that external physical elements have self-action, which action must first take place in order to affect the mind, which is at rest, creating new mental states?

SECTION II.

1. There can be no impropriety in saying that there are intellectual states of *internal origin*; for, although external objects may affect the mind through the medium of the senses, yet the mental state which follows must be wholly of and within the mind. And this state, though it follows an external cause, can not of itself be said to be of external origin. 2. The *origin* of all knowledge known to us, as such, is in the mind. The true study of psychology is of boundless importance. The undying soul may be said to contain within itself an eternity of meaning, being, and destiny. Through the medium of the senses we become acquainted with the realities, beauty, and grandeur of the external world; but by means of internal powers we can and do have

knowledge independent of material entities. 3. The most *ulterior origin* of knowledge in regard to external things, must begin with sensation. This knowledge only can embrace the fact that a sensation has been received, and that we have the presence of such an existent. 4. The action of *sensation* affecting the mind is immediately followed by a new mental state, which is the result of a reviving influence or action of the internal power of the soul. 5. The existence of simple *thoughts* and *ideas* must arise by and within the action of the internal power of the soul. The advancing of these from simple to complex, and the blending of them into combination, is real knowledge. Thinking, believing, hoping, and doubting have their origin wholly and only in the active internal power of the soul.

CHAPTER II.

SUGGESTION.

SECTION I.

1. SUGGESTION appears to be the *presentation* of an idea to the mind without the immediate aid of the senses. It has power within and by its own action to give rise to thoughts. We have notions, thoughts, and ideas which appear to be inspired, and arise from the internal action of the immaterial constitution. 2. *Simple* suggestions may be regarded as primary and natural. They have been regarded as a spontaneous result of intuitive power, or that they arise in the action of internal emotions or sensations. 3. From this internal action or states of the mind is suggested the notion of *self*, or of mind as real, and the cause and reality of change. *That* which suggests the idea of our being, or the notion of duration, is independent of the power and action of the senses or of sensation as to its origin. Such suggestions appear to arise from intuitive power and become the objects of consciousness, and such intimations appear to be essential to the nature of mind. 4. The idea of *self-existence* can not be tested by the senses. We can not see, hear, taste, or smell such an idea or fact, neither can we feel to originate the same, but it arises

from the mind itself. It is suggested spontaneously, from the very nature of the mind, as constituted by its sovereign Creator. 5. *The origin* of the idea of mind, as an existent, can not commence with the senses; for the senses are properly affected by external things, and no idea of mind can result abstractly from the existence of materiality. The origin of the notion is suggested by and from the nature of the mind within itself. 6. *The origin* of the notion or idea of personal identity is with the internal power of the soul. The beginning of such an idea is connected with the power of suggestion, and may be regarded as a simple idea, forever undefinable. But an idea or thought implies and is action; therefore, the self-acting power is of and within the mind itself.

SECTION II.

1. Suggestion is *involuntary* when thoughts arise in connection with other thoughts which are not at the time the special objects of the attention or of mental action. 2. This power may be said to be *voluntary* when we, by intentional cogitation, use certain thoughts, feelings, or bearings of facts in order to trace out other or similar things of which we have had no clear perception before. The discovery of each new fact suggests the idea of something as real still beyond. 3. *The origin of the idea* of material existences may be imparted to us through the medium of the senses, but we could not, from sight or touch alone, judge of the qualities or properties of a com-

pound beyond the surface which is seen or felt. But *that* which is tested by contact with the senses can and does suggest an idea of those properties which exist within or beyond the outer surface. 4. We are principally dependent upon suggestion as to the origin of our *idea of motion*. We can test the abstract existence and qualities of objects which are in motion, but there is a difference between that which moves and motion itself. Our idea of that which changes the relative position or order of things must be suggested; for motion can not be regarded as a real object of the sense; hence, the idea or notion of it can not arise from the power of the senses, but is suggested in the change and relative position of things. 5. We are dependent, in an important sense, upon *suggestive power* for our notion or idea of the relation of effect to its cause. The character of an effect may suggest the cause, guided in part by the presence and action of the senses; but the origin of the idea of the cause is wholly of suggestion. If it requires strength to raise a small stone from the earth, the thought of lifting a larger one naturally suggests the idea of additional power; hence, the presence of the vast globe naturally suggests a First Cause, or omnipotent power.

SECTION III.

1. The *origin* of the *idea* of *time* is connected with the suggestive power. Time is duration measured by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. We can not have clear conceptions of duration existing in succes-

sion, though we can have of duration which can be measured. The events which take place in time, and the relative positions in the flight of the orbs which measure it, can not give us a satisfactory idea of time; hence, such an idea arises from an internal suggestive power. 2. If *duration measured* can be called time, then duration without being measured, or being unfinished, may be called eternity. 3. We can not recall the time when we first received an *idea of space*. It appears to have arisen spontaneously, or is a result of an intuitive suggestive power. There is no way to represent space to the senses; it is without form, figure, or bounds. 4. *Resemblance* may be regarded as an ulterior law of suggestion. The primary power of suggestion is connected with the intuitive powers of the mind, as the previous argument will show. The mutual or reciprocal resemblance of objects often suggest each other, and is the occasion of recalling past existences by means of the suggestive power and its action. The house of a stranger may replace in the mind clear or vivid conceptions of the old homestead. The appearance of yonder grove, or the banks of that rolling river instantly revives the place of my childhood sports, and where my little brother and sister sleep peacefully waiting the sound of the last trump. The peculiar voice of a stranger may recall, as from the grave, that of my father. 5. The *internal action* of the suggestive power is aided by the contrast involved in the nature and existence of objects. The presence of the dead body of a cele-

brated warrior, statesman, or divine is almost instantly followed by their appearance when living and in their glory. 6. The *extremes of conditions*, in existences, suggest their opposites. In connection with the idea of a suffering beggar is suggested the thought of prosperity and happiness. The prairie which has smiled under the rays of a thousand summer's suns only affects the mind by the introduction of the thought or idea of dark, silent groves, or majestic forests waving in the living emerald of beauty and grandeur. 7. In thinking of some one of *cotemporaneous existences* often others of the same epoch are suggested. If objects distinct from each other, yet united by an invariable connection, as the batteries at the extremities of a telegraphic wire, the thought of the one often suggests the other. 8. The *activity* of the suggestive power depends much upon the *habit* or manner in which it is exercised. It should be tested and exerted with care and with repeated egressive efforts in presenting the mind with new and delightful truths or facts. In the contemplating of these natural truths the mind rises, admiring the power and goodness of Him who reared the forest, commands the storm, rolls the ocean, and eliminated, as from the uncreated light of Lights, the planetary lamps which move in boundless space around us.

CHAPTER III.

RELATIVE SUGGESTION.

SECTION I.

1. IN contemplating objects the mind is capable of receiving impressions, or of being influenced in regard to *certain relations* which such objects mutually sustain to each other. *That* which awakens a feeling or mental state in regard to the natural relationship of objects is called *relative* suggestion. Without doubt the mind is capable of such an influence, but it is difficult to clearly define its office, as it appears to be midway between the nature or character of simple suggestion and that of the judgment. Yet suggestive power, in any way or to any degree of strength, is clearly distinct from that of the judgment. 2. The mind is capable of experiencing *certain influences*, which are affected by a peculiar relationship of objects of similar or dissimilar coördinate properties or qualities, which give rise to a new class of feelings and mental states. 3. *Influences of relation* may arise and be suggested, or experienced by the mind, in the notice or contemplation of a great variety of realities or facts. The degrees of difference which glow in the emerald hues of a summer forest, are the occasions of giving rise to the first apprehensions, or per-

ceptions, of the different kinds of trees composing that forest, and other relative facts. In the sound of the national band, one instrument is loud, and another soft; in touching frozen mercury and cotton, or in tasting different kinds of fruit, there are natural differences, the relations of which affect or influence the mind in regard to them. 4. *Terms of correlative character* may involve and express that which is intended to be explained. The mere mention of them involves the relation they sustain to other objects. In the use of the terms father, mother, governor, or commander, the relations are the more direct causes of a full mental action.

SECTION II.

1. *Relative suggestion* does not depend upon the power of the *senses* for its existence, else brutes and birds would have it as fully developed as man; for they can see and hear as well as we can; but as to their power of suggestion, or their perception of relations being well developed is very doubtful. The idea of the tallness of a tree could not be conveyed to us by sight only; for if no tree of any kind existed save that one, it would, doubtless, appear neither tall nor short; but if we know that tall and short trees are before us, it is evident that their relation has been suggested to the mind, and has been an object of mental action. 2. We are not dependent upon the *action of the senses* in recognizing, and in realizing the mutual relationship of hope and expectation, love and joy, or

that joy and grief are opposites; yet these relations give rise to mental influences and new states of mind. The number of relations which affect or cause action of the suggestive power, in consequence of which new mental states are experienced, or take place, are almost as the stars of heaven for number. What a limitless variety of objects and facts contribute to the action and resources of the mind! What must mind be contemplated in the perfection of its powers! What an eternity of duration, and infinity of feeling, memory, knowledge, action, and being within itself! Imperishable gem, assert the power of immortal faculties; for living thou shalt never cease to be. 3. *The extent* of this power, and the number of objects and facts involved in its action, can not readily be defined. Its action is connected with relations of coexistence, resemblance, diversity, degree, and position. With more than lightning speed it sends forth pioneer thoughts upon the road of interminable duration, without ever arriving at the ulterior bounds of its dominion. 4. Who can define and contemplate the soul *perfected* in its departure from earth? Progressive flight! when millions of rising series in knowledge have been numbered, comprehended, and passed, still onward in knowing more, and still more, of the incomprehensible fullness, love, and goodness of that Being to whom it owes its existence!

CHAPTER IV.

THE JUDGMENT.

SECTION I.

1. THE faculty of the human mind called *judgment* has often been acknowledged, while something else has been defined in lieu of it. Its existence can not but be acknowledged, for it is a real faculty, and as such should be defined. 2. It is *that faculty* of the mind by which we are enabled to compare ideas or thoughts, and to determine upon the evidence as to preferences, or that which is right or wrong. By it we not only compare ideas and thoughts, but we advance to compare the relations of terms, of propositions, and of arguments; also to determine upon that which is correct. 3. It is *that* which may be called the determination of the mind, in which we become satisfied from the evidence and influence received in comparing the relations of ideas, thoughts, propositions, and arguments. 4. It is not only the act of judging, but is the *power* by which such process or action is concluded. And if it has power to examine the agreement or disagreement of things in order to arrive at the truth, it has power to determine or decide upon that truth after it is found or defined. It not only has power to examine and determine upon

relations, and the correct stages of argumentation, but is the concluding action of the mind in regard to determining the truthfulness of objects or entities, and of determining the mind favorably to truths, whether casual or substantial. 5. The faculty of judgment is a particular *power within itself*; it is not to be taught in order to have being; its origin is connected with the existence and action of the primary elements. It is not originated by education, but exists only to be exercised. If it is naturally deficient, there is no process of instruction that can supply the defect. The understanding may be naturally perfect, and the same may be true of suggestion, or other powers; but if the judgment is deficient, the mind generally acts hastily and at the first intention. 6. The judgment has not only power to determine an action, concluding, or of finishing that which may be called a mental process satisfactorily, but can *analyze, abstract, classify, and generalize*. By it we can class an individual existent under a general notion in the affirmation, as that is an animal of a certain kind, or that is a tree of a special kind, or from a certain mountain.

SECTION II.

1. *A naturally-defective* faculty of judgment is attended with great uncertainty and much confusion, as to a proper discrimination and action in regard to what is right or wrong. Such minds may desire to do right and act conscientiously in all things, but there is plainly a want of proper and safe decisions.

They should share of the charity of others rather than suffer severe penalties in case of wrong acts. 2. The judgment *presupposes the understanding*. The latter may exist without the former, but the judgment can not exist with any special manifestation without the understanding. The latter furnishes the materials or facts upon which the former acts. It furnishes to the judgment that which is capable of being analyzed, abstracted, classified, or generalized. 3. The understanding only knows objects as they really exist, and as they are presented to the mind; but the *judgment must discriminate* by arranging them together, and by evolving those things which agree or disagree; and it depends upon this power to give a decision accordingly and correctly. 4. The *action* of the faculty of judgment is so closely connected with reason, that reference to the one may aid in explaining the other. Reason embraces the ground of an opinion, or the premises of an argument upon, and from which the argument is based, and carefully carried through to the conclusion. The judgment appears to inspect this process, and weighs the facts presented in the different objects so as to decide upon them, or the correctness of the conclusion of an argument, by deciding upon all the facts involved in the argument, even to the correctness of the premises, unless such premises be free from confusion or doubt, and then the judgment must approve the same. That the judgment is really and only reason is absurd. Reason, unaided by judgment, does not appear to know any thing but the premises

and conclusion, with the regular argument, or successive steps in going from the one to the other, while the judgment appears to decide upon the truthfulness and the amount of weight that should be attached to all the facts, together with the justness of the conclusion.

SECTION III.

1. We may readily decompose a compound, but it requires the *presence of the judgment* in attending to the agreement or disagreement of the properties and the relations of resemblances—the natural adaptation and agreement of the parts to each other and to the whole. It is the work of the judgment to clearly discriminate these facts, and to so satisfy the mind in regard to them. 2. The truthfulness of axioms, and the relations of angles and propositions, are *objects of the judgment*. If we say that all axioms which lie at the foundation of mathematical science are self-evident truths, incapable of either proof or disproof, it requires the exercise of the judgment in order to receive them as such free from doubt. 3. The skill and success of a physician greatly depends upon *this faculty*, or mental power. He must be able to judge of the symptoms by which a disease may be known, though they may resemble those of other diseases, as well as the effect of certain remedies upon disease, and upon different physical constitutions. 4. Decisions may be true or false, in proportion to the clearness and distinctness with which we *judge* in weighing all the facts and influences connected with the

premises, argument, and conclusion. He who arrives at conclusions upon slight, partial, or imperfect evidence, and is unwilling to admit corrective facts, will be almost invariably wrong in his decisions. If, with pure motive, he attempts to regulate his own conduct, and is not guided by a proper judgment, he is liable to be led, by the most hasty impressions or feelings, to quick and rash conclusions; therefore, we should form our opinions with care, properly judging all the facts which would naturally lead to sound results.

SECTION IV.

1. The faculty or power of judging *differs* from *that* of the understanding. The understanding seems to know notions or objects as they appear, but it requires the exercise of judgment to abstract or classify according to natural principles and differences, so we can have clear and real knowledge of their existence. That which is the object of the understanding is that which is decided upon by a well-developed judgment. If the power of the understanding be vigorous and well developed, and that of the judgment radically deficient, the mind will have experienced the presence of many facts without the power of combining them, so as to have distinct and decisive use of them: hence the knowledge of many things, but the control of almost none to advantage. 2. The *power* of judging is closely connected with *that of suggestion*. The latter consists in the first intimation, or presentation, of a fact or ideas to the mind, but the former has decisive

power in regard to them, which proceeds upon the notice of, and the influence or weight of all the differences compared and balanced. The action of the power of judging is clearly different and distinct from that of suggestion. 3. The power and action of *relative suggestion* is not one and the same with *that of judgment*. The former takes place when the mind experiences the first effects, or influences, which arise out of certain relations that different objects mutually sustain to each other. The making known to the mind, merely, the first intimations of mutual relationship may be called relative suggestion, but it requires an act of judgment to decide upon the causes of these relations, and the importance that should be attached to each, or all the facts connected; and we can not have clear conceptions and a distinctive command over them, only as it is given by the correct exercise of judgment. That the judgment only acts under the controlling influence of suggestion, or that of relative suggestion, is absurd; but it has the natural right, and does act upon and in regard to all facts or influences which are the objects of mental action, being embraced in the power of suggestion, or of relative suggestion. And it is clearly and unquestionably true that it differs from them both as to its nature and office in the mind. 4. The importance of a *well-developed and active judgment* is incalculable. The acquisition of knowledge, and right use of it, in adding to our own happiness and to the happiness of others, depends upon it. If we are deficient in

regard to the power of this faculty, we never can act with that degree of prudence and discretion that the laws of propriety and right require; but with a mature and well-regulated judgment we are furnished with facts from all sources, together with an unshaken belief in, and command of them, upon which we can depend with the utmost confidence, and can arrange either to hide from the dangers and storms of earth, or triumph over and beyond their power.

DIVISION SEVENTH.



CHAPTER I.

REASON.

SECTION I.

1. REASON is a faculty of the mind, having power to act, or of remaining at rest. It is connected with the intuitive elements of our being, and can be cultivated so as to increase its power of vividness in action, but it is impossible for its origin to be the result of education. It is that principle of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from error, and good from evil. In the exercise of this function other faculties appear to harmonize, and can be called into action as auxiliaries in the investigation of truth, and in distinguishing between that which is correct and that which is false. 2. *This principle* enables us to allege or assert, with confidence, the ground or cause of opinion upon which is to be built the elements of argumentation, or facts leading from the cause to the conclusion. 3. *Ratiocination* can not exist without a power competent to be the foundation of such action. It is this power which enables us to arrive at a knowledge of the process of demonstration, both as to the facts involved and the correctness of the process. 4.

Reason is not only a power existing in the mind, but is capable of action. It is a faculty capable of acting, and such action is reasoning when appropriate facts are involved as materials of argumentation, and influences and results are correctly deducted from the premises. Reason, as to its natural and real existence, is correct, and so we may regard it when in action; for we can not have conceptions of incorrect reasoning. The judgment will admit of degrees, but the moment reason is incorrect it ceases to be reason. The chain of facts is broken, or the relation of effect to cause, or of cause to effect, is unjointed, and the action of reason being intercepted, ceases to be either reason or reasonable. 5. *Reason differs* from the understanding. The latter is that which apprehends and embraces things presented to it, but reason proceeds, in the investigation, to the certain knowledge of their real existence and character. Notions may arise with, or be given by the understanding, but reason enables the mind to investigate the truthfulness of them, or to know that which is true and that which is false.

SECTION II.

1. The power of reason *exists* in the *mind*, and is connected with its intuitive faculties. Its origin is neither the result of habit nor of education, and the objects of its action can not be numbered. 2. There are certain *intuitive facts*, and self-evident truths, which can not be tested by reason. Such self-evident existences are in the mind, and lie at the foundation of

rationality. 3. Self-evident truths may be divided into *two classes*: (1.) Those truths which lie at the *foundation* of the philosophy of mind; and, (2.) Those truths which belong to, and are connected with, the *science* which appertains to *external* things. The axioms, or self-evident truths, upon which the whole of mathematical science stands, or is based, are incapable of either proof or disproof; yet we are compelled to receive them, as facts, independently of any power of reason; therefore, what power is capable of receiving the primary, self-evident facts which lie at the foundation of all external science or knowledge, but the intuitive, self-evident elements which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind? 4. *These intuitive principles* are the foundation and origin of all knowledge to us: hence intuitive internal facts, or elements, with our feelings and experience, are to be depended upon as true with more absolute certainty than the knowledge of all external things; for the latter are tested by and through the medium of the senses, which may deceive us by reason of their connection, often, with diseased physical nerves, while internal feelings, or facts, are objects of direct knowledge, without the interception of physical elements. 5. A knowledge of *our own existence* arises in connection with the power and action of the primary elements of the mind. Self-evident truths, which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind, have power to affirm and know our own existence; and in their existence and power we have knowledge of all other

facts within the bounds of mental action. With them arises the conviction of our own existence; and being identified with their being and nature, it is utterly impossible for us to avoid the knowledge of our real entity. With the same powers arises the conviction as to the distinct nature of the mind from the body, and that the mind is capable of thinking and acting without the aid of the material organs. Knowledge implies a power capable of knowing, and objects capable of being known. Those elements which are capable of experiencing a conviction of their own existence, and that of other existences, may be regarded as primary, self-evident principles.

SECTION III.

1. In connection with the power of reason is our *confidence in the uniformity* of the laws of nature. The cognizance of the exactness, or uniform manner in the succession of phenomena, evolving the relations of sequences and antecedents, of effect and cause, gives rise to a conviction and notion of their order and obedience to law, all of which enters into our experience and knowledge. The origin of such conviction is connected with intuitive power. Experience, guided by reason, enables us to apply it to the proper objects, or process, in successive events. 2. Our immediate confidence in the *uniformity of phenomena* gives origin to the notion of causation. The regular tendency of one event to follow another, becoming or affecting an abiding expe-

rience, gives rise to the conviction that the former is that of cause, and the latter is the result or effect. We then regard the cause as adequate to the effect. The next item is, to notice the character or nature of both cause and effect, and if these uniformly harmonize, we come to the conclusion that the same cause, under the same laws, will invariably produce the same effect. 3. The *conduct* of all persons shows their *belief* in the existence of primary truths, whether they acknowledge or deny such existences. No skeptical philosopher can proceed in the investigation of any fact without involving a reference, and clear evidence of his belief in their existence, though he may deny the same at every step or degree of his argument. If he is in quest of some primary truth, the absence of which would soon involve him in sufferings or death, it would be revolting to all his feelings to be informed that there was no such thing in existence; and his dismay would be augmented if he should be reminded that to prove such an existent, is that he own his own existence to be utterly impossible. How can he prove origin to self-knowledge, or the beginning in which he knows his own existence to be real? Without confidence in such settled facts, how could he contemplate *that* which, from the regular chain of such truths, will affect his interest or happiness in the future, or be certain that the pain he had received, in time past, was experienced by the same person, called by his name, and which he now thinks to be himself? 4. If he looks upon a beautifully-finished tower, it is

natural for the mind to run back to the *beginning*, at the foundation, and to inquire as to the process of building, and also as to who the builder was. Notwithstanding he is assured by thousands that it exists without a cause, builder, or beginning, which would accord with his avowed faith, yet an internal, intuitive conviction would appeal to his understanding, and thunder the perpetual lie to such defective assertions. In all cases, those who labor to deny first truths are wholly dependent upon them for facts by which they are rendered capable of doubting or of denying the very truths which are the foundation of all the knowledge their minds are capable of. 5. There is a difference between the *process of argumentation* and the mere *action* of the reasoning power, in arriving at primary truths. The mind, which is capable of correct argumentation, has power to evolve facts by basing one upon another, or by connecting them in a correct chain from the first to the final result. It is natural and easy for us to believe that an effect must have an adequate cause. When we look on the trembling fires of yonder heavens, we believe in a great First Cause, and see the power and design of Deity as written in the existing flower, rustling leaf, burning sun, or flying orbs. 6. *Reason differs* from *consciousness*, the latter being the knowledge of mental operations and of sensations, or that act of the mind which makes known internal objects or feelings. The former evolves and connects facts in arriving at results, and apprehends truths necessary, absolute, and universal.

7. Its *power differs* from that of the senses. The latter may be regarded as the medium through which sensations make their appeal to the mind; but the former commands the energies of the mind in amplifying its research, and in extending its knowledge.

8. *It differs* from the judgment. It appertains to the latter to discriminate, combine, and decide upon the truthfulness of that which is used in argumentation, and also the relations of facts and the correctness of the state, and each position of the argument; but it requires the presence and action of reason to properly connect this chain, and in forming a correct process and conclusion.

9. *Reason differs*, also, from the understanding. The latter apprehends the real state of that which is presented to it, or is the power of believing; while the former leads to a satisfactory result, or certain knowledge.

10. In connection with the power of reason arises *convictions* in relation to *right* and *wrong*. The mind is capable of being influenced, and has intuitive power to act in reference to, and in distinguishing between good or bad, right or wrong. An intuitive influence affects the mind favorably in regard to right, and deters it in relation to evil.

11. In connection with the power of reason, we may experience, or have, to some extent, ideas of that which is *beautiful or sublime*. Many objects of the same class may differ in degree of beauty; that in each which approaches nearest the most perfect one, or to our conceptions of a perfect model, requires the presence and action of reason, in arriving to a correct

equilibrium, or balancing of them, and to just conclusions. The descriptions of an orator may surpass the perfections of that which forms the object. The painter may surpass the natural beauties of the landscape, or the graphic sublimity of some occurrence or reality. The arrangement and regularity of these must require the presence and action of reason.

CHAPTER II.

REASONING.

SECTION I.

1. REASONING is the power of reason in action. It is the act or process of exercising the faculty of reason, in and by which new or unknown propositions or facts are deduced from previous ones, and previous facts are established from the relation and character of their results or effects. 2. *The correct exercise* of reason is destructive to *atheism* or the *foundation of infidelity*. We know that an effect can not exist without a cause, and we can not believe in a cause that is inadequate to the effect which follows it. Universal existences all around us confirm our belief in the existence of a great First Cause; and the idea of such cause, or Being, is a first truth of reason. 3. *Two modes* of argumentation will settle and confirm our belief. The *first* evidence or proofs are drawn from the *necessity* that such a being must exist independently of the evidences which are every-where written upon his works. The *second* embraces proofs or evidences of his being and perfections as given in his works. We now proceed to examine these two modes of argumentation.

SECTION II.

1. If there be *no one being* in infinite space but such as might possibly not have had a being, it would follow that there might possibly have never been any existent; hence the possibility that such an entity might have arisen from nonentity. This is impossible. Then it is impossible that there might have been no existence in any way; therefore, an impossibility of not existing must be true, and there must have been a being whose non-existence is impossible, otherwise the truthfulness of all reason and knowledge would be reversed. 2. All the *essence* and *attributes* of an unoriginated being must be unoriginated, and necessarily self-existent. Such an essence, or being, can not give origin to its own attributes, unless it had power to act before it existed, which would be impossible. Such a being must be real, absolute, self-existing, and eternal; for any thing finite, or contingent, must have a cause which would be anterior, and show that such finity, or contingent, could not be causation nor eternal. 3. *The attributes* of an unoriginated being must be absolute and limitless, otherwise they would be imperfect or limited, and that would involve a modifying cause; but no such cause can be acknowledged, as such cause would be imperfect. But the cause of which we speak, being perfect, lies back of all things, and may be styled the cause of causes, being infinite or eternal. No modifying cause can be allowed, as such could not be

absolute in perfection, and could not be eternal; and all imperfect attributes, or any attribute which is not infinitely perfect within itself, is finite to some degree, and must be capable of greater perfection by improvement, exercise, and experience. This would prove imperfection in an unoriginated being, and that he was perfecting his attributes and existence by self-action, experience, and further acquaintance with his own works. His being, and each attribute, must be perfect and unoriginated. 4. Such an unoriginated and infinite being *must exist every-where*, in the same way and manner he does any where, otherwise there must be a cause by which his existence and presence is limited. But there is and can be no cause limiting the existence, action, or presence of Deity; for there can be but one first cause, which cause, from necessity, must be unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal. It is utterly impossible for us to have conception of more than one infinite space, and beyond this thought can not travel; neither can we have any idea of any out border, or limitation to the innumerable worlds which are the result of a cause lying still back of their origin and motion. Then if there is only one infinite space, it can contain only one infinite series of points in that limitless space; therefore, that reality which is capable of filling each point in infinite space must be indivisible, one, and infinite. As two or more infinite beings can not occupy one and the same infinite space, filled with only one series of infinite points, without being one and the same

being, therefore there is one, and only one unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal cause and Governor of the universe.

SECTION III.

1. *This unoriginated* being must be a reality, precisely the same in every place, not consisting of parts, as they would naturally exist independently; nor of whole, for that would imply a combination of parts; nor of degree, as that would signify imperfection and quantity with comparison; therefore, this being is one and omnipresent, without any thing like degrees, comparison, or limitation. 2. Such a being can not be *materiality*, for this would come under the laws which govern it, and would have density, divisibility, form with limitation. Nonentity can not give origin to matter; and matter which is limited can not give origin to matter, for it contains no power of self-action; much less could it produce an existent with self-cogitative power, being within and of itself unthinking; and if a portion of matter was eternal, it could not originate other inert elements, much less give origin to self-acting and cogitative intelligences. 3. If *matter* and *motion* were both eternal, and could be connected together, yet they never could produce a cogitative mind. Matter and motion, though changed or varied in any possible way, yet the particles could only meet, impel, and resist each other. Then, if nothing were eternal, matter could never have had origin, as it could not result from nothing. If matter without motion were eternal, then motion

could never have a beginning; for matter has no self-motion. If only matter and motion are eternal, then thought or intellectual action could never have being; for matter, either at rest or in motion, can not originate cogitation and knowledge; neither is it capable, abstractly, within and of itself, to act and feel joy, pleasure, or grief. Then the first being must be infinite, and must have self-power to act, think, foresee, and arrange the beginning and real existence of all finite things; and that which is first of all things must really possess, of necessity, absolute perfections, as nothing which is essential to such an existent could ever be added; for that which was added would be finite, and in this respect imperfect, and would be created. 4. Such a being must *possess wisdom* and *power* without limitation, and all other *attributes* must be, within themselves, absolutely perfect. 5. The *existence of more than one* unoriginated being in the universe, or the same infinite space, is utterly impossible. Such a being is possessed of infinite attributes, and must, of necessity, be present in every point in infinity. A second unoriginated being must be equal to the first in every respect, as both must, necessarily, be eternal, from the fact that they are unoriginated; therefore, as there can be only one infinity to be occupied or filled by them, that infinity can be no more than perfectly filled; and those two unoriginated and infinite beings must, necessarily, be the same in essence or nature, every-where present, incapable of any distinction or dissimilarity, and, of absolute necessity, they would have to be one and the same. 6.

The *absolute omnipotent power* of Deity does not make his acts either *arbitrary* or of *necessity*. They are free in their nature and power, and are with effort, otherwise such acts would be of necessity, which necessity would be the cause, and not the free power of absolute perfection in unison. What he willeth he can do, yet nothing is done by him only that which is right. He is too wise to err, and too good to be unkind. 7. His omnipotence does not *necessitate* his knowledge; yet he knows all things, and there is nothing hid from him. Necessity would imply something that was, or is yet to be explored by him; whereas, if there is any thing which he would not choose to know, as contingent or otherwise, it would imply that he must first know what that is before he would choose not to know it. 8. *From reason* we may infer that the object of man's existence was to share of the endless goodness of God; his duty was to glorify his Creator; and that the performance of this duty wholly depends upon volition; therefore, he must be created free to serve and glorify God. If such service was of necessity, or by requisition, then such requisition would be the agent in rendering glory, while man would be passive: hence, the object of our being would have been cut off by law, and, of course, our existence would have been impossible.

SECTION IV

1. We now proceed to the *second mode of reasoning*, which is to establish or prove the existence of

Deity, by arguing from *effect to cause*. 2. Our conceptions of a being of *infinite power* and *wisdom* would naturally lead us to suppose such power and wisdom would be evidenced in the variety, multiplicity, agreement, dependence, mystery, and design which exist in, and in connection with all his works. That which we can comprehend, and those things which we can not comprehend, are alike characteristic of his power and wisdom, and are evidences of his being. 3. There is evidence of the *wisdom and power* of Deity in the different systems of innumerable orbs which glow in the heavens. The order, distances, velocity, gravitation, and centripetal forces; the diurnal and orbital motions, all of these are conclusive evidences of the wisdom, power, and existence of God; for these things are neither of self-origin nor accidental. 4. *The earth* contains, in its own structure, *evidences* of the presence and power of an infinite Creator. Its internal order contains the archives of its own periods and ages. Vegetation upon its surface is mysteriously promoted by the circulation of nutritious properties elevated by capillary influences, forming ligneous fibers, or is consolidated in trunks, boughs, and leaves. The delicate fibers and glowing tints of almost an endless variety of flowers, can only be regarded as so many evidences of the wisdom and goodness of the great Creator. 5. There is evidence of the existence of Deity in the *order of providence*, which meets the demands of all animated or self-moving beings—the regular return of the sea-

sons, the descending rain, and warming sun, each year yielding a sufficiency, and not too much. 6. *Life, sleep, vision, and muscular action* are evidences, and furnish positive proof of the *existence* of Deity. It is utterly impossible for any finite existence or influence to originate, and keep in regular action, the expansion and contraction of the intercostal nerves, by which, in part, the lungs are enabled to inhale the atmospheric air, receive the oxygen, and throw off the carbon from the blood. We have no self-power to keep up this process, yet it goes on whether we sleep or wake. Reason, together with the facts in the case, teaches us that this process is arranged and continued by the wisdom and constant presence of a merciful Creator, and the very moment the influence of his presence is withdrawn from these nerves our breath is paused forever. 7. Another source of evidence may be found in connection with the *circulation of the blood*. It is stated that in health the heart, in one minute of time, makes eighty pulsations, and a little over two ounces of blood are expelled into the aorta at each pulsation—about nine thousand six hundred ounces every hour, and about one thousand four hundred and forty pounds per day! It is also stated that each pulsation of the heart propels the blood eight inches, making fifty feet in one minute! The average quantity of blood in each human body is about thirty pounds, and is said to pass through the heart twenty-three times in one hour. In calculating the velocity, and the force necessary to effect action

to the remotest extremities of the arteries, or where their anastomosis with the veins take place, and the mysterious counteraction of the blood in the veins to the heart again, would require the heart, in its legitimate office and action, to possess the astonishing power of four hundred pounds. Who is prepared to acknowledge that the realities and processes of action are the result of inert materiality, or of chance or accident?

SECTION V.

1. But how are we to account for the irregular, yet continuous, *expansion and contraction* of the muscles and cords of the heart, which gives motion to the blood, upon which depends the perpetuity of life? These muscles and cords, being matter, have no self-power to move or act, and the suspension of such action is death. Human knowledge has never attempted to solve the mystery, but in one way that had the least appearance of reason; that is, that the pulsations of the heart are caused by the stimulating nature of the blood. 2. This has been *disproved* by the following experiments: (1.) If we apply a stimulus to the muscles of the heart of an animal after it is emptied, it will dilate and contract as if it were full. (2.) If all the large vessels of the heart be entirely emptied, the dilations and contractions will continue for some time, in the entire absence of the blood, and it will be discovered that the dilations are as forcible as are the contractions. 3. The continued and *unwearied action* of the heart is evidence of the

infinite wisdom and presence of its Creator. That which exhausts all other muscles of the body increases the power and action of the heart. This action is wholly involuntary, and the muscles and delicate cords of the heart, unlike any other physical powers, may act incessantly, and *without weariness*, for a hundred years. Natural laws can never explain this. 4. Reason may be regarded, in a certain sense, to be the *power*, and *reasoning* the *action*, or *process*, of deducing conclusions from premises. This process adds a second step to that which has been used, and a third to the second, and so on to the last, or the conclusion. In other words, it may be regarded as that process of action which connects a chain of facts, or a train of reasoning, involving them as a whole, and, in their legitimate order, or appropriate fitness, as parts most naturally adapted to the nature of the premises or proposition. Reasoning is the continued exercise of reason, in the demonstration or investigation of subjects, or series of facts, tracing their relations, arriving at and establishing legitimate conclusions. 5. Reasoning is a *source of specific* and *certain knowledge*, giving the mind a controlling power over the different steps, degrees, or relations of things, or realities, which would be too complicated and obscure to be known to us in any other way. It enables the mind to penetrate the unexplored mysteries of nature, and its action is the occasion of the origin of new ideas and new series of interwoven facts, or change of propositions.

SECTION VI.

1. When *effect* is the object of a reasoning process, its cause is implied; for such an object, first known to us as a result, or effect, would involve reasons as to why it is thus characterized, and an investigation would employ the power of reason in tracing backward each step to a cause, and such a cause as would be adequate to the effect, and corresponding in nature or qualities. 2. Reasoning *a priori* deduces consequences or results from definitions formed, or facts assumed, or infers effects from causes previously known; and is that process, or kind of reasoning, by which an effect or result is proved from a cause. From the nature and relation of combined facts, or propositions, we can readily assume results corresponding to the legitimate tendency of such antecedents or causes. That general adaptation or fitness, blending and harmonizing existences, naturally leads us to infer or believe in other corresponding realities. This kind of reasoning is common, whether in the mind abstractly, or carried on in relation to external things through the medium of the senses. 3. Reasoning *a posteriori* is drawn or proceeds from effect, facts, or results. We might say that reasoning *a priori* is from cause to effect; but reasoning *a posteriori* is from effect to cause; yet both methods can be varied in accordance with different varieties of facts or propositions. A process of reasoning may commence with an effect or result, and extend back to a cause, or to

something of anterior existence. 4. In every correct process of reasoning there are *three things* which must claim our attention. (1.) We must *know the premises* to be correct or true. If not, we can not proceed correctly; and if there is any doubt in regard to this, we should prove the premises true, if susceptible of proof. (2.) The truthfulness of the premises being established, the chain of reasoning, it may be, consisting of numerous distinct facts, arguments, propositions, or steps, must *all be true within themselves*, and correspond in respect to the same premises, and so connected that one step in the argument becomes an essential part of the premises of the subsequent one, till the entire argument is completed. All intermediate steps, from the premises to the conclusion, must be carefully examined and known to be correct. (3.) With *caution* in the preceding steps, the *conclusion or result* will be easy and natural; but we must know that such conclusion is a legitimate result of the preceding argument, corresponding to the correct force, natural existence, condition, or influence of the truths which have compelled such a result or conclusion. 5. The power of correct reasoning *depends very much upon attention* and the *judgment*. Progressive reasoning evolves new facts, attention places them under the inspection of the mind. The judgment discriminates and decides upon their appropriateness and truthfulness.

SECTION VII.

1. *Mathematical reasoning* has been regarded as being superior to mental reasoning, from the fact that

there are fewer intermingling or connected contingencies, and we have not so many things to assume. This, in part, is true; but we are not prepared to admit that mathematical propositions or demonstrations are worthy of as much confidence or belief as those which are mental or moral. 2. *If, in numerical reasoning*, nothing is assumed or taken for granted, in regard to the truthfulness and existence of premises, upon which the reasoning is founded; and if all necessary assumptions are few, contingent, and easily freed from intricacy, yet the *power* of knowing and of receiving these as true realities, is found connected with and in the intuitive power of the mind. 3. *No fact, tested* by the power, or received through the medium of the senses, can be known as real and true *only as the internal, intuitive power* of the primary elements of the mind enables us to receive and know them to be such. It is this power alone which enables us to know that the axioms which are the foundation of all mathematical calculations and demonstrations, are self-evident truths. 4. *Internal mental or moral reasoning* can not be said to be of remote origin, and received, in whole or in part, through intercepting mediums; but our knowledge of such is direct, present, and experimental. 5. *Demonstrative reasoning* is used to probably a greater extent among the masses than any other, progressing from cause to effect, or from premises to the conclusion, showing, or proving, by clear and certain evidence, the result. 6. *Investigative reasoning* is that kind of disquisition

which involves the idea of vivid, keen, and penetrating mental action; and is that kind of progressive mental action which forces its way into hidden fields of realities. It searches minutely, bringing to light new facts, which may evolve others connecting, or adding them into appropriate incursive chains, rendering such dormant treasures the conquest of research and imperishable knowledge. 7. *False investigative reasoning* may take place or exist when the acknowledged primary facts are untrue, either in whole or in part, or in their conditioned combination or relation. 8. *False reasoning* may take place by assuming premises or propositions which are incorrect within themselves, or which are not naturally adapted to the conclusion desired. (1.) *By assuming a proposition* asserted to be a conclusion of some previous process of reasoning, without examining such former process, or knowing it to have existed, and to be true or correct. (2.) *By confusing the distinctiveness* of each step in the connected links or chain of reasoning, thoroughly rendering a change in position possible, and without detection. (3.) *By commencing the argument* at some point far removed from the premises. (4.) *By petitio principii*, or begging the question in assuming a principle which amounts to the same thing to be proved, or which may vary slightly in some almost imperceptible way. (5.) *By assuming a principle, and then wandering off*, reasoning on many contingent things, till they can be combined together, from which the reasoning commences, without any connection with

the first assumed principle ; or by reasoning in a circle, in assuming a principle, and employing it to establish some other reality or facts, which fact or facts are used to prove the first assumed principle. (6.)

False reasoning may arise by means of the sophistical use of terms and analogies in principles assumed, all of which can be corrected by careful examination.

9. *Reasoning* may be influenced improperly by an impure motive. This will so bias the efforts of the mind as to cause more than a due proportion of attention to be bestowed upon those things most intimately connected with some conclusion designed or desired, while real facts, naturally adapted to the argument, receive such a slight proportion of attention as to be finally lost from the argument, or have no special influence. 10. *Prejudice* will affect reasoning so as to distract or destroy its accuracy; for in this way opinions are formed before the subject has been investigated or examined. Reader, if you would start right, and continue in a right course, never prejudge the subject of your inquiries, and never dare to act according to or with an improper or vitiated motive ! Let motive be pure forever.

DIVISION EIGHTH.

CHAPTER I.

DREAMING

SECTION I.

1. DREAMING is having thoughts, notions, or ideas in or during sleep. They may arise in connection with only one subject, or we may experience a series of thoughts or moral impressions. Under the above heading we shall define that which may be called *mental* dreaming; and, in another place, we will define *moral* dreaming, as there are two kinds clearly distinct in nature. 2. It may be regarded as *wholly involuntary*; for we often experience impressions, or ideas, which arise in the mind, of an unpleasant nature, or those which are revolting to us, but have no power to divert our notice of them, though we experience an effort to effect such change. 3. Dreaming is *common* to all persons; yet some dream much more frequently than others. But very few have ever asserted that they have never experienced any thing of the kind. Those who think so, may have dreamed and be unable to recall them in waking hours. 4. *Mental dreaming*, as a general rule, arises in the mind, or is one of those states which take place in

sleep, immediately following and corresponding with those facts, or subjects, which were the objects of mental action previous to the slumber in which such ideas arise. 5. *Mental states of mind*, which take place under the influence of dreams, are not to be depended upon as true preludes of things to come. They are mere circumstantial or casual states, which can not be regarded as positive evidence that those things made known in dreams will ever occur, or that their opposites will come true. 6. Dreaming may, in some degree, be *caused* by physical debilitation. On careful observation it has been ascertained that dreams are pleasant or revolting in proportion to the strength and health of the body. In good health the occurrences experienced in the mind, while under the influence of slumber, are apt to be of an agreeable or pleasant character; and if we are verging to an attack of disease, we are apt to rest imperfectly in sleep, and our dreams are oppressive and generally of a disagreeable character.

SECTION II.

1. There is no *fixed law of conformity or of agreement* in relation to dreams; for there is great disagreement and contradiction in them. Such thoughts are often disconnected and desultory. These irregularities are not corrected by reason, judgment, and the exercise of the senses, in regard to definite truths and settled laws in external things; and those mental powers which have a correcting control over the mind

are partially suspended. 2. We are now prepared to go still further, and say that we may have facts revealed to us in dreams of which we *have never had any conclusive knowledge*. Students have been known to work late at night at propositions in mathematics, and retired to rest without solving them; but solved the difficulty in a dream, and, on waking, with joy placed all the work on paper correctly, and without trouble. 3. Our conceptions of the *length of time* occupied in dreaming appears of very long duration, when, in fact, it can only extend to a few minutes. A chain of events may pass through the mind in one dream which would require many days in reviewing, but on waking we discover that it has been the work of a few minutes. 4. *Dreaming conceptions* are not confined to old conceptions. Under the influence of slumber, poets have composed parts of poems, and, in waking hours, have written out the same. The logician has unraveled mysterious things, and concluded his argument correctly; the mathematician has concluded his demonstration; and the linguist seen how to translate a difficult passage. 5. It is useless trying to define the *causes of dreams*. The best we can do is to regard them as varying with the many and mysterious influences connected with the phenomena of mind. Each person can best determine the cause of mental influences, or states, by carefully attending to his own experience in regard to them. All facts connected with the phenomena of dreaming are evidences that mind is ever active and imperishable.

CHAPTER II.

CLAIRVOYANCE.

SECTION I.

1. CLAIRVOYANCE does not properly belong to this work, and should not receive this brief notice, were it not that it has been regarded, by many, as being an essential part of the phenomena of mind. 2. It is the *clear-sightedness* of the mind in perceiving, or in apprehending facts or events, without the aid of the senses, as a medium in arriving at a knowledge of such facts, or events. This is, in reality, closely connected with dreaming, though it appears to take place further removed from any internal controlling power governing it. This ulterior process appears to occur when we are under the deepest influence of Somnus, and the senses entirely inactive to external affecting causes, so far as can be determined. 3. It is a power *attributed to persons in a mesmeric state*, of perceiving, or discriminating objects or realities not present with, nor objects of the action of the senses. 4. Such power does not appear to be *common or naturally* connected with earthly intelligence, in the proper existence and relationship which characterizes them. However natural it may be to the action of spirit within itself, abstracted from bodily

organs, yet such action is not common to the masses, or, if so, we are unable to recall such action in waking hours.

SECTION II.

1. If such power does really exist in *connection with some minds* when unknown to others, or to the great majority of persons, we can not account for its existence as an essential element of spirit, or any thing superadded to one that is withheld from another; therefore, the only rational way of meeting the subject is, that such differences depend upon some peculiarity in the nervous constitution, connected with the mind's developments. The nerves connected with the brain are so inseparably connected with the sensations experienced, that mental states may be affected by them; and we know not how far such states may vary or correspond to the peculiar sensitiveness, condition, or influence of the nervous system. 2. *How far or to what extent* the doctrine of clairvoyance is true, we shall not determine; but too much faith or belief in such things is deceptive, dangerous, and adds no essential truths to knowledge. 3. That a *simple state* of clairvoyance may be experienced by some minds connected with a peculiar nervous constitution, is neither unnatural nor new in scientific research. Such persons are so naturally constituted that they can be affected by mesmerism, anxiety of mind, fatigue, or disease, so as to have some kind of stupor over the action of the senses, and, at the same time, experience some kind of per-

ception of things which can be the objects of mental action. This is no new theory, either in reality or in the investigations of science. It is as old as this kind of peculiar nervous constitutions. It is natural with the nervous sensitiveness of some persons, though the perverted use often made of it, in the necromancy and feats performed in the world, is deceptive, tending to absurdities and ruin. 4. So far as any person has a natural disposition and tendency to such mental states as may be included under the meaning of clairvoyance, it is *innocent*; but when an intentional perversion takes place, it becomes wickedly absurd. No one can be so operated on by another as to reveal facts of the spirit-world beyond the limits of personal identity, or mental resources and action.

CHAPTER III.

SOMNAMBULISM.

SECTION I.

1. *THIS is the act or practice* of walking in sleep. In dreaming the mind acts, but the somnambulist walks abroad, or has power voluntarily to move from place to place while under the influence of sleep. This singular affection differs from dreaming. Simple dreaming involves only the action of the mind, while somnambulism includes the affection and action of the physical powers in connection with mental inclinations and action. 2. *It differs from dreaming* as to the exercise of the mind. The mind may be fixed upon its own impressions, or ideas, which are passing under its inspection, but there appears to be less power in recalling such exercise in our waking hours than to recall the substance of dreams. There are but few if any somnambulists who can ever recall the fact of walking in sleep. As a general thing they never have the slightest knowledge, in their waking hours, that ever such occurrence took place. 3. The same appears true in regard to *talking in sleep*. There is, perhaps, not one case out of a thousand where persons in the habit of talking in sleep, ever have the slightest knowledge of such fact from any action of their own minds, though

highly probable they are dreaming, or the mind is acting in some way all the time. 4. The *first degree* of somnambulism, with some persons, is an inclination to talk in sleep, though others are not known to talk. The former often rehearse what is passing in the mind, and frequently that which was not intended to be known. If this propensity increases, we may expect them to walk during sleep. A friend of mine lodged in the same room with a man who was in the habit of walking during sleep, intending to follow him. About midnight the somnambulist arose, walked down stairs, passed out at the door, took a path across the field, crossed a water-course on a high log, not touching the hand-pole, and without either stooping or pausing. In this way he could not pass over in waking hours by daylight, yet he passed on without any difficulty; then turning into a dark valley, ascended and seated himself upon drift wood; in a few moments returned by the same way, to his room and bed, and knew nothing of the occurrence next morning.

SECTION II.

1. Somnambulism differs from dreaming, in the *power which the action of the mind* has over the *muscles* and nervous system, whether such mental action or volitions can be recalled in our waking hours or not. Dreams appear to be real in the mind, and the same appears true in regard to that which is passing in the mind of the somnambulist. The additional power is added by which he can and does put his

physical powers in motion. A servant in the South, during sleep, often responds to his master's call, takes his horse, waters him, puts him in the stable, feeds him and fastens the door, returns to bed, and knows nothing of the transaction next morning. 2. Another peculiarity is, that in sleep the *senses and muscles* appear powerless and inactive; but in somnambulism the *latter* are active, while the *former* are inactive. This can not be defined unless it exists in connection with that peculiar sensitive class of nerves connected with the muscles, and not with the senses, being affected in some way and manner as to invoke or induce an effort of the muscular powers under the influence of mental volitions. 3. The *absence of fear* is another peculiarity connected with somnambulism. The somnambulist can go where he could not in his waking state without fear or loss of life. They have been known to pass out of windows and climb up on the tops of houses, and, in an erect posture, walk narrow joists or beams from twenty to forty feet above the ground. 4. A very singular phenomenon is sometimes witnessed in the presence of *paroxysms*, which come on in daytime as well as at night. At times they are preluded by a singular sensation or noise in the head, but frequently are experienced without warning. The mind seems abstracted from external impressions, yet there is no apparent difficulty in conversing about that which is passing through the mind at the time. 5. Some persons are *totally unconscious* of any external thing; others can hear and answer questions.

There have been instances given where persons have, while under the paroxysm, conversed readily in Latin, which they could not do at other times. 6. A contingent feature of this affection has been referred to as being produced by an attack of somnolency. In recovering from one attack, persons have lost all literary knowledge; but in recovering from the second, all lost attainments have been restored, and thus alternating for years. 7. It would almost appear that, under such paroxysms, the mind or spirit has *sight and perception* independently of the senses. Philosophers have given instances of persons who have had their eyes closed while under the paroxysm, and bandaged with many thicknesses of black silk; yet they could read and answer questions in regard to distinct objects correctly, and in regard to some things which they had never seen before. We know of no way to explain this, unless in proportion as the soul is abstracted from the bodily organs, the more perfectly its powers are developed. 8. Whatever there may be that is strange or novel in this chapter, yet it should be borne in mind that all these facts go to show that *mind can act* without the body, from which it is reasonable to believe in its superiority, and to infer its imperishable nature or eternal duration.

CHAPTER IV.

MESMERISM.

SECTION I.

1. BY *mesmerism* we understand animal magnetism, or the existence of a peculiar kind of sleep, in which the mind is active, though the mesmerized person appears unconscious of external objects. 2. The act of mesmerizing is that of *affecting the body* in different ways, so as to produce a species or kind of sleep, while the mind retains its activity and power. This is no new discovery in scientific research and knowledge. Long has it been known, and it has and does exist, in reality, in the very natural constitution of some persons. 3. *A constitution* capable of being mesmerized is almost the same as those which come under the influence of somnambulism. The mesmeric susceptibility is connected with a peculiar condition or nature of the nervous system, and never can be imparted to one who has it not; yet the influence or power of disease might effect such change, or condition of the nerves, as to render a person capable of being mesmerized who had no natural disposition to it. This constitutional or natural affinity to mesmeric affection, or influence, can be affected or produced by external agencies or causes, neither marvelous nor

uncommon. 4. There are *but very few persons*, if any, who are in the habit of talking or walking in sleep, while in health, but can be mesmerized; yet this can not be done contrary to the will or permission of the subject. 5. Some subjects, under the influence of mesmerism, are *wholly unconscious* of external things, while others are not, but have no immediate power to break the influence. Mesmerizers claim that the former class can be operated upon by will, in commanding them to do as they please, while the latter can resist only in part. It may be that persons, being mesmerized, go into that state with the mind entirely directed to the operator, and when stupor comes over the power of the senses, the mind still having liberty to act, and the operator being the object of the mind, he may have more controlling power over it than any other person, and more than would seem natural; but there is far more contained in the assertions of such agents than in facts as they are.

SECTION II.

1. In this way the *truthfulness* of phrenology has been established by the action of mesmerized persons corresponding to the nature of the organ touched by the operator; but this is no proof, if what the mesmerizer claims is true, that subjects can be operated upon by will; for he knows what organ he is touching, and the kind of action he expects. This being fixed in his mind would be that which he would will: hence, the action of the subject would correspond

to the will of the operator. With all the obscurity and doubt of the correctness of this conclusion, yet that spirit can thus operate upon spirit is far more reasonable than to believe a mere physical organ of the head can possess within itself spiritual rationality sufficient to act. If spirit can act as spirit, why may it not act without involving the inert medium of the skull. The truthfulness of phrenology can not be established by mesmerism while mind and matter are dissimilar and divisible. 2. If the somnambulist becomes lost to every thing but that upon which his mind is intently fixed, and if he has power to walk abroad in obedience to any internal inclination, may not a person, on being mesmerized, become unconscious of every thing in regard to the action of the senses, yet *controlled* by the thoughts of the mind, which still cluster around the existence and will of the operator, so as to be thus influenced in some way? But deceptions in regard to these things are far more probable than conjectures in favor of such mysteries. 3. Some persons, who, under mesmeric influences, are *partially sensible* of what is passing, are unable to move from any position placed in, though they try to do so. By a well-tried effort, some have succeeded in breaking the influence. 4. There is *another class* which appears unconscious of every thing, yet they will respond to questions, or walk, if ordered to do so. This may be accounted for upon the same principle that a person continues to converse with another in sleep; they will answer almost any question asked.

In this way confidential truths have been revealed. But to fully explain such phenomena must be the work of each one who thinks upon the subject. 5. Though this *constitutional or natural tendency* to, or susceptibility of mesmeric states can not be defined, yet we can but believe, to some extent, in its mysterious existence; but, when properly viewed, it contains no more mystery than dreaming or somnambulism. This far we may go in safety; but the idea that men send the spirits of others to distant worlds, or have the facts of the spirit-world revealed by them, is not only absurd, but tends to ruin. Finitude has no such power.

CHAPTER V.

PHRENOLOGY.

SECTION I.

1. PHRENOLOGY proceeds upon the supposition that the brain is the organ of thought and passion; that the science of the human mind is inseparably connected with this supposed organ; and that the different powers may be determined principally by the size and shape of the head, together with the undulations of the skull, embracing the position and condition of such undulations. As to the general features, or outline of phrenology, we file no very special objections; but when we come to define and settle the divisions of the organ, we are plunged into darkness and confusion. 2. *The size and the general appearance* of the head, together with the expression of the eye and countenance, are important in forming a correct judgment in regard to the mind. Doubtless more is indicated by physiognomy than by phrenology. The expression of the countenance, as a general thing, is more important in deciding upon the strength and character of the mind, than all that can be gathered from the different sections in craniology. 3. There are several important *points to be settled*, and acknowledged as true, before the philosophy of mind,

with its well-tried chain of truths, can be supplanted by it. We do not regard the doctrine of phrenology as being sufficiently interwoven with mental science to require an extensive analysis: hence, we shall refer briefly to only a few connected facts. 4. The *truths* which support the doctrine of phrenology must be sufficiently clear and strong to show that it is, in fact, a science; but no two writers have agreed, in every respect, in regard to the localities of different organs, as indicated by the peculiar shape of the skull, which, according to phrenology, is essential to such theory or doctrine. 5. It must be *demonstrated without doubt*, that the brain is, wholly, the organ of the mind, otherwise the cranium might deceive us; and as all nervous matter in the entire system is of the very same properties as that of the brain, and is, to some extent, connected with it, there might be some difficulty involved in locating the organ of the mind. 6. Phrenologists should first prove that the *brain is the organ* of the mind, and then they must agree in locating the different powers or faculties according to the exterior surface of the skull, and especially those locations should be made and defined without doubt, which have so long been the objects of doubt and contention among different writers. An intelligent world will expect these questions to be settled before they will consent to regard such system, as a whole, consistent with reason, or science. 7. It must be *clearly shown* how the skull bone, which is inert, is better adapted to the development of the

various influences and powers of an immaterial nature, than such nature would be to develop its own powers and action. 8. If we adhere to the exactness of phrenological claims, it must be *demonstrated*, according to general uniformity, that each undulation on the external surface of the skull has a concavity corresponding on the inner surface, answering to the different lobes of the brain, which lobes have been assumed as being the basis respectively from which the action of the various powers of the mind are eliminated; but this is impossible. 9. There should be a clear showing, or proof, that the brain does really contain *lobes*, or *protuberances*, as assumed, and just a sufficient number to correspond with the different powers and affections of the mind; but the almost imperceptible waves of the brain can not be called lobes, as is set forth in the doctrine of phrenology.

SECTION II.

1. Should such *lobes exist* as organs of the different powers of the mind, it would appear that they exist in immediate contact with the skull, so that the external surface would indicate the size and strength of such organs thus manifested; therefore, no vacuum, or space, could exist between the brain and the skull without confusing the definite location and action of the various mental powers. But there is a vacuum between the brain and skull which severs the connection between the two, and renders it impossible to trace the connection between the external surface of

the skull and brain at any time, without taking into the account the changes under different circumstances.

2. Philosophers agree that the *brain* may be regarded as the organ of the mind by reason of the wise order in the arrangement of Infinite Wisdom, and not from its peculiar essence, or natural qualities; for in this case the whole nervous system would be the organ of the mind, as it is connected with the brain, and contains precisely the same essence, or properties.

3. The idea that the mind is *wholly dependent* upon the nature and condition of the physical organs, in order to be manifested, or for the character of its action, is absurd; for we have already seen that mind can act without the bodily organs, and when the senses are locked up, or their power is suspended by sleep.

4. The *doctrine* of phrenology, not sufficiently guarded, often misleads the mind. In some instances it has given origin to tendencies which have resulted in the worst forms of infidelity, by and in which it has been assumed that all sufferings of both body and mind are the results of imperfect physical organization, and that the fall of man affects only the physical powers, by and through which mind acts. If this be true, and it is possible for us to have any consciousness of guilt or sin, then *that* which tests this fact must be matter, and when the body dies all our consciousness of guilt must perish with it. This would result in the doctrine or idea of annihilation, which is false.

5. The physical organs, being *inert* within themselves, have no power to comprehend the knowledge of suf-

fering, and report the same to the mind, in order to be known. Matter can never originate intuitive mental convictions and feelings of our lost estate; for it is by the existence, and self-action of innate mental elements that we can have any knowledge of the capability of the body to suffer, or that it ever has experienced pain. 6. *Injuries* received upon the head often affect some power, and an injury received upon a certain organ affects one mind very differently from the result the same cause would produce upon another. The same organ in kind may be affected on different heads, and the results are not similar; but, in most instances, very different. The same organ in the same head may be affected by a blow, at different times, without producing similar effects upon the mind; therefore, it is impossible to locate the different organs from the similarity in the effects realized. 7. *Different portions* of the brain may be diseased without affecting the mind corresponding to the office, nature, and action of the organs thus affected. A lady has been mentioned, one-half of whose brain was completely paralyzed by disease, yet the faculties of her mind were perfect. A man has been mentioned who retained the right use of all his faculties up to the moment of his sudden death, and on opening his head it was discovered that suppuration had destroyed the whole right hemisphere of his brain. Though one-half of his cerebral organs were destroyed, yet his mind was not affected. Operators testify that they have removed, in a similar way, as

much as a half pound of matter found in the brain, when the mind did not appear to have been affected up to the time of death. 8. We learn, from different *experiments*, that large portions of the brain have been often removed without destroying the exercise of the mental faculties. A man has been mentioned, whose head had been so injured that a large portion of the right wing of the *os frontis* was removed, supuration had taken place, while at each dressing, for over two months, the matter discharged brought with it large quantities of the brain; yet he retained the right use of all his faculties to the time of his death. 9. Instances have been given, in cases of *fracture* of the skull, when large portions of the brain have been removed without the slightest injury to the minds of the persons thus suffering. These facts are conclusive evidences that different organs in the brain can be entirely destroyed without marring the correct action of the mind. 10. How can this be accounted for upon the *principles of phrenology*? There is only one way of escape; that is, when the organs on one side of the head are destroyed, we have to assume that there are double organs, and those on the other side correspond to those lost. But this is only assumption, as it can not be based upon any primary principle of phrenology. 11. While the *general principles* of phrenology may be regarded as true, we are unprepared to adopt it in lieu of mental philosophy, as the latter has been long established upon correct principles, attested by almost any amount of experiments and facts known to be true.

DIVISION NINTH.

CHAPTER I.

REFLECTION.

SECTION I.

1. REFLECTION is the act or operation of the mind by which it turns its views, or thoughts, back upon itself or its operations. 2. *By this power* our thoughts may be thrown back upon the past, or upon that which is absent. In this way the field of past events can be entered, and diligent search instituted, in regard to facts which are desired to be used by the mind in forming combinations, or in tracing relations and associations of truths. 3. Reflection is *involuntary* when it takes place without any willing or intentional effort. 4. It is *voluntary* when we pause the action of the mental powers, and throw back our thoughts in search of some express object, or for some special purpose. 5. It is connected with the power of reason, but more intimately with the power of *remembering* past perceptions, and past mental acts or processes, so that they can be compared with present facts, feelings, and inclinations as experienced by the same sentient being. It traces the laws by which the processes of mental action are governed, regulated, and known.

SECTION II.

1. While the mind, by the power of *reflection*, is canvassing and considering past events or realities, there is called into action the power of memory, comparison, and judgment, which give rise to new states of mind, and new trains of thought. 2. In connection with these, there *arises certain internal convictions*, and the exercise of an intuitive belief in external and internal realities. 3. Under the *process of reflecting*, we experience an internal conviction and belief that we are real existences, and that we possess cogitative minds, with powers superior to materiality. 4. While the action of the mind is paused to give place to *mature and deliberate reflection*, there arises, in connection with the mind's intuitions, a conviction of the truthfulness of the report of the senses, and the power to believe in the reality of external things. 5. *The importance* of reflection is invaluable. It leads to the safest and most effectual preventives of evil, and enables us to take, in due time, the necessary steps to avoid danger and ruin.

CHAPTER II.

APPARITIONS.

SECTION I.

1. APPARITIONS are only another source of evidence showing the connection and influence which physical organs have over mental states. Such visibilities are mere appearances, and are opposed to reality. Persons often speak of seeing angels, or individuals who are absent from them. Others suppose they see ghosts or spirits of departed friends. 2. These may be *caused* by the effect and influence of disease upon the *eye*. All that enters into the composition of the eye is more or less affected by disease. The transparent properties are liable to change, so as to present the appearance of objects which do not exist.

SECTION II.

1. The effect produced upon the *retina, or optic nerve*, is the greatest cause of deception, giving rise to perceptions of objects as real, which do not exist. The organ of the visual sense is far more perfect in health than when diseased, and it is not a difficult task to mark the variations of its power passing under the influence of different kinds of disease. 2. *Internal mental excitement* may have power to change, in some

way, the retina, or optic nerve, in whole or in part, so as to give origin to perceptions of existences which have no present or real being. This would suppose self-power with nervous constitutions to affect the optic nerve, by sudden alarm or excitement, so as to give origin to the notion of entities where they do not exist; and as such changes belong to the physical system, and as such perceptions, through the medium of the visual sense, are not intentional or voluntary, that which is seen and thought to be real, but has no existence, is at first received with the utmost confidence, and often requires a strict exercise of reason in correcting the perceptions arising in this way.

CHAPTER III.

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS.

SECTION I.

1. SPECTRAL *illusions* may be regarded as being of more importance than is proper or right. Those who are accustomed to such illusions have, as a general thing, the utmost confidence that the beings they see are real. 2. An instance has been recorded of a man advanced in life, possessed of a sound mind, and having enjoyed good health, in the latter years of his life, who had almost *daily visitations* from spectral forms. These forms or figures generally appeared as human beings. The forms often varied, but the countenances appeared to be the same. He could see them at different times, and with his eyes either opened or closed. By pressure on his eyes, they disappeared; yet, when present, their appearance was pleasant, and features clear and distinct. Any stimulant or excitement increased the number of those visitors. By examining this history, we have no difficulty in accounting for this, as any thing which excited him produced the presence of those existences. His constitution was so easily affected that the optic nerve was influenced, and forms appeared which had no existence. 3. *Images or persons*, which seem to appear to individuals

influenced out of the ordinary way, either physically, or by the effect of excited minds upon physical organs, seldom speak or answer any questions; but, in some instances, they are reported as having conversed. There is a case recorded, where a man, mourning over the loss of his wife, who had been the victim of sudden death, realized, as he thought, while in deep study, the door of his room open. The form of his wife reappeared, and informed him that she had entered into rest, and desired him to prepare for the same happiness in the future. The specter could have been the result of a change in the visual organs, while the language he thought she spoke might have originated in a dream of which he was not sensible, the mind being intensely exercised at the time. 4. A case has been given, and attested as true, of a man seated in a worshiping congregation, who suddenly shrieked out with great intrepidation, rising to his feet, steadily looking toward the stand, and exclaimed, "Do you not see the minister clothed in a shroud?" In a few minutes, the minister, who had not yet arrived, came, entered the stand, and preached. Before the next Sabbath he was dead, and in his grave.

SECTION II.

1. *Nyctalopia*, in its various forms, exerts no annihilating power over the mental elements, but exhibits a peculiar acuteness and power of the visual organ, by which the sensibility of the optic nerve must be very much increased. This is only another evidence

that it is capable of various changes, and that the presence of spectral illusions depends upon certain influences affecting the retina or optic nerve. If the eye was perfect in all its parts, and free from the power of disease, it would be relieved of phantoms, or specters. 2. Those who are approaching *epileptic* fits, often are troubled with the appearing of phantoms or specters. The evidence of a man has been recorded, who says that the prelude to the paroxysm was, the appearing of a peculiar-looking human being, who struck him on the head; then the paroxysm commenced. This specter was, no doubt, caused by the effect the approaching attack had upon the brain and eyes. 3. The influence of *febrile diseases* upon the peculiar sensitiveness of some constitutions, may be regarded as occasions of the origin of spectral illusions. A case has been given, where a man thus affected, while under the influence of a violent pain in the head, distinctly saw his family in the room, who were, at that time, three thousand miles distant. A lady has been mentioned, who, under the influence of severe illness, saw her father, at different times, come into her room, and speak in his natural tone of voice, though he had not been there at any time. 4. *A too highly-excited imagination* may lead to a belief in existences as real when they are not. An excitable mind, when aroused, can imagine fearful sounds, or the footsteps of an enemy approaching. They see something in the distance, which appears nearing, and enlarges with more perfect form, till the beholder is

terrified, awed, or overcome with fear. 5. *All these facts* show that our knowledge, which we receive through the medium of the senses, can be rendered uncertain, as the organs can be so easily affected by disease; but our internal knowledge of the existence of self can not be doubted, as we do not depend upon any physical elements in arriving at the certainty of such knowledge, or in knowing that we do really exist.

CHAPTER IV.

SPIRIT-RAPPING.

SECTION I.

1. NECROMANCY, though not intimately or closely connected with mental science, has been involved with mental phenomena, for the purpose of adding importance to the office of modern teachers, or those who would be gifted in enchantment or conjuring. It is styled, or called, the art of revealing future facts or events. There is a pretended medium of communication with the dead, or minds disembodied. 2. *Spirit-rapping* may be called a delusion. That some peculiar nervous constitutions may be affected in a way mysterious to the individuals themselves, and to others, is perfectly correct; but that such physical constitutions are, or can be, the medium of other finite spirits in communicating facts to us from the spirit-world, is contrary to the laws of both mind and matter, and must be absurd. 3. Persons who style themselves *mediums* may be sincere in not understanding why the physical organs have an involuntary action, and often contrary to their wish. The delusion is not in the fact that such action takes place, but exists in that their excited minds refer the cause of such action to spirits, when it is natural to their pecu-

liar nervous constitutions. That palsied man can not tell why he shakes contrary to his will. He might attribute such action to spirits with as much propriety as a medium can refer to them—the motion by which his hand writes. The mere turning of the mind of a nervous person to the thought that they are moved by spirits, will startle them, and cause involuntary action. If they can keep their own excited spirits from rapping out thoughts by accidental marks, or their own intentional thoughts, they will not be troubled by the spirits of others. 4. If it is *right* for finite spirits to communicate future events to us after they have left the world, why done in such an obscure way, and with so much doubt or imperfection? It is reasonable to suppose that such knowledge is perfect, and that it should be conveyed correctly; then why should they move a nervous arm to write it with irregular or accidental motions? If it is right they should send important messages to earth, it has always been so; then why have the spirits of dear departed friends been so idle and careless in this respect, during the past ages of the world? 5. That *disembodied spirits* can reveal facts, or ideas to us, must be either true or false. If false, further argument would be useless; but if true, then those privileges and communications must be either right or wrong. If right, they are not only permitted, but take place according to the will and purposes of Deity. If these things are ordered of Heaven, they must be right, and arranged for the good and happiness of this world's inhabitants. All

means employed by Infinite Wisdom for our happiness, are adapted to all ages and all circumstances connected with our race; therefore, such messages would not have been delayed for the discoveries of modern mediums, and without regard to the moral character of such agents. 6. If these things be *ordered* and *sent by* the Divine Being, the object must be pure and holy, and all connected influences and operations must correspond in purity and holiness. Then, none but holy beings can reveal such messages, or be mediums for pure spirits. None but good messages can be sent, and such as are calculated to do good to man, and cause him to glorify God. 7. Therefore, according to all our *ideas* of infinite purity, and the holiness of good spirits, it would be utterly impossible for such finities to communicate to any on earth but pure and holy mediums. 8. The *character* of all such messages must not only be pure, but must correspond with truth as evidenced in the works of nature; and must agree with the volume of Revelation, and in no case deviate from its truths.

SECTION II.

1. But if the tidings thus revealed be *impure*, or *contrary* to these sources of truth, we have a right to suspect the medium is bad, or vile; and if this be true, the spirit which moves or influences such an unholy medium, must be vile or wicked within itself. 2. If such *spirit* is from Satan, or from under his influence, we have a right to question its declarations, as

he would not have any truth published to us, as that would thwart his own interests and purposes. Then, if such tidings be from an evil source, and calculated to lead to delusion and misery, the less we have of such news the better for the world. We have a right to doubt the correctness and truthfulness of such things, as we have no evidence that the Lord ever intended to instruct the world in this way. 3. This view of the subject would compel us to believe in, and to be much influenced by what has been called *demonology*. This would comport with the intimations of some alchemists of England, who profess to have borrowed much of their skill, in turning common metals into silver and gold, from Satan. We know not what or how much power Satan may have over wicked men, in regard to such things, but one thing appears certain, that tidings calculated to do good, and from a pure source, never could come from an unholy medium. If spirit-rappings be true, we have no evidence that they could be either ordered or blessed of Heaven. 4. As *these things* have been improperly connected with mental phenomena by many writers, we can only add that philosophy knows no principle or action of mind, abstracted from the peculiar sensitiveness of physical organs, capable of forming a basis for such spiritual revelations.

CHAPTER V.

EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON
INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. WE understand by *excited conceptions* those which arise, or take place, in connection with an excited nervous system and vivid or highly-wrought mental states. An unnatural excitement depends very much upon the proper organization and health of the physical powers. 2. A mind with *unusual power of action*, connected with a frail, nervous system, gradually sinking by disease, may overpower the strength of the physical organs, with which its action is connected, and become bewildered with excited conceptions till the system becomes paralyzed, and the mind either inactive or incapable of rational life. 3. *The strong physical constitution* may retain its strength, while some organ essential to the right use of reason may become diseased or prostrated by some extraordinary mental effort, leaving the mind to wander amid the wildness of excited conceptions and imaginations of things that exist only in phantom. 4. *General debility*, caused by disease, often produces excited conceptions, or wildness of thought, which disqualifies the mind for usefulness; yet it seldom

affects all the organs of sense in the same way, or to the same degree.

SECTION II.

1. We can not conceive that the mind, abstractly, or within and of itself, *is capable of either excited conceptions or of delirium*; for these affections can exist only in its connection with the body, otherwise delirium or idiocy might exist on forever, which is absurd. 2. The excitement of *great joy* often gives rise to excited conceptions, and we see things very differently, for a short length of time, from what we do ordinarily. 3. The effect produced by *grief or despair* appears to almost hang the earth in mourning. Under such influences we have conceptions only of scenes or facts, like those we have just witnessed; and as thoughts pioneer the road of misfortune, we have vivid conceptions of series of calamities, which become the principal objects of mental action. 4. Though the principal cause of excited conceptions may be found in the effect and influence which disease exerts upon the *visual organ and the brain*, an instance is recorded of a man, whose physical organs were so affected, that for months, in his waking hours, he saw passing through the field of vision the forms of men, women, animals, and birds. Under all such exciting influences, the mind is only advancing to a midway condition between a rational state and that of insanity. 5. The last general cause we shall notice is, that which exists in *febrile influences* upon the

physical organs. This influence is not only general upon the system, but the exciting effect it produces upon the nervous system, and the brain in particular, causes singular and strange excited irregularities in the action of the mental powers.

CHAPTER VI.

PARTIAL INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. THE mind, under the influence of *partial insanity*, is disqualified for healthy action; though perfectly sane or correct on some subjects, it is the reverse on other topics. . Often, when such mind is employed on subjects foreign from those upon which it is wild, all appears right and reasonable; but when we speak of any thing which has a relevancy or connection with that upon which its action is imperfect, there is an immediate change in the excitability of the mental state or action, and from this the chain of thoughts begins to disconnect, and the mind wanders. There is an instance recorded, where a man brought before the court for examination gave no evidence of insanity. When the man was about to be dismissed, an intimate friend proposed that he be asked when he was going to judge the world. He was instantly excited, and assumed the character of the judge of the universe.

2. The mind may be called *partially insane* when it gives evidence of wildness upon certain topics only periodically. There are such persons who, at times, and in their deliberate moments, appear reasonable and mild in their feelings or disposition, but, at other

times, can not control the action of their mental powers. 3. Another class of individuals appear to be *sane* on all the events or occurrences of early life, but can not converse, in a connected way, upon recent facts or events. This change is clearly the effect of physical debility. 4. *This affection* may exist in the unhealthy state or defective action of one or more faculties, though the mind may act correctly, with the exception of the affected element or department.

SECTION II.

1. The *influence of insanity* can exist in connection with the judgment. When there is no healthy action of this faculty we lose the correct power of perceiving relations, and of rightly discriminating differences; it can not confidently decide upon the same, or in relation to them; and when decisions are thus made, they are as likely to be absurd as correct, or they are almost certain to be wrong in some way. The mind appears to arrive at conclusions accidentally, and to abandon them at pleasure; so action is like a log floating upon the waves of the sea, and its decisions can not be depended upon. 2. Partial insanity may be connected with the *imperfect action of original suggestion*. The ideas and convictions which arise in connection with this power must be objects of belief or unwavering confidence. We must believe that we exist, and have personal identity, and that the objects of belief remain unchanged; for without this we can not be sane. 3. The power of *associ-*

ation may act so imperfectly that decisions can not be regarded as correct. When the power of associating ideas or facts is defective, there is evidence of great recklessness in the arrangement of facts. The thoughts fly in every direction, and words are apt to be used without number, and without any special force, unless to weary those to whom they are addressed. Minds of this character seldom ever retain the objects of conversation for any length of time. All it dwells upon seems to be visionary and like the morning cloud or early dew. 4. The *physical organs* connected with the senses may, under the influence of disease, cause deception in the character of sensations experienced, and a state of partial insanity ensue. This brings us to the general cause of insanity, the effect of material organs upon the action of the mind, which are imperfect within themselves, or paralyzed in some way by disease.

CHAPTER VII.

TOTAL INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. WE understand by *insanity* a deranged mind or intellect. When the judgment is dethroned, or reason broken, the trains of thought suspended, so we can not go from the premises to the conclusion, the mind is insane without the destruction of other faculties. But we now come to that state of delirium which is a total disorganization of mind, or of correct mental action. The power of reasoning is wholly in ruins. 2. Insanity destroys the *healthy action of the mind and the power it has over its own mental states*, of connecting and directing the chains of thoughts, fixing the attention on internal realities, or upon those of the external world. 3. *The power of mental action may cease* in regard to all subjects only in a wild and utterly-confused manner. There may be an indistinct apprehending of things, but without any rational conception of order, classification, or law. 4. The mind may be *influenced by only one impression*, without any power of varying from it, or of dismissing it from the most intense excitement. There is an instance recorded of a man who became insane; he always moved as though in great haste. The only answer he ever

gave to any inquiry was, "I am going home," though it could not be discovered that any thing had the slightest degree of his attention. The melancholy case of a young minister has been recorded, who, by a fall, was deranged, while on his way to be married. Never afterward was he known to pay attention to any thing; and never was he known to speak of any thing but his expected marriage. 5. *Mania* may be regarded as *varying in degree* of mental range or action from certain limited abstract impressions to a wild, amplified view of imaginary realities. Though such a mind may glance at real truths, yet there can be no exercise of reason in relation to them. 6. *The hallucinations of a maniac* can not be corrected, as the disordered action of the principal mental faculties is so extensive that there is no way or means of correcting that which is wrong. The maniac will continue to fancy himself a king or ruler of this world, having a right to command and to force obedience to his authority. Though such persons may be of the lowest degree of obscurity, still they appear to have conceptions of great honor and power, and that all the world contributes to their glory. 7. *A common characteristic of maniacs* is evidenced in the fact that some impression or idea has taken possession of them, and upon the oneness of the theme the mind acts, without being corrected by truths, which would produce an equilibrium of the intensity of mental action, and relieve wrong impressions. Whenever the mind is permitted to act upon some one idea, excluding all other

facts which would be examined in connection with it, such action will become intense, and the longer we dwell upon one thought the more excited the concentrated action will become, and the tendency to lose all power of reason or control in relation to the existence of real facts will be increased. 8. *In total insanity* the mind is incapable of correct reasoning on either correct or false premises. The connection of thoughts or facts in argumentation is broken and so confused that no correct steps can be taken in pursuing any subject; all is confusion and uncertainty.

SECTION II.

1. *Mental hallucinations* may *suspend* or *dismiss* the impressions which have been of abiding experience, and, after a long interval, they may be suddenly revived, which can not be accounted for, unless attributable to some change in the physical constitution, either in regard to increased degrees of maturity, or the diminishing power of disease, so that the mind can be more vigorously exerted. Instances are given of persons, when doing a certain piece of work, suddenly struck with insanity; and, after the lapse of years, on being restored, the first thing of their inquiries was in regard to the work in which they were employed when they went into insanity, while all the time and events which had intervened were entirely lost. It has been stated that persons who are addicted to periodical paroxysms of delirium, have been known to resume the conversation on their recovery precisely

at the place where they left off when the paroxysm came on, without any knowledge of what transpired in the interim; and it has been stated that some of these persons, when the paroxysm reappeared, commenced with that part or subject of their hallucination precisely where they left off when reason returned; but, as a general thing, there is not such uniformity. It is more generally characterized by a fearful erratic wildness. 2. The *extremes and modulations* which characterize the feelings, and the deportment or acts, of maniacs, may be accounted for, in part, as corresponding to the different temperaments connected with each constitution; and they may arise, in part, from the uncultivated viciousness of the one and the guarded mildness of the other. They may vary again with the mind that had been under religious influence, contrasted with the mind which had always been vicious and revengeful. 3. *Insanity*, as it exists in the case of the maniac, is apt to be of a restless and turbulent character. Great excitement generally prevails over, and is connected with the entire mental powers. There appears to be a constant disposition to keep moving or to be traveling from place to place. This is not the kind of derangement, under the influence of which the person loathes life and seeks death; for persons under the influence of this kind of derangement are always suspecting danger, and are flying from it with feelings of appalling frenzy or dread. 4. *The general character* of mental derangement is that which has connected with it a fearful apprehen-

sion of danger or death; and such persons are always trying to escape from harm. Such persons are generally harmless, and have no disposition to inflict injuries upon their fellow-beings, though the care of such is attended with great trouble. 5. There is another class of insane persons, who are *malicious* in feelings, and are always seeking revenge. It is not unfrequently the case that they imagine they are expressly ordered to take the life of some fellow-being; and, as a general thing, those who are selected to be tortured or put to death are the nearest and dearest friends.

CHAPTER VIII.

INSANITY—MELANCHOLIA.

SECTION I.

1. THAT kind of *mental depression called melancholia* may be regarded as a result of some kind of disease upon the physical constitution, or it may have its origin in connection with repeated and excited mental exertion, prostrating the power of the organs through which mind acts. There is a difference between real mania and melancholia. The former is connected with the presence of hallucination, under the influence of which the individual appears carried away with excited conceptions of his condition in life, and does not appear to be under any sense of want, or that such a state of things could be possible. The latter condition is connected with those who are depressed in feeling, and may arise from the influence of lingering disease, or with trouble of mind, which prostrates the bodily powers, rendering them subject to disease. This gloomy or melancholy state may increase till maniacal excitement takes place; but melancholia generally continues in a state of mental depression. 2. A *very peculiar difference* between melancholia and mania is, that a person under the influence of the former has power to reason more accu-

rately, and the mind evinces stronger features of reason than in the latter state; yet, the impressions of such mind can be changed with far greater difficulty than those of the maniac. 3. *Melancholia differs in a peculiar manner from mania*, in the tendency of minds, under such influence, to commit suicide. Real maniacal insanity seldom ever gives rise to any feeling or inclination which would lead to such an act or horrible result. It is very common, when suicide is committed, to say that the person was totally insane, or devoid of all reason; but there is no instance recorded of totally-deranged persons, or one devoid of all reason, ever being guilty of suicide. 4. *A raving maniac* has never been known to commit suicide. All their feelings and manifested inclinations are averse to any thing of the kind. When they possess any traits of reason, or conscientious thought, they evince the utmost degree of excitement and horror in regard to any thing like danger or death, and are ever flying from their own apprehensions of danger in seeking safety. 5. *It is depression or melancholia* which leads to suicide, and that, too, before reason has entirely left the mind. We are forced to the gloomy acknowledgment that all persons who commit this horrible act have sufficient amount of reason remaining to know what they are about to do when they use the weapons of death; otherwise, the act could not and would not be perpetrated. 6. All persons who *commit suicide* do so of *their own individual and voluntary choice*. It is impossible for

any totally deranged to have the control of their mental states, or thoughts, long enough to carry such intention into effect. By the most accurate examination, no feeling or tendency to suicide can be discovered in minds devoid of reason. 7. He who takes his own life has the *right use of reason, to a sufficient extent*, to know what poisonous drug, or weapon of death, will effect the work; the amount necessary to be taken, or the manner of applying the deadly weapon, requires some degree of rationality and judgment. 8. Another proof that such persons are not totally insane is manifested in their conduct. With what tenacity they keep such intentions from being known to others! See their shrewd, artful, and cunning management, avoiding detection in obtaining that which will take life, often securing it under false pretense! How carefully they select a time and place suitable to avoid all detection, so their design and plans may be carried into effect! All these facts show that such persons are not totally deranged. 9. We are compelled to the conclusion, that all who deliberately commit suicide have a sufficient amount of reason *to know* what they are going to do, and how they are going to effect the work; also, what the result will be, otherwise they would not have presence and control of mind to determine upon such a course; and if they had, the mind would lose sight of such arrangement before they could arrive at the final result. If a person must be totally devoid of reason, in order to commit suicide, then he would have no

inclination to do so; for a child, before it has the right exercise of reason, never manifests any inclination to destroy its own existence. The same fact is true in relation to idiots. If persons could commit suicide totally ignorant of what they were doing, then it would be innocent; but if they know what they are doing, in laying violent hands on their own lives, they are guilty of sin, and will be held accountable for such offenses.

SECTION II.

1. *The hallucination* which takes place under the influence of melancholia, or depression, becomes the only object of mental action. All other impressions, or facts, naturally connected, which would correct any excited perception in regard to supposed realities, can not become the object of attention. The mind becomes bewildered and overwhelmed with hopeless misery, and, being unable to contemplate any future relief, the whole soul appears plunged into a cloud of augmented gloom. Many persons, under such circumstances, are apt to begin to imagine that all their friends have forsaken them, and then begin to lose confidence in every person. The very appearance of nature is gloomy and mournful. They begin to feel that life is a burden, and commence forming conclusions to leave the world. When such resolutions are once formed, then the mind acts upon them exclusively, by connecting with such purposes the most effectual way to accomplish the dreadful act; which act becomes more harmless, in their

opinion, as the mind, under great excitement, dwells upon it. 2. *Such purposes can be and have been abandoned* when the mind has been suddenly arrested by some new and alarming object of thought. A man has been mentioned, who left home at night for the purpose of drowning himself; but, on being suddenly attacked by robbers, fled for refuge, where he soon realized that all inclination to suicide was gone. 3. *There is an impression of insanity*, connected with the idea of suicide, which the mind appears to possess while there is the least manifestation of reason remaining; and it is certainly true, that when the mind is totally lost to all reason, it is incapable of determining upon suicide. 4. *Another hallucination* often arises in connection with the impression of the criminality of suicide. Persons have been known, in the history of the past, to commit murder for the sole purpose of rendering their lives up to the requirements of the law of the land, and thereby die by the requirements of justice. This they seem to have supposed frees them from the sin of suicide. Many have avowed their intention of murdering some one, without having the first improper feeling toward them; and often such selections were made of some one whom they loved more than any other. They have confessed, on some occasions, that they only wished to commit murder in order that they themselves might die by the just sentence of the law; and have been known to go still farther, by selecting a child, which they believed would be happy after death, and console

themselves that it would be no special injury to the child to take its life, and then they could themselves die by the hand of justice. The right exercise of reason is lost with such persons, and it would appear that their long-cherished desire to die had always been checked by connection with the exceeding sinfulness of suicide: hence, the resolve on the death of some innocent person was favorably entertained from the thought that such persons would be happy after death, and it would give themselves the opportunity of dying according to justice.

CHAPTER IX.

IDIOCY.

SECTION I.

1. THE *term idiocy* conveys to the mind the idea of natural defect of the understanding. The degrees which have been acknowledged to exist in idiocy are not well defined, as any thing like partial idiocy is only another department of partial insanity; yet there are some distinctions by which a difference may be discriminated. 2. *Fatuity* includes that kind of mental weakness which differs from the turbulence and fierceness of the maniac, on the one hand, and that of a desponding state of insanity on the other. In the latter case or state, part of the faculties may retain power of healthy action; but, under fatuitous influences, the mind appears to suffer a general suspension of healthy action in all its departments. 3. *Cretinism*, as it was anciently understood among the valleys of the Alps, contained an amplitude of signification, which will not philosophically apply to a correct idea of idiocy. The cretins were classified so as to convey an idea of the strength and action of the mind. The intellectual action of the first class was not far removed from animal life, having no language to convey thoughts, or judgment in seeking happi-

ness, or in avoiding danger. 4. There is another class, which evinces some signs of *intellectual action*, with occasional traces of rationality; but the whole mental powers are so inactive that, in looking on such countenance, we have conceptions of the presence of a form, while the mind or soul appears to have taken its departure. 5. *An idiot* is one who has ever been under the influence of mental imbecility, so that the mind can not be said to have been, at any time, sound or rational. The mind of such person has *always been in ruins*. 6. *Idiocy is incurable in this life*, from the fact that the cause, which is principally deformity, can not be removed by remedies which remove the power and influence of disease. We can have no conception that the essence called mind can be naturally deformed, or that it can be, within and of itself, under the influence and power of idiocy; for such conclusion would be without proof; therefore, all our ideas of idiocy have their origin in connection with the deformities and imperfections which we believe to exist in the physical nature. 7. We can have no conceptions of the mind, or spiritual existent *naturally defective in faculties*, or without the right use of them; for if such defects exist wholly in the mind, then it must suffer such defects forever, as we have no promise of any new creations in the future. To suppose the existence of a mind naturally imperfect in its immaterial nature, or as to the existence of some or all of its faculties, and that it can and will maintain such imperfect existence in the spirit-world, is to

suppose an absurdity, and reflect dishonor upon the wisdom and goodness of its Creator. Then it will follow, as an irresistible conclusion, that if the soul can be or always has been totally insane, or idiotic, it has violated no law or rule of right, and must be sane in heaven. An idiot in heaven can never fulfill the design of a gracious Creator, in glorifying and praising the Author of all good. The idiot will be saved, but will leave his idiocy with the deformity of his body in the grave, while his rational and exalted spirit will ever move the harp of eternity.

SECTION II.

1. We have evidence of the *destructive influence of the physical organs over the power of memory* in the aged. An active and retentive memory often loses its power of action as we advance in age. If we say this loss of power is wholly in the mind, then it would follow that it is capable of losing its faculties, and it would be reasonable to suppose that they were entirely destroyed by temporal death. But this is absurd; for when aged persons are unable to recollect the occurrences of one hour past, yet, if their attention is directed to what took place in the early part of their lives, they can narrate that which transpired, and connect facts and events together, without any hesitancy. This is conclusive proof that the power of memory is not lost, nor can it cease to be. 2. *That the physical nature curtails the power of hearing*, is clearly demonstrated in the example of those who are far advanced

in age. Such persons often become deaf; and if this defect was abstractly in the mind, then we could conclude that the mind, in this respect, was becoming annihilated; but when the ear-trumpet is applied the hearing is restored; hence the power is not gone nor destroyed, but is ever living in the nature and essence of the imperishable mind. 3. The *same evidence is true* in regard to the *organ of sight*. The eye becomes affected as persons advance to old age, so they dimly see, but when an optic is applied, the sight is restored. The power is still there, and the whole difficulty must exist in the physical organs. 4. Then we are forced to the conclusion that the *cause of idiocy* is wholly connected with the bodily powers. 5. If *sin*, either directly or indirectly, can *cause idiocy*, then it follows that the remedial plan, in destroying such power and influence, will reveal rationality as inherent in the very nature of those elements which were locked up during the existence of the body; therefore, we are led to believe, that when the soul of an idiot is released from his sin-diseased body, it will be possessed of rational powers and knowledge, in the enjoyment of which it will flourish in immortality.

DIVISION TENTH.

CHAPTER I.

INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I.

1. THE soul has *knowledge in itself*, and its power to know and retain knowledge is wisely arranged by the great Author. It has internally perception, thinking, reasoning, believing, doubting, knowing, with various mental operations, or acts, which are experienced, and we are conscious of their real existence, in connection with which we receive distinct ideas of them, or in relation to them, without traveling beyond the internal being and action of mind, and unaided by the power of the senses as a medium of knowledge in regard to external things. 2. *The mind has power of knowledge within itself*, which power is connected with the *existence and action of intuitive mental elements*. The mind is not capable of receiving or possessing knowledge of external things unless it has knowledge of purely-internal origin; for all knowledge of external facts is unknown to us only as we have internal power to receive them as such. And if those elements connected with the origin of intuitions, have internal power to receive external exist-

ences as facts, they have power within themselves to know thoughts of internal origin, and to have ideas of interior operations or mental action. 3. *The primary power* of knowledge is *not material*, but *mental*, and has *its origin* in connection with the internal mental elements. Connected with these is the self-power of knowing existing truths, and with them is the origin of all our knowledge. 4. *Knowledge* received through the medium of the senses from the *external world*, and in regard to external things, may be regarded as of *secondary* order, or of an ulterior nature, when compared with that of internal origin. 5. *The internal action* of the mind, by which items of knowledge are apprehended, is so connected with such an immaterial essence, or being, that rational force and vigor are derived from it; yet the soul employs material elements or organs to aid in the acquisition and perfecting of knowledge in regard to the external universe of materialities.

SECTION II.

1. *Knowledge is of internal origin*, though it may be said to begin in the senses; yet only so far as sensations through the medium of the senses, being caused by external things, are necessarily followed by new mental states. But knowledge does not and can not begin with the senses, unless sensation within itself can be called knowledge ere it makes its report to the mind; otherwise, we can have no knowledge of external things, till sensation is followed by percep-

tion of the cause or causes, and the mind decides upon them. 2. *Ideas of internal origin* may be readily and clearly defined. The origin of the idea expressed by the terms thinking, willing, and believing, can not be traced to the power or action of the senses; for they are not the objects of the test or action of any of the senses. Neither can we say that the ideas of cause and effect, right and wrong, space or infinity, order, truth, and power can have their origin in the senses. The internal operations of the mind can exist and be known to us as primary sources of knowledge. 3. *The primary origin of knowledge* can not be said, philosophically, to commence with any ulterior faculty or medium of mental action, but must be connected with the power of intuition. Intuitions appear to be spontaneous, and when they are brought under the power and action of reason and the judgment, may be known as ideas or notions. 4. *This* may be *extended* by noticing *complex ideas of internal origin*. Such ideas are composed of elementary facts, and these parts are simple or individual entities. The process of combining these ideas may be carried on without reference to external things, and may be entirely an internal action or mental operation.

CHAPTER II.

THE DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION OF THAT WHICH RESEMBLES MIND IN BRUTES.

SECTION I.

1. WE do not introduce all the contents of this chapter as properly belonging to the analysis of mind, yet it contains many things which should be studied. That mind or spirit exists can not be doubted; and almost the next inquiry is in regard to the *extent of mental or spiritual existence*. Can any order or form of physical existence below that of man possess any thing which in nature is similar, in any respect, to the human soul. 2. A portion of *clay* may lie in the earth for thousands of years, without any increase or diminution, or change, so far as we can determine; but there are evidences which indicate and even establish the fact that other combinations increase in size, or grow with, seemingly, no cessation or interruption. Petrifications are conclusive of the beginning and advancement of the work of change. The formation and growth of rock can not be doubted. This process of advancement or growth, which characterizes the various degrees or conditions of such inert existences, has been called *inanimate life* in contradistinction to

those existences which contain no real or contingent evidences of change. If the advancement or change indicated in maturing petrifications, crystallization, and enlargement of rocks can be called *life*, it is certainly the lowest order of life of which the mind can have any conception. We will simply say that no geologist, lapidarian, or mineralogist, will dissent from the fact that such life, or change, is very different from, and is of a lower degree or order than the life of timber or vegetation. The latter is periodical, and depends upon the change and condition of the seasons, while the former appears to be continuous and of an inherent nature, independent of the influence of the vernal sun, summer solstice, or tropical shadow; but in connection with this change, there is no evidence of mind or spirit. 3. *That kind of inanimate life in the growth of timber or vegetation*, is of a higher order than that to which our attention has just been called. The growth of vegetation depends upon certain influences immediately connected, such as the warming and invigorating power of the sun, and the reviving effect and motion of the atmosphere; but a sufficient cause can destroy the emerald hues of the summer forest, yet there is not any thing which indicates the presence of mental or spiritual influences. 4. *Animated existences, or animal life*, is very different from that of inanimate realities. Animals or brutes are classed in a higher order or scale of beings, and we are forced to the conclusion that beasts, birds, and fish possess something more than is or can be

contained only in material elements or existences.

5. Brutes exist *either wholly of material elements*, or that influence or power which is connected with such elements differing from them, must be *superadded or is superior* to any essence or elements of matter.

SECTION II.

1. *Brutes differ* from inert existences in being possessed of life with sensitiveness, or are capable of experiencing sensations; and they can not experience sensations without having internal power to realize such influences; and if they are capable of realizing or experiencing sensations, that internal power by which such sensations are tested is different from crude matter, and is superior to it. 2. Brutes have *power of self-action*, which is perfectly opposed to the nature of matter, and contradictory to all laws governing material elements or existences. 3. To a certain extent brutes *see, feel, taste, smell, and hear*. Some of these powers are more acute than they are in connection with the human body, yet they are not connected with a mind that can reason or that is capable of moral influences. 4. *This internal and superior natural and motive power possessed by brutes* has been called instinct; but what is instinct with the lowest degree of meaning that can be properly attached to it, but mind? 5. *Volition*, to some extent, is evidenced in the *freedom of animal action*. This can be noticed in the manner of their movements. If escaping from danger, there is care manifested in selecting the safest

and quickest way; they never choose the direction of danger or of their foe. 6. Brutes appear to *have naturally a knowledge of courses*, and have but little confusion in determining and in pursuing the proper direction to any place where they have ever been, and often are seen moving from one section of the globe to a more plentiful region, though they may have never passed that way before. Bears, in times of great scarcity, have traveled from their native woods through cultivated parts of the country for hundreds of miles, on a direct course to a new wilderness abounding with supplies. And with what exactness and certainty do the different kinds of birds direct their course in the heavens, alternating with the seasons in going from one climate to another! 7. The horse and dog *know their masters by sight, and by the sound of their voice*. They are capable of being trained to move in different ways by certain motions or sounds of the voice. 8. *The power of judgment and comparison* appear to be evidenced to some degree. A fox was once observed to run down into water, and gradually sink under, holding a lock of wool in his mouth. On drawing his head under the water, the wool floated off, which was found full of fleas. Another instance is given of a fox that was observed in a field, playing round a group of pigs as though the large swine were objects of terror. The fox suddenly caught up a piece of wood about the size of a pig, and running toward the fence, jumped through a large crack; then dropped the wood, re-

turned to the swine, seized a pig, and ran through the fence with it at the very same place. He *compared* the pig with the size of the wood, in order to judge of the chance to escape with his prey. All these traits of mind or spirit can not be the result of insensible matter.

SECTION III.

1. There is a great *dissimilarity existing between the powers of man and that of the brute*. The former is naturally constituted with superior powers, and has control of them in the examination of any subject. The brute may be said to have perceptions of external things, and may move in the direction of some object of sight; yet there is no power to combine facts or reason in regard to them. 2. The human mind, from the *nature of its structure and action, is really scientific* in research. The brute appears to act from what he sees, hears, and feels, without any reference to the cause, or as to why such cause or causes exist. 3. The human mind is capable of *progressive improvement*, and its rising efforts and conquests in scientific knowledge appear to be bounded only by the feebleness or paralyzing weakness of physical organs. Brute intelligence appears to be susceptible of improvement, in some instances, to a very limited extent, but can not pass beyond certain limits or bounds. They may be said to remain in their generations in the same limitations of instinctive action; but the imperishable mind of man, limitless in research, sends out exploring thoughts, like a burning sun radiates its

million beams of light, filling the universe with the brilliancy of effulgent day. Man is possessed of a conscience, and feels himself to be a moral agent, and accountable to God; but the brute is without any innate moral principle. 4. The human mind can not become familiar with scientific research, and arrive at true knowledge, without the presence and action of *self-consciousness, reason, original suggestion, the understanding, and the judgment*. These appear to be absent in the manifestations of brute intelligence. 5. Man is a moral agent, subject to moral feelings, his conscience constituting the great court of appeal; and, in connection with it, the moral sensibilities, emotions, and feelings appear to harmonize. Here *intuitive convictions arise in regard to right and wrong*; but the brute, *being totally destitute of all these*, must hold a lower position in the scale of beings.

SECTION IV.

1. The dog can be *taught* to go errands for his master, and look for game in any direction, by the motion of the hand. If he is commanded to watch at any certain place, he will remain there till released by his master. The sound of two words will change alternately the course of a horse. 2. Animals have been *learned to dance at the sound of music*. This has been thought to arise from the fact they were trained upon hot plates of iron in the first place, and that ever afterward, on hearing music similar to that played while they were dancing on hot iron, they

would begin to dance; "and that the associations which had been established between the sound of music and the mere animal sensibilities reproduced dancing." If this is true, and proves any thing, it proves too much; for then the brute must have power to distinguish such associations of music from other associations, or sounds, in order to know when to dance; and, in the next place, it proves that the brute has power of memory in calling up the associations connected with music and circumstances long since past. 3. *A horse can recollect* the road in returning to his home from a distant country. We have an account of a horse, owned by an itinerant minister in this country. In one part of his circuit he always turned off from the highway, along a path at a certain tree. After the lapse of seven years, returning along the same highway, he came to the same tree, and the horse turned off with enlivened speed; it was with difficulty he could be turned back to the road. 4. The term *ruach*, as used in the Hebrew Bible, when applied to human beings, means the soul; but the same term is used in Scripture in regard to beasts, and means, without doubt, the spirit, or soul. But there are other terms which define the great difference which exists between the human soul and the soul of the beast. It is clear that, from the meaning of the term, men have souls, and that beasts have souls. 5. If the brute has a *spirit, or soul*, will it not *exist forever*? We may base an argument on this position upon the indestructibility of matter; we have

no proof that any property of matter can or will ever cease to be. If this be true, it is reasonable to infer that the spirit of brutes, which we have seen differs from, and to be superior to matter, will exist forever, and that, in connection with their bodies, immortalized in the restoration of all things. 6. Does it not appear reasonable, that if beasts existed before the fall of man, they *were pure in nature and free from servitude*; and that they were designed to be happy forever? If their sufferings and death were brought upon them by man, and are the results of sin, what can be their condition when sin and its effects are wholly removed, but that of happiness and life? If the brute suffers innocently it is only reasonable to suppose that they will be restored. 7. It is impossible to conceive, that an All-Wise Being would create beasts for the *purpose of annihilating them* at some future time. If they had been created suffering and dying before the fall, then we might have room to doubt; but as they were originally pure and happy, it is reasonable to suppose that such will be their condition in the final restoration.

CHAPTER III.

INTUITIONS.

SECTION I.

1. By *mental intuition* is understood a natural internal power which acts in perceiving realities. It is the act by which the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two or more ideas, or real facts or truths, the moment they are presented. It is the power of perceiving facts immediately, without the intervention of reason, arguments, or testimony. It presents truths to the mind on bare inspection, and this simple inspection is knowledge. 2. This intuitive power has *its origin* in connection with the *primary elements*. Here philosophical inquiries must pause, as we can go no further back than original elements. 3. Several of the primary elements of mind may be regarded as intuition faculties; but no powers of our being are more closely connected with the origin of intuitions than consciousness and conscience. 4. *In the reciprocal relations of intuitions* it is impossible for them to be opposed to each other. They appear to arise as perfect spontaneities of empirical order. They are simple in their origin, being free from all contingent influences which may follow; as there can be nothing in the philosophy of mind

anterior to those primary elements which lie at the foundation of mind. 5. *Ideas arise* in the mind in connection with the *nature and power of original elements*. When intuitions arise they are immediately followed by the action of the judgment, in discriminating difference and resemblance, which presupposes the presence of consciousness, and afterward they are embraced by the understanding and reason. 6. *Simple ideas arise without natural classification*. It requires a special action of mind in evolving them as objects of reason, and in combining or eliminating from the original, simple concrete. 7. *General ideas, or notions*, may arise in connection with simple or even eliminated ones. We may, in the first instance, have the perception of a tree without any general idea of more at first than a specific tree; but the perception of a second tree is succeeded by the suggestion of a third or more, till the judgment, discriminating, causes the mind to be led in contemplating an extended number of trees.

SECTION II.

1. *Spontaneous action, or developments* of the intelligence, are those which exist in the mind anterior to attention and a full apprehension of them; but a correct and distinct apprehension of objects depends upon attention, in which they become the objects of reason and judgment. 2. When spontaneous developments are *sufficiently apprehended to secure attention*, then the full apprehension of them, in connection

with which they are conditioned and decided upon, is voluntary as well as the exercise of those other powers in receiving them as knowledge. 3. In connection with the *action* of these internal spontaneous affirmations is the intuitive conviction of self, and by reason of such action is the mind revealed to itself, and its real existence becomes knowledge. 4. Though a *knowledge of self* is revealed by reason of these spontaneities, acting out or from natural intuitive power, yet the *character of self* must begin with apprehension, attention, reflection, and consideration.

CHAPTER IV.

COMMON-SENSE.

SECTION I.

1. COMMON-SENSE may be regarded as the process or power of practical judgment. In character it is regarded as that which is sound and safe, and is efficient in directing us in proper deportment and to correct action. 2. It may be defined as the *immediate or instantaneous decision* of correct reason. It is universally appealed to as a correct guide in detecting falsehood, and testing that which is true. 3. *Mental affirmations*, which arise in connection with the same order or classes of truths common to all minds, being a result of unaffected reason, forms the peculiar condition and sound mental action, inspecting and presenting to us those events or facts which we immediately depend on and receive as true. 4. *The vivid and correct exercise* of this mental power, which is not really a faculty, is of the *utmost importance* in constituting a well-regulated mind. Some minds are capable of being called great and overwhelming in that which might be called uncommon sense, while they are almost entirely destitute of common-sense. The former is attended with strong, hasty, and ill-timed efforts or action, while the latter is character-

ized with prudence and successful efforts with increasing influence. 5. The mental action or power called common-sense is manifested by no appeal to casualties or assumption, but *commences with the real affirmations of the mind*. The origin of its action is not with external objects, but commences wholly within the mind, in connection with truths apprehended, and the immediate action of reason. 6. The reality of common-sense *involves a general understanding of facts*, notions, and feelings evident in themselves, which are the objects of the judgment, giving strength to the belief and direction to our action. In the very nature of this power there appears to be a healthy action of the various faculties concentrating in a common consent to, and a correct understanding of *that* which is true of the thousands of facts and events which are present.

SECTION II.

1. *If common-sense be affirmations common to all minds*, and that these are immediately connected with the exercise of reason and judgment, then it can not be absent in any mind, or such mind must act almost by accident, and always appear unsettled and unhappy in the midst of contentions, or when surrounded by storms. 2. *Common-sense directs in correct investigations, and is a guide to truth*. Its aid in the detection of error is of the utmost importance. An appeal may be made to this power with full assurance, and with confidence of certain success. 3. This

power, so indispensably connected with a well-regulated mind, may *be cultivated* and rendered more *efficient* in directing to proper conclusions. This may be done by carefully attending to the process or reasoning, and the true and correct discriminating power of the judgment. It is an invaluable treasure of the soul, and wherever it exists the mind is capacitated for undisturbed happiness and great usefulness in the world.

DIVISION ELEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

VOLITION.

SECTION I.

1. VOLITION has been regarded as the *power of willing or of determining*. It is essential to the existence of sentient beings of high moral destiny. This power is very closely connected with the existence and nature of the entire faculties of the mind, or soul. 2. It is also to be the *act of willing* and the *act of determining choice*, or of forming purposes to be carried out by the action of the whole mind. 3. The president of a college, favorably and extensively known, *defined volition*, in a baccalaureate address, as follows: "Volition in man is that power which moves his body. That it has, in whole or in part, any power or influence over the mind, is a doctrine we think long since lost in oblivion." If volition has power to move matter, and has no power or influence over mind, then it is neither matter nor immaterial in nature. If matter it would be inert, and if of mind it would act with the mental powers, and have influence, otherwise it would not have power to move the body. 4. *Volition is, in nature, freedom within itself*. It

has power to act or refuse to act. This is implied in the use of the very term, its meaning and nature. 5. *There is or there is not* such power as volition. If there is no such power, then all arguments about it are unmeaning; but the existence of such faculty or power has been acknowledged by general consent. If there is such mental power, it is characterized by its nature, office, and relation to other faculties. 6. The doctrine that volition is only and simply the “*act*” of the will, or that the “will is the mental power or susceptibility by which we put forth volitions,” and admit such volitions to be simple action, can not be clearly sustained; for *action* is only *action*; and if we say the will has power to act, then volition would be lost in the same action, unless it was a secondary or double action in one. But this would be absurd; therefore, there is a more extensive and deeper meaning to be attributed to volition than simple will-act or will-action. 7. If volition be only *simple action*, such action may be applied to the action of water, or atmosphere, with as much propriety as to the action of the will, if its reality is wholly dependent upon the action of the will. 8. *Volition* can not be any thing more or less than an *internal power* existing naturally of *self-freedom* in action.

SECTION II.

1. *Volitions* differ from *volition* only in the plurality of their various actions, or the almost simultaneous eliminations of spontaneous motion, correspond-

ing to various qualities of objects, or those entities closely combined. 2. It is impossible to give a true definition of the *nature of volition or of volitions*. It is not proper to say they are simple states of mind, or that they are either mental determinations or conclusions; for they are still more important, and lie back of all these. The moment we appeal to conscience and our experience, we are satisfied as to the existence of the power and action of volition, though the nature of either or both can not be defined. 3. Volition may exist in reference to *some object or objects, and also without any object*. The belief that it can not exist without some object, is contrary to all our conceptions of its nature and office. If it only exists with an object, then its existence is either an accident, as an object may or may not exist, or the object is the cause of its existence; therefore, such an existence has its origin wholly in connection with the object which may be inert; but this is absurd. 4. If volition *can not exist only in relation to or with an object*, then it follows that, if there is no object present, volition is non-existence. 5. It is utterly impossible for volition to *consist only and wholly in the action of any faculty or faculties* of mind; for then its existence would be an accident, as such faculty or faculties may or may not act; and if such action was not put forth, volition could not be called up from nonentity, which would be natural to it; and if it could, then each appearing would be a new creation, which is absurd, as no element of the mind has power

to create another element or faculty. 6. *Volition can and does exist of* and within its own *essential nature*; and such real existence is independent of all contingent entities. It exists either with reference or *without any reference to what we believe to be in our power*. The latter consideration, which may be the object of belief, can neither create nor annihilate the abstract existence of volition as belonging to and existing in the mind; and the action of belief has nothing to do in originating this internal power. 7. *The exercise or action of volition* can exist either in reference to or without any reference to what we believe to be in our power. 8. *Volition* is one thing, and *volitive action* is another. The former is an *abiding power* and the latter may or may not exist. The former may exist without the latter, but the latter can not exist without the former. No man believes that he can fly, yet he has power to desire to do so. We are not to understand, therefore, that volition implies that the act desired is actually performed in order to constitute volitive action; for, in that case, it would appear that the action must first be completed, in order to know that we have had volitive action.

SECTION III.

1. *Volition and desire* are not one and the same. The former may exist in nature independent of the latter, and may act in reference to an object, or refuse to act. It can also act in relation to inaccessible objects, or those we do not expect to obtain; yet such

action is soon suspended on the clear apprehending of intervening impossibilities; but desire, in many instances, seems to be undying in nature. When we have fondly cherished desires for some object, though there is not the slightest possibility of realizing such object, yet we can not totally suppress our desires. 2. *A difference between desire and volition* can be tested by consciousness. We can experience an internal discovery and decision of the two existences with a conviction of the reality of that which is peculiar to the nature or character of each as clearly distinct. If from consciousness and experience we can have knowledge of such powers, with their dissimilar characteristics, then it is impossible for us to ever have conceptions of them as one and the same. These differences have already been discussed to a sufficient length. We know that we often have volitions, and act entirely contrary to our desires. Persons may desire to participate in some luxury, pleasure, or gain of earth, fraught, to some extent, with evil, while the strength of such desires is overruled by the volitive power, in determining and in pursuing a high and holy Christian course. 3. *Volition differs from desire* in its power of sudden change, and its controlling power over or in counteracting it, while the latter can not readily change, and can only affect the action of the former by a mild influence, inducing action. Volitions can be changed with the rapidity of thought, till such changes may number thousands in a few hours. So rapid is this process, that we have only

to appeal to the action of this power as experienced in each mind, as proof or knowledge of the fact; but desire, though attended with joy or heaviness of spirit, can not be easily changed under certain circumstances. The traveler from home may desire to return, but he voluntarily conquers its power by pursuing his lonely journey, while his eyes give vent to his feelings in a flood of tears. That man who has been exposed to the storms of maritime life can not change his desires to see his loved friends at home, having been long absent from them. No person rocked on ocean waves, in returning from some transmarine country, can cease to cherish a thrilling desire to see his home and dearest friends in his native land.

4. If the power of volition *necessarily acted* in conformity with our *highest or strongest desire*, we would be destitute of any rule of morality capable of restraining from any evil a depraved nature could wish; but conscience furnishes correction to evil desires by dictating that which is right and should be done. In this way conscience furnishes motive to volition, but in no case can it command or control it. 5. Intellectual and moral beings are capable of being *led by pure motive*, and such motive is furnished by those mental powers which lie at the foundation of moral action. Without the development of these powers, man would be like the brute, led by desires which correspond to and act in conformity with mere animal nature; but, possessed of moral susceptibilities, we have light to act correctly, and if we refuse, guilt is

the result. And when we voluntarily act in reference to any object, we have an immediate, internal conviction as to whether it be right or wrong.

SECTION IV.

1. The volitive power is manifested with various *degrees of strength*. Like other powers, it may be strongly or vigorously developed in some minds, while others appear to possess not so much strength or degrees of power. 2. The same *degrees of difference* may be applied to the *force of action* of the volitive power. Action may be either weak or strong, and the force must, necessarily, depend upon the original power to act; for without such power action would be wholly an accident, if it could possibly have an existence. 3. *Volition* differs from *feeling*. The former is the power of free or liberty-action, and its leading characteristic is motion, and not emotion or feeling: hence, it is not necessitated by preference, feeling, or desire. 4. Volition relates to *self-action*, both of *body and mind*. The body may move voluntarily or involuntarily, yet it can be made to move. We may determine to put forth action of the bodily powers instantaneously, or that it shall be done at a certain epoch in the future. The mind can act in arranging any process of future or contemplated events or facts. It is difficult to express the liberty and limitlessness of this power. It is peculiar in nature to itself, and can not be arbitrarily trammelled by preference, desires, or motive. 5. We have seen, by the preceding

argument, that volition, in nature, embraces more than *mere action*, being a power capable of action, and at liberty to act in any way independently of other powers. We have demonstrated that mere *action* can not exist if there is nothing capable of acting. 6. *Volition differs from choice*. If our liberty consists wholly and only in acting according to choice, then choice must invariably precede action, and be the cause of such action; therefore, we can not commit crime till we first choose to do so, neither can we do a righteous act till we choose so to do; but when a variety of objects are presented to us at the same time, we can have no voluntary mental action of any kind in comparing the properties or preferable qualities of them, in order to choose which we prefer, till we first choose to know that we can apprehend differences, and that we can choose to originate mental action in apprehending their existence at all. This is absurd. 7. *Volitive liberty* is, within itself, the power of *acting or not acting*, and that either with or without choice. Choice has no creative power by which volition is a mandatory result.

SECTION V.

1. Volition is *anterior* to choice; for choice, in its very nature, implies the possibility of a different or opposite selection to that which is made. Then if a different selection could have been made, the power and liberty of such selecting must necessarily exist anterior to choice, and the selection made; therefore,

choice can not exist till we have volitive action, at least, in connection with apprehending the presence of objects of choice. 2. There is an *antecedent volitive power*, in which there is always an *alternative* to that which the mind decides on, with the consciousness that we can choose either. This liberty we can not doubt. If many objects are presented to the mind, we are in possession of the same liberty to choose or not to choose any one or class of them; and to deny this is to disorganize the rational mind. 3. Then it follows that our choice, or *act of choosing*, is free, being opposed to any thing like an unchanging necessity. Volitions can exist as opposed to the laws over matter and natural causation, and even the laws of instinct. Thus, the mind has power to choose, in which alternatives are disposed of without respect to any natural relationship, elements, or cause and effect. 4. Volition is possessed either of *self-freedom* or is *under the law of fatal necessity*. If governed by choice, and choice is an effect of our constitutional organization, then the whole mind is under the law of necessity, whether it be regarded in a primary or a secondary point of light. It has been asserted that we are free, or are at liberty to act according to choice; but we have seen that volition is anterior to choice, and that choice is dependent on it for existence. The wheels of an extensive manufactory tend to rest, but they can all be thrown into motion by the great water-wheel, which yields to the weight of water, according to the law of gravitation. The force of

this law is the cause or necessity of action. If man acts only under the law of necessity, then it is the *law* which is accountable for either good or bad deeds.

5. Another *false* proposition is, that "motives are causes, of which volitions are effects." It is again asserted that "every volition has a motive, and if the motive be single, which operates upon the will, such motive will determine it; but if there are several operating upon it at the same time, the strongest one will determine the will-action." It would appear that no proposition, or propositions, could be much more unreasonable or absurd.

6. Motive may be regarded as *that* which has power to *invoke will-action*; and when we speak of it, in connection with volition, we do not say motive is action, but it is that which invokes action of the volitive power; otherwise, motive and volitive action would be one and the same. If motive is not volition, then it can only influence the mind to action in a secondary way; for it can not act either as or for volition, but is rather a contingent influence inducing volitions. Then, in all cases, volitive power must exist anterior to motive, and motive can invoke volitive action, which may be granted or refused at the pleasure of the will.

7. The *origin* and arrangement of motives, *presuppose* and prove the pre-existence and action of the volitive power. If we can pre-arrange motives to produce in the mind certain volitions, then the determining to make such pre-arrangements is a volition, which must exist previous to motive, as its being is a prelude to the origin

and arrangement of motive. It can exist, in the order of time, after, but can never precede and give origin to the power of volition. 8. Volitions are *spontaneous*, and can exist *independent* of motive, and, in many instances, without being influenced by it in the slightest degree. We know, from the preceding argument, that motive can only have a secondary or an ulterior influence upon volition. The relation of cause and effect, when referred to the acts of the Divine Being, destroys all law of motive-control. Such law, then, could not exist unless by Divine volition. Then, if he could act once without motive-influence, he could continue doing so forever.

SECTION VI.

1. Motive *can not control* the Divine Mind. Dr. Edwards, in trying to sustain the doctrine of motive, gives us to understand that the "*energy of motives* exists in the nature of things anterior to the will of God." Mr. Upham says that "the Supreme Being is *inevitably governed*, in all his doings, by what, in the range of events, is wisest and best." Thus, he is inevitably subordinate to that which is superior in control, and which governs him; therefore, motive is superior and governs all beings in the vast universe. If the above propositions be true, the Sovereign Ruler of universal being is the *energy of motives*. This conclusion, if true, or if we could believe it true, would compel us to adopt atheism as an inevitable result; but we have seen already the absurdity of

such statements, in the fact that volition in mind any where is anterior to motive. 2. Such high motive-law *leads to materialism*; for the mind could not move only as it was influenced by motive, and in the same direction, and to the same degree. Then, if the volitions of the mind should be operated upon by two or more motives of the same or equal importance in every way, the mind must cease to act, and remain at rest forever; therefore, mind would become inert, and if so it would become insensible, as sensation would imply action, and action could not take place. Deity in wisdom placed fixed laws over the material universe, but he has placed self-moving and imperishable minds under very different laws. 3. It is utterly impossible to establish a conclusion that *motive governs volition*, without reasoning in a circle. If we ask certain philosophers what controls and determines the volitions, they answer, the strongest motive. But what constitutes the strongest motive? They say, that which determines the volitions. And they can not, neither dare travel beyond this circle; otherwise, this high law of motive is broken or severed forever. 4. That volitions are authoritatively controlled and determined by either motive or choice is directly opposed to the *consciousness* of mankind. Of nothing are we more competent to judge, or are we more thoroughly prepared to decide, than that the volitive power lies back of both motive and choice; and nothing do we know with more absolute certainty than in regard to the action of the volitive power, as to

whether it is necessitated or free. Evidence, reported to the mind through the medium of the senses, may deceive us, from the fact that the physical organs connected with the senses may be affected or even paralyzed by disease; but an appeal to consciousness is an end to all controversy or doubt. Its evidence can not be increased within itself, and its testimony is direct without the frailty of intervening material nerves, tending to paralysis and decay. If it be unreasonable to doubt evidence or testimony from external objects, it is infinitely more unreasonable and absurd to doubt our consciousness or its evidence. Its voice is without contingencies, or the possibility of deception, and to doubt its unerring truthfulness is to be coerced into universal doubt and skepticism. 5. In the unerring truthfulness of consciousness, we feel and know that our action in choice, and even in the selection of correct motive from evil, is not *arbitrary*, but *free*; and we can no more doubt it than we can the consciousness of self as a reality. In calling up our past acts which were evil, we feel that we were free at the time to have acted differently: hence the responsibility and accountability, a sense of which we could not feel if our acts were necessitated. If we intend to do wrong, at a certain time in the future, we feel that it is positively in our power to avoid such an act, and consequently we feel and know we shall incur guilt, a sense of which we could not have if our volitions were controlled and determined by either choice or motives. 6. The *untrammelled liberty* of

our volitions is clearly established, from the fact that the existence of consciousness in man prevents him from being effectually reasoned out of a sense of his accountability. They who have faithfully tried to extinguish this internal light, have found it to be like smuggling subterraneous fires, the accumulation of which suddenly rends every obstruction with the throes of an earthquake. The reason is plain. We are more absolutely conscious of the liberty of our volitions in acting right or wrong, than we can be of any law of motives or even as to whether they can have any existence at all. We can have no sense of remorse for any act, however bad, without consciousness. While we feel that our evil acts are freely our own, we experience condemnation; but if our acts are not wholly voluntary, it is impossible to feel that we have done wrong.

SECTION VII.

1. We are more *vividly conscious* of the sensations or feelings we experience in *voluntarily* choosing motive, than we can be even of the real objects of choice. When many motives influence the mind, such influence implies a previous voluntary action, which must take place in apprehending the presence or existence of such motives. The strongest among many motives can not be determined till a previous voluntary action takes place: first, in apprehending them; and, secondly, in comparing them, in order to determine upon the preferable or strongest one; otherwise, the

strongest could never be known to the mind, as such motive or motives have not self-power to make themselves known. 2. There is a *difference* between *resolving to act* according to the strongest motive, after it is voluntarily discovered, and acting from fatal necessity. In the very act of yielding to the strongest motive, after voluntarily determined, we distinctly feel, in the resolving to conform to it, that, at the same time, we are entirely able and free to resolve on a different course. While standing on the projecting rocks of Niagara Falls, I may determine not to throw myself over, and, at the same moment, feel that I am able and can leap over into the abyss below. 3. The *strongest* motive affecting the mind is embraced in the *law of self-preservation*; yet we feel and know that it depends upon ourselves whether we may adhere to such law or not. It is, with us, to become obedient to the rules or laws of health, or to be intentionally reckless of them, or we are at liberty to destroy life by violence; but if we were compelled to this by motive, the act would be perfectly harmless, as we have seen. 4. The law of *motive-necessity* is contrary to the conscious feeling and acts of mankind in general. All claim to refer, in some way, to right and wrong, reward and punishment, merit and demerit. There is a universal feeling prompting to reward him who does right, and to punish the transgressor. This universal conformity of belief, conduct, and actions, which are regulated according to an internal conscious feeling of liberty, in which we know that they can be correct

or the reverse, according to the freedom of the volitive power, forever destroys any necessitated restrictions upon our spontaneous volitions. 5. The remembrance of past acts is attended with a conviction or consciousness the most positive, that, in the same condition, or under identically the same circumstances, our volition and acts might have been precisely the *reverse* of what they were. In the recalling of any act, the consciousness of our power to have voluntarily determined and acted differently will be distinctly recalled in connection with the act, and the one is as clearly vivid as the other. 6. In deciding upon the acts of others, we have a conscious sense of that which is right or wrong. These convictions arise from a consciousness of mental liberty. We have an unerring conviction that all offenders might act differently if they would: hence their condemnation; for if we could feel and believe that their acts were necessitated, it would be impossible to censure them for any wrong.

SECTION VIII.

1. This *conscious sense* of liberty is evidenced in regard to acts of present time. If a variety of objects are presented to the mind, we know that we have power to collect any one of them, or any class; and by this volition the object or motive is distinguished and selected, in connection with which we can act, continue to act, or refuse to act at any time. 2. The doctrine that "motive produces volition, and that volition produces the act, and all the circumstances taken to-

gether constitute the motive," is only favored with words and confusion of thought. It is a specimen of that continuous, argumentative circle which is adopted by all who vindicate the laws of fatality. 3. The *ground* of our *accountability* exists in the possession of a liberty-power to do right, and to refrain from evil or wrong. No where can we find the ground of accountability beyond the fact and nature of voluntariness. We are satisfied that man is accountable for all his voluntary acts, and we are equally as well satisfied that he is not accountable for any thing beyond this. 4. Man naturally *possesses* volition, and he is capable of volitive action, or of *putting forth* volitions. If he is not capable of voluntary action, then it is needless to exhort him to do right; for he has no power to act. 5. Mr. Stewart says that "will properly expresses that power of the mind of which volition is the act." If volition is only the act of the will, why call it volition? for the act of the will is the act of the will, and no more or less. If will has real action, it would be foolish to say that volition was the same action, and only the same, yet this would be the case if volition is the action of the will; but this is false. Then, if volition be only the action of the will, and is dependent upon such action for its origin, and can not be the action of the will, as the will is acknowledged to have its own action, it must be an accidental and superadded action, which may have a casual being, and then sink into annihilation; but this is absurd. 6. Then we must come to a more rational

conclusion that volition can not exist *only* as action, unless there is something capable of moving. The very idea of action implies a power capable of acting.

7. Mr. Upham says the will is "the mental power or susceptibility, by which we put forth volitions." This amounts to about the same thing as that given by Mr. Stewart. But it would stand thus: that volition, or the *act* of the will, is that which puts forth the *act* of the will.

8. *Volition* and the *will* are not distinct powers of the mind, neither are they co-ordinate branches of any mental power. One can not give rise to the other, nor are they dependent upon each other for existence. The two terms refer the mind to the different conditions and degrees of strength naturally connected with and contained in the one intellectual power.

(1.) The term *volition* refers the mind to the natural liberty-power, essentially free to act in any way or manner corresponding to the nature of such freedom.

(2.) The term *will* refers the mind to the same mental power of action, embracing not only its primary spontaneity, but involves an idea of its higher degrees of strength, authoritative and mandatory power, not only in giving origin to action, but in continuing, counteracting, and in compelling action.

All the difference that need be referred to in this place, in the meaning of the two terms, is embraced in the nature of the condition of the one power in its varied manifestations. We now enter upon the analysis of the *will* in its more extensive manifestations, and will define, in brief form, its relation to other faculties of the mind.

CHAPTER II.

THE WILL.

SECTION I.

1. THE will is that faculty of the mind by which we *determine* either to *do* or *forbear* an action. It is an inherent power or faculty which we exercise in deciding among two or more objects, as to which we shall choose or pursue. 2. The will, in its *very nature*, is the *liberty-power* of the mind. The peculiar condition of its essential being is self-freedom and self-power of action. 3. It is not only free in its very nature, but has determining power, deciding in the mind that something *shall* be done or forborne. 4. The *will* is closely connected with the *judgment*, and is often influenced by it; yet, while the latter can discriminate and decide upon realities or facts, it requires the presence of the former in determining or in compelling action. The judgment can only act in relation to truths; and when it decides, such decision is knowledge; but the mind is wholly free to act or to forbear action. But when we will to secure that which is the object of decision, the powers of the mind are directed to the work necessary to be accomplished. 5. The understanding *can not control* the will. It has power to contain or embrace all that is necessary to

be brought under the inspection of the mind, and can go no further than to invoke volitive action. 6. Reason may connect the different steps, or chain of facts, from the premises to the result, but has no authority over the *will* in causing action. Its power is under the control of the will, by which its action can be continued or suspended at pleasure.

SECTION II.

1. We object to the *order* of the "classification of the mental powers," according to the arrangement of some writers, upon the nature of the will. A fine specimen of seemingly-unintentional, though intentional, design may be detected in the assumption, that "a knowledge of the will implies a preliminary knowledge of the intellect;" and that such "knowledge implies a preliminary knowledge of the sensibilities." This arrangement will claim that we have knowledge of the existence and action of several faculties as anterior to our knowledge of the will, thereby fixing a previous basis containing laws governing the will. The absurdity of this arrangement will be clearly defined hereafter. 2. To define the *relation* of the will to other faculties, or to all of them combined, in order to find some or combined influence as a law or laws of the will, by which it may be and is governed, is wholly unnecessary, as the very nature and relation of the will to all other powers of the mind will forever preclude any idea of the correctness of such confused argumentation. 3. *Feeling, thinking, and will-*

ing are three faculties distinct from each other. They have been known as the sensibility, intellect, and the will. All sensitive states and feelings are referred to the first; all intellectual operations are referred to the second; all mental determinations are referred to the third. It is improper to call an act of the will either a thought or feeling. 4. We object to "laws of the will." No material element, or elements, anterior to the existence of will in the human mind, can, within themselves, contain any "*law or laws*" possessing *action*; and if inertness would be essential to the nature of such existences, they could have no power over the will. 5. If they intend, by the "laws of the will," to say that the *laws* which Deity has fixed over the *material universe* have power to control the will, then mind is matter, and the will is inert; but this is false. 6. It can not be possible that they *refer* to the existence and controlling power of the Divine Being; for they could not call such existence the "laws of the will," and if they do, it would follow that he is the action of our wills, and we are both passive and not accountable. 7. It can not be that they refer to any *other faculty* of the same finite mind; for it would be just as improper for any faculty to have volitive power to act in the place of and for the will, as it would be for the will to act for itself

SECTION III.

1. We have already seen that "*laws of the will*," as contained in some works on mental philosophy, can

not exist, or, the human mind is incapable of having any satisfactory knowledge of them. 2. The will is *governed by its own law*, and from its nature it is impossible that any other faculty or faculties should control it. 3. "*Contingent action of the will*" implies the continued being and power of action as possessed by other faculties of the mind, and that volitive action is accidental. If the action of the will is wholly accidental, then there is no abiding or real principle capable of being called the will. Then, if the will is contingent, or only exists in *action*, it follows that, when such action is suspended, it is annihilated; but contingent volitive action, as taught by many, is false, and is resorted to only for the purpose of destroying liberty-power. 4. If the mind has power to act within and of itself, the condition of such power is *freedom, or liberty*; otherwise, no action could take place without an impinging cause. And if action is compelled, in any way, or by any power, beyond the identity of self, it is caused by such influence. Then *that* which causes mental action is that which acts while the mind is passive or wholly inactive; but if the mind has self-power to act, it is reasonable to suppose that it possesses some faculty capable of acting, or of determining action. It is just as reasonable to suppose that the will possesses such volitive power as to refer such power to any other faculty or influence. 5. The doctrine that the "*will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom*," as taught by Mr. Upham, and others, is clearly incorrect. Under this proposition, it is as-

sumed that "the will is subject to laws." An argument to prove this is drawn from the fact that all things in the universe are subject to law, and that the mind of man can not be regarded as an exception. This general blending is very objectionable. Why was there not a distinction made between the laws governing the inert part of the universe, and the laws governing the intellectual and immortal soul? If an uplifted rock is ponderous, and naturally gravitate to the earth, is that conclusive proof that the soul is ponderous, and must naturally and always obey the same law? If so we are undone forever. 6. The decision having been made, that "*the will is subject to laws,*" then they make this deduction: "*The freedom of the will, whatever may be its nature, must accommodate itself to this preliminary fact.*" Here we have at least the will fatalized. 7. *The argument seems to stand thus:* The will is subject to and is governed by laws, and that the freedom of the will is the "liberty of acting" under and according to the nature and requirements of such laws. These laws are regarded as being infinite, and all they require is of infinite necessity. This system of philosophy teaches and enforces the doctrine of free will, which is our "freedom or liberty" to act according to necessity. 8. We have already seen that the will is *not subject* to such laws; and it will be remembered that "laws of the will" have been assumed without any attempt to define them, or any one of them. The *first position* assumed was, that a knowledge of the will implied a

“previous knowledge of other powers of the mind.” If that be true, it does not follow that those previously-known powers were laws governing the will; for the very nature of those powers, as specified, would forever refute such a position. The *next* general position is, that “the will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom.” Here “laws” are assumed without telling us what they are. We will now proceed to notice those things which have been specifically mentioned and pointed out by them as governing the will.

SECTION IV.

1. *The will may be influenced by desire*, but can never be controlled by it, only in a subordinate way. Desire is no more than a mere emotion or excitement of the mind, directed to the attainment of an object. It is an inclination or wish for something to be enjoyed. That which we wish for or desire may become the object of the determining power of the will, or we may determine to pay no attention to it, though the strength of such desires may remain unchanged. In traveling from home and friends, we may often desire to return; yet we have volitive power to continue our onward course to some far-off and perhaps uninteresting part of the world. 2. Desires may arise *voluntarily* and *involuntarily*. We have volitive power to turn our attention to an object, or class of objects, till such object, or something connected, becomes the object of desire; and, in connection with some peculiar condition or fitness, which claims our voluntary

attention, may arise a desire to have the same in our possession. In this way desire may be successive to volition, if not a result of volitive action. They may be involuntary, though the will has power to cross or counteract the strength of such desires, and, by repeated efforts, diminish and destroy them. 3. Another position assumed by many writers, to enslave the will, is, that it is positively controlled by *choice*. The liberty of the will consists in the power of acting according to choice; therefore, our liberty is wholly embraced in obeying *choice*. If choice has mandatory control of the will, it would follow that, when it is exercised by any inert object, such object governs choice, which controls the will. 4. The very nature of choice implies the possibility of a *different* selection to that which is made. We intuitively feel that there is always an alternative to that which we choose or decide on; and as we compare different objects together, we have an abiding consciousness that we are at liberty to choose any one under our inspection. We know that we have volitive power to choose or not to choose. When two or more objects are presented to the mind, we feel that we have power to choose any one of them, or refuse making any choice. If choice can not be controlled in any way by the will, and is the result of some anterior constitutional determination, then it would follow that choice is inevitable, and that it can only take place as effect follows its cause. Then, it could never take place only in an involuntary way. 5. We know that choice does

exist; then its origin must be caused by the laws of natural necessity, or the mind has natural and volitive power to decide between alternatives. Choice can never be free if it be *produced* by the laws of necessity. Our freedom to act according to such necessity is bondage. If choice is produced by laws of natural necessity, it can never be free; but it implies liberty or freedom, and without this it ceases to be choice. 6. The position of some writers is, that *choice controls* the will, and is the effect of the laws of natural necessity. Then, for the effect of a natural cause to govern the manner, qualities, or condition of itself is impossible.

SECTION V.

1. Another assumption is, that the will is *governed* by motive. Mr. Upham says that "the will acts in view of the strongest motive, and *necessarily so acts.*" If such action is *necessitated*, it could not be otherwise. 2. Motive is that which *incites to action*, having only subordinate influence upon the will. The very nature of motive implies no mandatory power over its own origin and action; and if it possesses no self-power of government, it would be impossible for it to govern the will or any other faculty in a positive way. 3. The only way for motive to *govern* the will is, that its action be anterior, in the order of time, to the origin of the action of the will. It is utterly impossible to prove that the action of motive in the mind is anterior to the origin of the action of the will; and if it could be done, it would be no evidence that motive-

action could control the will. 4. If motive has power to *act*, and such action can only be induced by the presence of an object, then the object controls the motive, and the motive controls the will. Then it would follow, that when the object was inert it would control the mind. 5. It has been maintained by many writers, that motive governs *mind in general*; that it governs volitions in the human mind; and that in the same way it applies to the Divine Mind. Mr. Upham says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same with that of the Supreme Being himself. He is *inevitably* governed, in all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best;" therefore, the Divine Being is "*inevitably*" governed by a superior. We understand Dr. Edwards, that the "*energy of motives*" existed, in the nature of things, anterior to the will of God. In this way, many writers take the ground that motive governs the will of man, and the will of Deity, being anterior to it: hence, we are driven to the conclusion that motive governs all beings, and that it must be, of necessity, supreme. 6. Motive, in the Divine Mind, is subordinate to volitions. If "*motive*," or any "*certain fixed and irresistible influences*," control the acts of Deity, such controlling power could not have been originated and arranged by him; for, in that case, he must have *willed* the existence and arrangement of such pre-existing and controlling power. Then it follows, that such controlling power must either be anterior to any act of Deity, and thereby

superior to him, or such an assumed controlling power could not have existed till the Divine volition *willed* it into real being; and if it could only exist by the *will* of Deity, he had power to act independent of such supposed influence. If he had power to act once independently of this motive, or natural irresistible influence, he has power to act on independently of such supposed influences forever: so, farewell to the eternal sovereignty of motive! 7. We are as *conscious* of the existence of spiritual-self, as we can be of the reality of matter. Then if such finite spirit can exist somewhere, it is reasonable to suppose that an Infinite Spirit may exist every-where. And if a finite spirit can know some things, an Infinite Spirit may know all things, being every-where present. If the former can know some things as they come to pass, and such knowledge not the necessity of their being, then the latter may know all things coming to pass, and such knowledge be not the necessity of such existences. Deity foresaw that man, in his essential liberty, *would* voluntarily depart from right, and not that he *should*. There could be no necessity for the latter, in causing the very thing he had already seen coming to pass. 8. We have already seen that motive has no power to *control the volitive power* in the human mind. It may have subordinate influence in inducing volitive action, but nothing more; for, in order to control the will, it must be proved, without doubt, that it exists anterior to the action of the will, and has volitive power to act in causing the will to act; but, from its very nature,

it can not have such power; and if it could, it would be just as fatal to the law of necessity as to refer such power to the will where it belongs. 9. Another position assumed and strongly argued by Mr. Edwards, is, that "the will always is as the greatest apparent good;" but he explains this by admitting that the "will is *determined* by the greatest apparent good." To blend the will with the intellect is absurd; for we can not say that it is a thought; and it is equally as incorrect to blend it with the sensibilities, for it is not a feeling. And if motive can induce volitive action, under the law of necessity, then it would follow that when an inert existence was the object of motive; that as the object controlled the motive, so would such object control the will: hence, we would be compelled to serve material elements and laws in common with every thing else possessed with power to influence motive; but this is false. 10. That the will is *untrammelled* is in perfect accordance with the *consciousness* of mankind. Of nothing are we more positively certain than in regard to our acts, whether they be voluntary or of necessity. Knowledge received through the senses, connected with diseased and perishing physical organs, may deceive us; but consciousness, possessed of its own evidence, is knowledge, without demanding an increase of testimony from the senses. It is of and within its own existence and nature the end of all controversy or doubt. To doubt its power is to doubt the reality of all things. Our consciousness of self-action as

to whether such action is of infinite necessity, or is free, equals our consciousness of existence itself; and we can no more doubt this than we can doubt the existence of self and that of every thing else. When we contemplate future action in regard to many objects, we feel and know that we have natural volitive power, or ability, to choose any one, or to determine on any course we please in relation to one or all of them; and we are perfectly confident that we have power to refuse action contrary to either motive or the power of choice. When we reflect upon a wrong act in the past, we feel an internal conviction that we were free to have done differently: hence our deep regret or sense of sin; for without this conscious liberty, we could never regret the imperfections of the past, or feel that we had ever sinned. As long as we feel that we are accountable for our acts, we feel a consciousness of liberty in acting. If a consciousness of liberty could be removed from the mind, just as long as such sense was gone, we would be incapable of any regret or remorse. However much we may dread the results, yet if we do not feel an intuitive liberty, we never can experience any thing like regret or remorse in regard to any past act. Just as long as we could feel that we had no conscious liberty, we would be compelled to feel our acts were not our own.

CHAPTER III.

LIBERTY OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

1. THE expression "*free will*," is, to some extent, objectionable, as it would seem to imply the opposite, or that there could be such a thing as the will enslaved under a law of infinite necessity, which we have seen to be incorrect. *Will*, in its very essence, or nature, is a free principle. Liberty is its essential condition or law. *Free will* is as incorrect as *bound will*. Liberty is essential to its nature, and it is not *will* if it be *not free*; and if it be *bound*, it ceases to be *will*. Volitive power of action is essential to the being of the soul, and to all rational, intellectual, and accountable beings. Action and self-action are essential differences between matter and spirit. Spirit has self-power of choice; matter has not. Ratiocination is essential to intellect, and can not take place without action. Connected with these, volition is forever inseparable; therefore, mind can not exist without self-liberty of action. 2. The will, in its *acts* and *determinations*, is subject to the law of self-liberty in opposition to the law of necessity. We have seen already that the will can not fall under the law of infinite necessity; therefore, it must fall under that of

liberty, as opposed to necessity. If we know that we are under the law of necessity, then we have the same power of knowing that we are not accountable. To suppose and believe that our actions are necessary, and that we are accountable for such actions, is to suppose and believe an absurdity; for we never can experience remorse for any act, or acts, which are not wholly voluntary, either by intention or permission. 3. The doctrine of liberty is clearly established by consciousness, in which there is a universal conviction that our past acts, even under the same circumstances, might have been very different. Such conviction could not exist only in spontaneous origin or liberty. 4. In connection with the presence of many objects of choice, we have a positive consciousness that two or more acts of the will may be put forth, or that we may will to refuse them all, and that contrary to motive, desire, or choice. This truth can be tested by any one, at this moment, in regard to the very next act of the mind. The consciousness of liberty we now have, can no more be doubted than we can doubt our own existence. 5. We objected wholly to "laws of the will," as used by different writers. The will knows no law only *that of liberty*, which liberty may be regarded as absolute, being entirely and forever opposed to any law or laws of necessity. 6. I may determine to go to London, and while this determination remains unchanged, all other powers of the mind must be subject to the will. This determination may be continued or suspended only by the will. 7. The

effort to sustain the law of necessity has involved *reasoning in a circle*. Necessitarians have assumed that the "action of the will is always in the direction of the strongest motive." In defining the strongest motive, they say it is the motive in the direction of which the will does act. They have no way to define the strongest motive, but wait till the will acts, and then assume that the motive, in the direction of its action, is the strongest.

SECTION II.

1. *The spirit of dependence* can not exist under the law of necessity. The conviction that we are lost without an interest in the merit of Christ, is common to all; but to properly feel our dependence implies a *voluntary* act, in which we humbly and confidently rest all our hope upon Divine assistance. 2. *But the doctrine of necessity* can not naturally tend to mellow the exercise of the heart, and enkindle, with holy awe, the spirit of fervent love to the great Donor of all good. 3. If the doctrine of *liberty* be true, Deity does not preside over the myriads of earth's population for the purpose of executing the laws of stern and infinite fate; for such laws could need no additional power to enforce their claims, as such claims have been executed and enforced from all eternity. From the very necessity in their natural existence, no new claim or arrangement can ever take place, or ever has legally taken place. Such laws must either be self-existent and eternal, or there must have been a point

somewhere in the range of duration when they took place, or became real. Necessitarians can not admit that they were created by Deity; for he would have *willed* their existence. Then they must have had an existence anterior to any volitions in the Divine Mind: hence, the existence and claims of the laws of fate were all arranged before they came to the knowledge of the Divine Being; and, of course, he is subordinate to their control. Such a conclusion is worse than atheism. 4. A design in the creation of man was, that he might *voluntarily* serve God; and without such power, he could never glorify his Creator. Doubtless, without *natural liberty* to glorify God, the design of our being would have been destroyed, and this would have prevented our existence at all. Man must exist free to serve his Creator, or service would not be acceptable to God. And if it is necessary to have natural liberty, in order to glorify his Creator, then he is free to pervert the exercise or action of such liberty-power, and voluntarily fall from the favor of God, as in the case of our federal head. The mind is free, and, under this power, we may aim at the sun, step the silent paths of innumerable worlds, shout to their eternal flight; we may *will* the approach of heaven, the possession of its joys, and the full glory of endless day.

SECTION III.

1. It is difficult to define the difference between the *liberty* and the *power* of the will. Some have thought

that power was capable of degrees, while liberty remains the same. Whether there be naturally degrees in the power of the will, is not easily decided; for the apparent difference may be caused, to a considerable extent, by imperfect or diseased physical organs; yet it would appear that liberty, in all orders of mind, was essentially the same. The partially-developed mind, or that of a child, as well as the strong mind, enjoys the same liberty. The power of the will, as to the quality of its essential nature, can not admit of degrees; but it differs in different minds as to the degrees of vigor, vividness, and strength in its mandatory action. While liberty may be regarded as absolute, being opposed to every thing like infinite necessity, power may be regarded as more dependent. Liberty is without any compulsory infringement in any possible way; yet power is often incumbered by many contingencies. Liberty does not appear to be capable of being increased; but power, by repeated efforts, can become more vigorous and irresistible. 2. *The power and freedom* of the will is clearly evidenced in self-preservation. If I were in a boat, peacefully floating on the silvery waters of Niagara, above the Falls, I feel distinctly that life depends upon the efforts of myself, and only upon myself. I feel as conscious as I can of any thing, that I have power either to *determine* to row to the shore, or to go over the Falls without any effort. 3. The will has *self-determining* power. It is not a matter of astonishment that necessitarians should doubt the self-


determining power of the will; but they acknowledge that the mind, as a whole, has self-determining power. We hold that the will, in its nature and office, presides over all other faculties, and determines all the processes and acts of the mind. No event, object, or fact can be made the subject of knowledge only by the self-determining power of the mind; for nothing can be brought under the inspection of the mind without mental action, and such action is in the mind, and is a result of its self-determining power. 4. Mr. Upham says, "If by the phrase self-determining power of the will be merely meant that the will itself, that distinct susceptibility of the mind which we thus denominate, has *power of action*, we grant that it is so;" that is, the will can act, but not authoritatively—it can only act under the control of law or the strongest motive. The freedom of such action is in conforming to necessity. But again: "The will acts, and with such freedom and such power as to lay the basis of accountability." That is, "It is free to act according to the law of necessity." This is the substance, and amounts to the fact that such action is coerced by the law of fate. 5. Mr. Edwards says, "*If the will determines the will, then choice orders and determines choice.*" If the will can determine the mind, it certainly can determine the will; for the will is a faculty of the mind, and the self-determining power of the mind has been acknowledged to be true. We have already seen that no faculty or faculties can determine the mind except the will.

SECTION IV.

1. *The superior power* of the will is that peculiar power by which it is not only distinguished from other faculties, but determines the action of the mental powers as a whole. 2. The ground of offense in the sight of God, is not only our *power to perceive the difference* between right and wrong, and an *abiding conviction* as to what we should do, but is embraced in the fact that we possess the *power to do* that which is right, and to *refuse to do* that which is contrary to the Divine will. 3. Connected with *voluntariness* is the ground of all accountability. Take this away, and it is utterly impossible for us ever to be called to an account for any thought or act. We can neither be applauded nor blamed. 4. The will possesses *mandatory power*. The mind certainly has self-determining power, by the consent of philosophers, and in the very nature of its being and operations. By general consent, and true analysis, this power has not been defined as being diffused through the nature and power of all the faculties, separately or combined; but the determining power has been referred to some one faculty. No faculty, from its essential nature, can possess mandatory power but the will. 5. The will appears to *preside* over the combined action of the other faculties, and has power to control mental action. 6. Some necessitarians have erred in trying to confound the will with the *sensibilities*, and refused to appeal to special and universal consciousness. 7. Another evi-

dence of the independence and controlling power of the will, is contained in the fact that we can will to *perform impossibilities*; that is, we can will the reality of an impossibility. The atheist may be possessed of such horrible dread of the truths of the Bible, that, with all his soul, he may will its annihilation; yet he knows, at the same time, that this is impossible. 8. *Such is the will, the free liberty-power of the imperishable mind.* Under its vivid power and mandatory control, minds of the high and the lowly, enkindling with feelings of lofty and holy aspirations, assert their right to triumph over all embarrassments and storms, the mere results of physical tendencies, or the requirements of their laws, mind, intellectual and immortal, may determine upon the advance of infinite happiness, and the interminable progression of imperishable knowledge. How can we define the true character of the soul, when perfected in its separation from the decay of physical organs which trammelled its manifestations in time? Possessed of all the facts and knowledge of the past, its thoughts freely range all through the boundless future; but infinitely higher to our conceptions must be the character of that soul perfected in the knowledge, favor, and love of God! With holy triumph and increasing joy, burn on, thou spirit of endless day! As the accelerated travel of a star, range the progressive series of heavenly knowledge. Endowed with angelic reach of thought and gaze of fire, a bright immortality of universal being only extends the raptures of increasing delight,

whether paused amid brilliant perceptions of surrounding good and grandeur, or, contemplating the glow and varied motion of distant rolling worlds, tracing the mysterious vast of great eternity.



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.



PART II.

THE ELEMENTS OF MIND

WHICH

LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION.



"THERE IS A SPIRIT IN MAN; AND THE INSPIRATION OF THE
ALMIGHTY GIVETH THEM UNDERSTANDING."

THE HISTORY OF THE

1771

OF THE

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THE HISTORY OF THE

ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

DIVISION FIRST.

CHAPTER I.

MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. OUR attention will be directed, in the *second part* of these philosophical inquiries, to the analysis of MORAL *elements* of mind. The *first part* of this work contains the analysis of those faculties which lie at the foundation of *mental action*. 2. The present object is to define the *real existence*, *inherent powers* and *office* of elements which lie at the foundation of *moral action*, without which such action could not exist.

SECTION II.

1. A *correct understanding* of the intellectual and moral elements of mind, with a desire to know and properly appreciate their merited worth, vies in importance with all relative finities, or the dearest pleasures of invoked attainments. A correct knowledge of mind gives a conscious satisfaction in regard to self, and serves as head-light radiance, thrown on the way of rapid and illimitable progression. As the scintil-

lated travel of a star, so should the transit of a perfect soul on the disk of departing time reflect intellectual and moral light. Such living traces of greatness and sublimity, with moral beauty and worth, are pioneer sentiments guarding the way of triumph, and pointing out the opening future, every-where subtended with the glorious reversions of vast eternity. 2. Though the *human mind*, in relative contrast, be regarded as a mere atom, yet its being and knowledge is unending. Such finity is real in infinity, of bounded identity, but sustained by omnipotence. *The true study* of mind, embracing purity of mental and moral *action*, should be regarded as the GREAT SCIENCE of earth. It hangs the golden clouds of *another life*, high and glowing, around the setting sun of this! Then enter this spiritual domain burdened with a sense of immortal destiny.

CHAPTER II.

REAL EXISTENCE OF MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. THE *existence of moral powers* is evident. Effect can not exist without a cause. Neither can a beginning or change take place without a cause. Conscious convictions of the impossibility of inert causation, move us to look for a *cause* equal to the known effect. Of nothing are we more certain than that moral influences exist in the soul, and that we are capable of moral action; for such action, as a result, can not arise from non-existence. 2. As the mind *matures* from childhood, there is evidence of internal *moral powers*. When the attention is arrested by either sad or joyful news, the feelings will naturally correspond to either extreme; and there will be an intuitive approval or disapproval, as the case may be.

SECTION II.

1. We have *conscious belief* in *moral faculties*. When inspecting internal emotions and feelings, we have self-evident consciousness in regard to what is right or wrong, sanctioning or condemning, approving or disapproving. 2. Revelation appeals to the

moral nature of the soul with positive certainty; then man is capable of knowing right from wrong, and can feel obligations upon him to do right. 3. The Almighty has often called upon man *to decide* upon the deportment of others of our race, as to whether they be right or wrong, and as to the character of acquittal or degree of punishment. This is evidence of a moral nature with liberty of correct self-action.

CHAPTER III.

NATURE OF THE MORAL POWERS.

SECTION I.

1. THE *nature* and *condition* of moral faculties can be determined by reference to our consciousness of their being, and comparing them with elements purely mental. The affections, or influences of the soul enable us to form correct conclusions in regard to the power of the elements to which they correspond and by which supported. A pure conscience is connected with right motive and happy mind; but when the moral powers are connected with an evil conscience, the whole mind is gloomy and miserable.

2. The *moral* nature is evidenced by the purity or impurity of motive. The vicious and lawless of earth are looked upon only to be dreaded, and feelings of horror are spontaneous in reviewing their acts. On the other hand, kindness and merciful acts are applauded by the warm hearts of thousands.

3. The *harmony* and *peace pervading civil government*, is evidence of moral powers and influences stronger than that arising from impure and vicious minds. Had we no moral nature capable of being influenced by moral suasion, the whole earth would be confusion and scenes of blood.

4. Our *capability* and

enjoyment of happiness in the performance of duty, and remorse in doing wrong, prove the existence of a moral nature, with its character.

SECTION II.

1. The *relative existence* of the moral powers to the whole mind refers us, (1.) To the *relative claims* of the two classes of elements. The states of the intellect differ from the feelings and emotions connected with such states. The former is free to enforce investigative thought, regardless of consequences; while the latter has a feeling of caution, awe, and dependence. (2.) The *action* of the *mental powers* appears to be in the *direction* of the desirable: apprehending and contemplating the wisdom, sublimity, and grandeur of universal realities; while that of the *moral powers* looks to the GOOD, the RIGHT; and *that* which is happy under the Divine approval.

DIVISION SECOND.



CHAPTER I.

CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.

1. CONSCIENCE is a *primary or intuitive power* of the soul. Its origin is not a result of education, but exists and remains to be exercised. It was created by Infinite Wisdom, with superior power and influence in connection with the original elements of our spiritual being. 2. Connected with it is the *power* to know self; such reality can not be fully known, without the response, approval, and affirmation of conscience. 3. The *real existence* of external facts can be traced to this faculty, as a connected primary power in the knowledge of such realities. Millions of entities may crowd space around us, but a satisfactory knowledge of them is impossible till we experience a conscious feeling or sense that they are real. 4. *Things* mentally apprehended become objects of belief, and are received as true when we feel a conscious affirmation or satisfaction in regard to them. Then only is the mind at rest. 5. The *Scripture evidence* of the existence and nature of conscience is conclusive. Though all other sources were

silent, Revelation, internal experience, and self-conscious knowledge would render unbelief impossible. 6. The Bible teaches the *positive existence* of our moral nature, and that such nature centers in *that* which is called conscience, and by this name our moral nature is influenced, addressed, and commanded. The commands of Heaven show that we have power to know right from wrong, and that *conscience* influences and moves us to pursue the *right*. 7. The *existence, nature, power, and laws* of conscience may be learned from the following expressions: "Testimony of conscience. A good conscience. Commend ourselves to every man's conscience. Are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness." We pause; this is enough.

SECTION II.

1. *Belief* in the *existence* and *power* of conscience is the *inevitable result* of an intuition which is a part of self; and into this belief we are driven by a thousand realities from which mind can never be withheld, and there can be no belief, except intuitive. 2. This *power* of our moral constitution possesses an independence and importance among the moral elements and emotions too generally denied. It is called by the world-renowned critic, "the great master-power, the sovereign-regulator of the moral system in man, and placed there by God himself for this specific purpose." It is the superior faculty of the

moral elements, rightfully claiming persuasive and dictatorial sovereignty, when exercised properly in its heaven-invested influence and power. 3. Mankind, by a *general concurrence* of feeling and action, independent of either denied or acknowledged belief, have awarded to conscience such high jurisdiction. Though it may be the last court of appeal, yet it is the final and conclusive test to that certainty in knowledge, where a tendency to belief is wholly undisturbed. Its righteous dictates should always rule.

CHAPTER II.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND RELATIVE LAWS OF
CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.

1. *It is not the business* of conscience to say what is right or wrong existing anterior to self, separate or abstractly, for the real existence or nature of either is beyond its legislation. 2. Neither does it attempt to *settle* the *origin* of the law of self-being; but it can be, and is, in part, a witness or evidence in the origin of the knowledge of self-reality. 3. It is within the power and is the business of conscience to *decide* on our own right or wrong, involving our relation either to innocence or guilt. 4. It does not settle, but *assumes as settled*, the great principles of moral rectitude, and its influence over our feelings and actions corresponds accordingly. 5. It is a primary prerogative, or constitutional law of conscience to *lead* in deciding on self-right or wrong, to approve or disapprove. And its voice, under the influence of the Divine Spirit, should never be silenced, while all other powers should submit to its righteous dictation. 6. It is *a law to man*. Notwithstanding the near relation of the understanding, emotions, and will, its natural right is to reign supreme in impressive and dictatorial influ-

ence of the moral powers, and should be untrameled by either the will or heart. 7. As the *condition* and *action* of our moral nature is essential to happiness in time and eternity, the light of heaven should guide conscience in all we do.

SECTION II.

1. If conscience *be not* a real power, and is, as asserted by a great mind, to be only "*a general principle of moral approbation or disapprobation,*" then, when the mind is not influenced either way, conscience would be non-existence; and if so, we could have no knowledge of it again without a new creation. It is not another faculty under change, neither can other faculties originate it; therefore, if, at any time, we are capable of experiencing moral influence, called conscience, there must be a cause which is abiding and part of self. Though a superhuman influence be added to mind, yet that would neither be an element or part of self. 2. It has *self-power* and *intuitive right* to lead or influence in deciding on right or wrong, the merit or demerit of our own actions, feelings, and affections. 3. *Conscience-conception* refers to the peculiar natural susceptibility, in its central moral position and condition to receive, possess, and retain the first intimations of influences or impressions in regard to the great principles of moral rectitude, subject to the will and approval of the Divine Being. 4. *Conscience-perception* may refer to its natural and peculiar spontaneous acuteness and action, in appre-

hending and receiving the first influences by which it is affected, moving the mind to action, and constitutionally serving as a moral check against the alienation of other powers from right. 5. The *moral condition* and *ulterior laws* of conscience are of the utmost importance. (1.) A *right* conscience exists in the mind connected with a uniform pure motive and freedom from guilt, approved of God, and tenacious of the interests and happiness of self and our fellow-beings. (2.) A *pure* conscience is possessed of the renewing and hallowed power of Divine grace, by which it is free from the control of sin, and all the emotions and feelings tranquilized with peace and happiness. (3.) Such *conscience* is under the influence of pure love to God and all mankind. 6. It is said to be *evil* when it ceases to correctly influence the mind in regard to right and wrong. 7. It is described as being "*seared*," when it possesses no pain or misgivings, as the mind reflects upon wickedness or contemplates wrong. Then the soul is ruined. Yet it may return to illimitable love and the purity of immortal thought, transcendent in beauty, grandeur, and sublimity on the one hand, with sweet, effulgent glory and grace on the other, spreading soothing and mellowing light, as upon the despair of the almost lost.

CHAPTER III.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

SECTION I.

1. CONSCIENCE exists at the foundation of the soul's moral nature, with power to influence and move the same; while *consciousness* is more closely connected with the states, action, and conclusions of the intellectual distinctions and decisions. 2. *Consciousness*, in one sense, is *conscience in action*. Its moral condition and influence appears to be connected with the existence and influence of conscience, and extends its adjudicatorial prerogatives over mental operations and sensations of external and internal origin. 3. It is an *internal* sense or decision from observation or experience resulting in real knowledge. 4. In another sense, it may be called a *perception* of what is passing in the mind, while conscience, by intuitive power and right, extends to all our actions, physical and mental. *Consciousness* is properly the knowledge of the *existence*; and *conscience*, of the *moral nature* of actions. The former is busied with, and more naturally appertains to, metaphysics; and the latter, with morality. 5. *Consciousness* is self-evident in the philosophy of mind, known to be true, independently of either proof or disproof.

By it we are positively aware that *self is real*, and in opposition to non-existence; or, that *I am not*, or *am not myself*. Doubt is impossible, unless we could first cease to be; then there would be nothing capable of doubting. 6. *Self-consciousness* is sustained by conscience, and from the very natural laws of being neither of them can ever be doubted. 7. *Consciousness* is self-recognition, not only of the processes and emotions of the mind, but is also the mind *knowing itself* in these. 8. *Self-consciousness*, in the very nature of its existence, implies, (1.) An *inherent* knowledge of self-reality as absolute. (2.) That self-reality and action are its *subjects*. (3.) And that which is beyond self-finity, is its object or objects of ulterior knowledge.

SECTION II.

1. *Consciousness* is not only real, but is conditioned by a *spontaneous* constitutional law of intellectual being—evidenced from its *influence* and *action*; results known to exist in the experience of persons generally, but no result can take place with sufficient causative power. 2. It can not be a *result* of *other* faculties. Could any one of them, or all combined, create this power, then the original or first one may have created itself, which is absurd. 3. In the *original spontaneity* of consciousness there is decisive power in regard to mental phenomena. Belief in the *testimony* and *decisions* of consciousness and conscience can not be doubted till we know self to be

non-existence, but this is impossible. 4. A knowledge of *personal identity* begins with conscience and is matured more fully by consciousness. But belief in the uniformity of such identity is dependent upon *memory* and *reason*. Memory calls up past mental feelings and states; reason connects them in one chain up to the present conscious mental state, in which the conviction is irresistible that they all belonged to the same sentient being. 5. It has *direct respect* to the *present*; as we can not be said to be conscious, abstractly, of any thing which does not exist at the present time. We may have conscious remembrance of past events and a conscious contemplation of that which is future; but this involves, in part, the presence of other faculties. 6. Consciousness *is not* a "second source of internal knowledge." Neither can the organs of sense be a "*primary source*" of knowledge. It is not made known "by *suggestion*." That a "*knowledge of self*" does not have its origin in connection with consciousness and conscience, is absurd. Suggestion has no self-power to originate it, nor abstractly its own existence. The doctrine that "impressions from external objects must be experienced, in order to give origin to the idea of self," is untrue, unless mind is derived from matter. 7. All degrees of belief are matters of consciousness, and there is no belief but intuitive. It is a source of knowledge, including *emotions* of the beautiful, the grand, and the sublime: then descends to the ludicrous and those of horror. It includes *feel-*

ings of pleasure, hope, joy, and happiness; and on the other hand, those of pain, despondency, and remorse. 8. When we *experience* feelings of friendship, sympathy, gratitude, affection, and love; or those of hatred, anger, jealousy, revenge, and envy, we have *conscious knowledge* that they are real and belong to ourselves.

SECTION III.

1. *Consciousness*, as well as conscience, is a *primary source* of knowledge. It has power to witness of, and to self, in the origin of self-knowledge. Intuitive knowledge of self-identity is the (1.) or *primary*—the origin and the highest source of knowledge. The (2.) source is that which our *spirits* receive from the Divine Spirit in the *evidence* of pardon impressed or witnessed to our spirits, which is knowledge *direct*, being independent of any aid or hinderance from our abstract physical nature. Conscious experience can not be doubted. (3.) An *ultimate source* of knowledge is *that* from the external world derived through the medium of the senses. 2. *Consciousness includes* and is the *test* of all moral and religious emotions and feelings. Convictions, repentance, humility, adoration, dependence, forgiveness, the influence of pardon and the experimental evidence of salvation, together with approval, disapproval, or remorse, all are subject to the state, condition, and power of conscience and consciousness. 3. Then a *conscious* and *heart-felt* religion is the only effi-

cient and effectual known to man. Affecting the moral elements of the soul, it is, therefore, both reasonable and scientific, from the glow of its first dawn on earth to the infinity of its perfectness in heaven. It neither destroys nor creates faculties, but changes their condition and moral relation: giving spiritual freedom from bondage, joy for heaviness, peace for trouble, light for darkness, love for hatred, and happiness boundless—directing to safety and triumph, when the last trump shall sound, the seas dry up, and mountains dissolve. 4. If the *revolt* of a single star from its orbit shakes the earth, if not all worlds, then may not the *revolt* of a rational soul, priceless in purchase, all price beyond, move the moral universe? Its condition and action may affect either hell or heaven; deepening the wail of the one, or inspiring the song of the other. Look constantly to moral *purity*. Though the lamps of night's outer temple cease to burn, yet the soul shall live forever.

CHAPTER IV.

THE HEART.

SECTION I.

1. *The heart* is a muscular or nervous viscus, situated in the thorax. It originates the blood's motion through the arteries to the different parts of the body. It is the great center or seat of animal life. As it is the center of the physical organization, and has, by natural right, a mandatory control over all physical powers, so has the heart in our spiritual nature been regarded as the *central power* of the soul. 2. It is *natural* for all physical powers to become weary, except the *nerves* and *cords* connected with the continued action of the heart and lungs. We have no way to account for this, unless such unwearied action is caused by the continued presence of Divine power. 3. This *feature of unweariedness* very fitly represents the untiring vivacity and action of the soul. But we now confine our thoughts to the heart, as referred to our spiritual nature. 4. *It is not* an *element* of mind, but appears to be the central influence, or *power*, where all the elements of the soul concentrate, and by which they appear to be connected in unison of feeling, decision, and action. 5. In *nature, condition, and position*, it appears to be midway and modulating

the ulterior natural distinction of *conscience*, *the will*, and the *understanding*. 6. The *heart*, correlatively, within itself, possesses central power and influence with and over all mental faculties, emotions, and affections, and is the *disposition* of the mind. (1.) The *judgment* not only *informs* the heart, but has influence in presenting its decisions with correct distinctions of realities and worth. Yet the heart, with inherent power, often blinds the judgment till error and ruin are the results. (2.) *The will* has power over the heart, but the latter, filled with perverseness, often induces improper volitive action. (3.) *Memory* furnishes the heart with treasured realities in experience, yet the latter often refuses those facts putting out the light of hope.

SECTION II.

1. The *heart* is influenced by *moral* elements of mind. (1.) *Conscience* connects it with Divine influences, restraining from evil and directing to grace and pardon, but its impurities often rend all such restrictions. (2.) It is the *seat* of *affections*, and by the strength of these may its relation to evil or good be tested. (3.) In proportion as the heart is under the influence of *love*, is it controlled by it. Could there be a heart naturally incapable of pure love, the wandering Arab might humbly beg to be saved from its tender mercies. A true, loving heart, with pure motive, lives near heaven, and should never be broken of imperceptible companionship with angels. But

the heart can resist all the charms of love. In it the consuming fires of sin and depravity may burn, or upon it the dews of grace may distill, mellowing in the breaking light of eternal day. 2. We now turn to the *Scripture testimony* and *descriptions* of the heart. It is said to be "dilated with joy, contracted and depressed with sadness, broken by sorrow, and hardened by prosperity. It is desolate in affliction and melts under discouragements." There is "an honest and a good heart, a broken and a clean heart, a liberal and an evil heart." 3. A *depraved heart* is said to be "deceitful above all things and desperately wicked." And it requires Divine power to renovate it. "And I will give them an heart to know me: they shall return unto me with their whole heart." 4. *Hardness of heart* takes place under sin when the Divine Spirit withdraws from it. 5. A *pure heart* is constituted such by Divine grace. "His Spirit beareth witness with our spirit. Whosoever is born of God sinneth not. Love one another with a pure heart. Perfect love casteth out all fear." Keep thy heart pure and God will keep thee forever.

SECTION III.

1. The *heart* is the central power of the soul, correlating mental elements, either in natural existence or relative influences in action. It lies back of the power of association. The hill and valley, mountain and sea, flying clouds and blooming flowers, all present varied trains of thought with crowding images;

beautiful or mean, grand or revolting, corresponding with previous trains of thought, chiefly dependent on, conditioned and sustained by the heart. 2. *It may be restrained by grace.* The *understanding, will, and conscience* serve as its checks and modifiers, yet it may resist them all. 3. *True eloquence* never can proceed from a cold, unfeeling heart. It must *feel* the burden of its message till the deep internal fires of excited genius and energy thrill every active principle and emotion of the soul, all concentrating in the power and quickening throes of the great, the mighty heart. Then is realized the lightning and the storm, the thunder and the bolt! 4. *It bears up and onward* the full burden of the soul. What we feel we can make known and cause others to feel. It can not make thought, but is susceptible, and carries, in approximation, a greater infinity of thought and meaning than the inert bosom of a thousand moving worlds. 5. *Love*, pure and holy, should ever *rule* the vivid energies of such internal power, stupendous in research, feeling, and joy, and majestic in imperishability.

DIVISION THIRD.

CHAPTER I.

INTERNAL MORAL POWER IN THE ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I.

1. THE *original* powers of mind apprehend the reality of self, and are self-witnesses to, and of, self-reality. Such power of knowledge, abstractly, can neither be increased nor diminished, without varying the natural identity and essence of such faculties; for we can have no knowledge of abstract, relative self-elementary degrees. 2. Such elements have *natural power to know* the reality of self-being. And with them is the power to know facts beyond self. 3. *Primary* mental and moral elements are the foundation and source of *all* knowledge. 4. The *moral element* enters into and constitutes, perhaps, the most extensive part of this original basis in apprehending facts.

SECTION II.

1. *Conscience* is connected with this original power to know realities. Spontaneous intuitions and convictions in regard to entities can not be separated from conscience. And the mind is only satisfied in refer-

ence to such truths in experiencing a conscious feeling of their truthfulness. 2. With the *nature* and *essence* of such faculties is the only origin of real knowledge. 3. *Internal ideas* or *notions* may and do arise in connection with intuitive power, and no where else. If the soul had no power of knowledge in itself, it could have none beyond self.

CHAPTER II.

THE SOUL HAS ONLY THREE GENERAL SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: 1. INHERENT. 2. DIRECT. 3. ULTERIOR.

SECTION I.

1. *INHERENT knowledge* is contained in, and is inseparably connected with original faculties. Such elements are not only the natural *power*, but the *foundation* of our capability to know facts. 2. Then the *power* and *origin* of knowledge must be ever and inseparably connected with the primary mental faculties. 3. Therefore *inherent knowledge* is identified with the very nature of original elements, and constitutes the first and most absolute *source* of self-knowledge.

SECTION II.

1. *Knowledge direct* is that which is immediately and spiritually imparted or impressed, by the Divine Spirit, upon our spirits, without, and independently of, any aid from physical organs. 2. If our *immaterial* nature is capable of animating the physical organs of sense, so as to capacitate them to receive sensations by contact with external things, then it has power to receive spiritual impressions and knowledge without the inertness of such organs. 3. The soul

has *spiritual perception, sight, light, and knowledge*. Any conscious-felt fact is knowledge, and can not be doubted. 4. The *soul* is *immaterial*, and its *knowledge* is immaterial; hence influences and truths imparted to it by the Divine Spirit are true, and form the second source of knowledge, being direct and independent of all physical entities or laws.

SECTION III.

1. *Knowledge* by means of the physical organs of the senses is not absolute in perfection. This is the third and *ulterior source* of knowledge. 2. The *physical organs* have neither perfection nor natural ability to act, only as imparted by the connected immaterial nature. As inertness, decay, and death belong to them, our knowledge from such source is both *ulterior* and *deceptious*. 3. But the *soul* contains an *internal* world of positive and imperishable reality. The vivid celerity of thought makes the sluggish lightning flash. Sacred joy rising, swells upon the distant limits of possibility, certifying us of a happy infinity beyond.

CHAPTER III.

RELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHRISTIANITY AND
INFIDELITY—HOW TESTED BY THE
MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND—THE
POWER AND ORIGIN OF BELIEF.

SECTION I.

1. THE *relative claims* of Christianity and infidelity can only be fully tested by the *moral elements* of mind. Positive confidence can not exist without the approval of our moral nature. 2. *Infidelity* is either *true* or *false*. If true, it should be approved; but if false, such delusion is ruinous and fatal. 3. To be a *consistent* infidel, we must have always been one *constitutionally* or in *nature*. Our conscious intuitions, convictions, and emotions must have always been infidel in *nature*. Then belief must have always of necessity corresponded, and we never could have doubted infidelity. But the moral nature is universally opposed to such credence. Faith in infidelity is by effort, hence unnatural.

SECTION II.

1. There are *three general classes* of evidence establishing the truthfulness of Christianity, all *tested* by the moral powers. (1.) *External evidence*, as found in the existence, designs, and laws of nature,

and evidenced in history; the power and reality of miracle; the existence and correctness of prophetic fulfillment; together with the existence, harmony, and wonderful preservation of the Scriptures—all may affect the mind through the medium of the senses; yet neither that nor sensation has self-power to know them to be true. The *test* is with the *intuitive elements* of the mind. (2.) The *internal evidence* containing the harmony of the several parts of Revelation, written by some fifty different persons, without concert, ranging about fifteen hundred years. The chain is unbroken, harmonizing with itself, the light of nature, and the internal convictions and feelings of the soul. (3.) *Experimental evidence* is the highest, and far more convincing than the other classes, becoming a part of conscious knowledge.

CHAPTER IV.

RELATIVE CLAIMS OF CHRISTIANITY AND INFIDELITY—EVIDENCE OF SPIRITUAL INFLUENCE AND PARDON—CONSCIOUS AND POSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS DERIVED FROM THREE SOURCES: 1. INHERENT. 2. DIRECT. 3. ULTERIOR.

SECTION I.

1. *INHERENT knowledge* is connected with the natural power and action of original faculties. What *I feel* I am *conscious of*; and I am *conscious* of nothing but *what I feel*. If I am conscious of sensations of happiness or joy, it is only because I *feel them*. If conscious of pain, I know it only because I *feel it*. Conscience is connected with the origin of conscious feeling. 2. *Consciousness* is an original susceptibility of mind, coexisting with thought and feeling. Thought is known to the thinking principle, and feeling is a *sensitive change* affecting the original powers, and can only be known because *felt*. To talk of thought and feeling *not felt*, is unmeaning and utter foolishness. 3. If I *feel*, I am as sensible of the existence of the *feeling I* or *self*, as I can be of the emotion *felt*. If all thought, feeling, and self are *felt*, in order to be known, then spirit can influence spirit, and the conscious evidence of pardon can equal a knowledge of self.

SECTION II.

1. *Knowledge direct*, involves the power, action, and affecting influence of spirit upon spirit. This we know to exist, and believe with confidence. (1.) *Spirit*, in its *immaterial* nature, is adapted to spirit, and to doubt such fact would equal a denial of self. (2.) We have *knowledge* of any conscious change affecting our spirits. The pardon of sins is known to be true, and when fully realized can not be questioned or rejected.

2. The *third* or *ulterior source* of knowledge, by means of the physical organs of the senses, may deceive us. (1.) From the *inert* nature of the organs of sense. (2.) In being affected by the *paralyzing* effect of *disease*. But a conscious knowledge of salvation from sin destroys the power of death, presenting the glories of eternal life to the soul in its fearless travel to the future. Therefore, the origin of all positive knowledge, whether of a mental or moral character, is in connection with the primary elements of the mind; and physical elements can not add strength to the decisions of this internal court. Hence, knowledge inherent in powers certifying self-reality is independent of doubt. And the influence of the *Infinite Spirit* upon such immaterialities is direct, independent of physical organs, and without deception. The power of this intuitive court lies back of all materiality and infidelity—the uncertainty and deception of both are measured by it and left in total ruins.

DIVISION FOURTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONDITION AND PECULIAR STATES OF THE MORAL NATURE OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. IF God in the creation of the soul *always purposed* that it should live forever, then its immortality is natural and of necessity. For such purpose would be a law of his being extending to immortality, and securing the *indestructibility* of the soul. And in this purpose he created us with a *conscious* feeling, sense, and ever-anxious aspirings for the future, a natural longing after immortality and happiness. It is contrary to the purity of his being that we should be thus constituted only to be disappointed. 2. *Conscience* lies at the foundation of our moral nature, and such *nature* is established from consciousness. *That* which we experience in regard to right or wrong, approval or disapproval, is found only in such nature. 3. *Faith*, in one sense, is *natural* to mind, and connected with our moral nature. (1.) The faith of *creedence*, by which we accredit testimony or receive facts, is *natural* and universal. Angels and men have it, and even devils believe and tremble. (2.) The faith of

reliance is of higher order, and involves action of the moral powers under Divine influences. It is possessed by the true penitent. (3.) The faith of *assurance* is that by which a penitent soul is adopted into the favor of God, and realizes a renewing change of its moral nature.

SECTION II.

1. *Moral dreaming* refers to that condition of mind in which we have thoughts in *sleep*, yet it differs in nature or character from *mental* dreaming. 2. Mere *mental* dreaming is only evidence of the ever-active nature of mind, but thoughts thus arising are not to be depended upon as true; they may or may not come to pass. 3. But *moral dreaming* is closely connected with the moral powers, and generally arises from impressions made upon them by Divine Goodness, which influence the mind and are lasting. They should be cherished, as they are always given for some good purpose. 4. These impressions are made upon the *conscience* or *heart*. "God speaketh in a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men; then he openeth the ears of men and sealeth their instruction, that he may withdraw man from his purpose."

CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE MORAL NATURE OR ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. THE *will* has power over the moral faculties or nature; though such powers have a persuasive attraction or invoking influence upon the will, yet they can not *command* or *force* it to act. 2. The very term *will* implies freedom, and is liberty in self-nature. The expression *free will* is objectionable, as it would imply *bound will*. If it be not *free* in *essential nature*, it can not be called will; and if it be *bound*, it ceases to be will. Therefore, *self-liberty* is essential to its nature and being. And if we are conscious that it is now a free principle, it has always been so. 3. *Man is fallen*. The act of falling was either *free* or of *necessity*, by a perverted act of self-liberty or Divine decree. If by the latter, there was an epoch in eternity when such decree took place, and such act must sustain a certain relation to his foreknowledge. Three positions will cover the whole ground. (1.) The *act* took place *after* his foreknowledge; or, (2.) It must proceed with and *be in essence* his foreknowledge; or, (3.) The act must have taken place *before* his foreknowledge. We will examine these positions.

SECTION II.

1. If the decree took place *after foreknowledge* it would involve an absurdity. We must admit that Deity foreknew all things, and nothing was hid from him. Then it would be wholly useless, seeing that man *would* fall, to decree that he *should*. A bird flies through my window, but I did not *compel* it to do so. Man was made free to act, and this was essential to his being. God saw that in the exercise of this liberty he *would* fall, and not that he *should*, for he was cautioned and entreated not to transgress. Therefore a decree of such fall could not, in the order of time, follow foreknowledge. 2. If *foreknowledge* and the decreeing act are one in essence or nature, then such nature would be a part of or enter into the Divine existence, implying imperfection, and our fall by the motion of Infinite perfection. This is revolting. Perfect holiness can not cause such ruin. Foreknowledge and the will or act of Deity are divisible and distinct. I know that I have power to raise my hand to my head, but not *willing* to do so, it remains inactive. If our fall was decreed, it took place before foreknowledge. 3. For *such decree* to take place *before* the existence of foreknowledge, is absurd. But if true, then Deity knew not that man would fall till his decree revealed the fact. Then all men are innocent, having only and necessarily obeyed the law of infinite fate, and if recovered must be saved by the same. But this is absurd. 4. *Angels*

were made *free*, and some of them “*kept* not their first estate, but *left* their own habitation.” This was their own *voluntary act*. 5. *Man* was created with liberty of *voluntary* service to God, but in this *essential* freedom he departed, which separation was ruinous. 6. That mind is *free* to *voluntary action*, is without doubt. And upon this rests the soul’s destiny. Sin filled the heavens with thick clouds, and made turbid the moral night of earth; yet hope dawned with imperishable light, spread over distant hills and mountains of God, and penetrated the gloomy valley of death with the glow of immortality.

DIVISION FIFTH.

CHAPTER I.

PRIMARY EMOTIONS IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED WITH THE MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS refer to an *internal motion*, *agitation*, or *excitement* of the mind, which may increase slowly or rapidly, and pass away without desire; for if followed by desire it is called passion. 2. *They* arise in connection with the *nature* of mental and moral elements. But from experience, their conditioned distinctions evolve a more intimate dependence upon the moral powers. 3. *Conscience* enters into the *basis* supporting emotions with power to realize or have conscious cognizance of such influences. 4. *Emotions differ* from desires. The former arise, move, swell, and diminish, like waves of the sea. The latter may follow, and in common be based upon emotions, but differ in nature. They are realized subsequent to the mind's perceptive and cognitive acts, and more remotely than emotions. But perception, apprehension, and cognition can not lay the foundation, nor give origin to desires. The object of such

acts might be revolting, and nothing but that which excites pleasing emotions can be desired. In this respect desires follow and are dependent upon emotions. 5. *Emotions* are said to be *natural* when they arise between the action of the moral elements and our conscious feelings of moral rectitude or obligation. But they must follow perception, as we can not experience emotions in regard to any thing of which we have had no conscience-perception or feeling.

SECTION II.

1. The *character* of moral emotions *changes* in assimilation, or conformity to that of our moral perception or apprehension of realities adapted to our moral nature. 2. The *order of succession* is, (1.) mental states; (2.) emotions, and, (3.) desires. But such states are distinguished or conditioned by the moral influences or acts of our moral nature. Emotions are known only because *felt*; and they vary with the condition or character of *that* which causes their existence, whether in the intellectual or moral world.

CHAPTER II.

PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS, OR EMOTIONS OF
MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

SECTION I.

1. PRIMARY *moral emotions* refer us to that class more immediately connected with the existence and influence of the moral powers. 2. *Such emotions* of *approval* and *disapproval* have their origin in connection with conscience and consciousness. They are capable of degrees of excitement, swelling higher, like waves on the silvery surface of a lake before the rising breeze; then retiring back to undisturbed repose. 3. That there are *no moral emotions* except those of "*approval* and *disapproval*," is absurd. Without moral elements, we can experience no conscious-felt emotion in regard to any fact. 4. *They* are *experienced* immediately successive to the action and first influence of the moral elements, and follow perception. But perception morally has a twofold power of action. (1.) In regard to objects of the *external* world, reported through the medium of the senses. (2.) And the internal moral powers of the soul have *spiritual perception* in regard to character, right and wrong. 5. That we can have "*no moral emotions* without antecedent perceptions" of external

things, is false; for emotions of moral approval and disapproval can exist in mind without reference to external things. 6. *Emotions* of moral approval and disapproval are *not* "the basis of the subsequent feelings of moral obligation;" but they are connected with conscience, consciousness, and the heart, which constitutes the true basis of obligatory feelings, and where they arise in reference to right and wrong.

SECTION II.

1. *Moral emotions* change corresponding with the condition, in change, of antecedent perceptions. If a friend saves me from sudden death, my emotions instantly approve the act. But here is a case of murder; my emotions instantly change to positive disapproval. 2. *Conscience-perception* of internal spiritual influences is more positive than those of external realities, and are worthy of full confidence. 3. *Conscience* gives law to emotions of approval and disapproval, and without it we could not have knowledge of such realities. Though, like ocean-waves, they wake from the slumber of the deep, subject to the changes of a thousand wrecking storms, yet, as the waves of ocean tell the direction and condition of passing tempests, so moral emotions approve or disapprove, while conscience is the final court of appeal in correct decisions. Emotions may appear and retire, but *conscience*, true to its heaven-endowed prerogatives, holds to right. 4. It is absurd to say that the *basis* of "the emotions of approval which we ex-

ercise toward an object, lies, in all probability, upon the extreme boundaries of human knowledge." This is beyond our comprehension, as all the reports of spiritual self must be made to intuitive powers of our being, in order to real knowledge. 5. An act of kindness is approved, because our emotions in regard to it are agreeable and sanctioned by conscience. 6. A *vicious act* is rejected, being opposed to the nature of our moral emotions and the decisions of a righteous conscience.

CHAPTER III.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF
MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

SECTION I.

1. THE *primary* objects of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval are *moral agents*. (1.) Such agents must have power of *self-action*. (2.) They must be endowed with the power of *self-cogitation*. (3.) They must possess a moral nature or *conscience*. 2. None but such agents can have conscious knowledge of *moral action* or of what constitutes moral rectitude.

SECTION II.

1. *Secondary* objects of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval may embrace, (1.) All objects of self-action, possessing animate life, below the rational mind of man, which evidence in their nature and actions any thing of passion or calm, rage or mildness. For we have seen that all self-moving animate beings have spirits or souls, and any manifestation of the same which agrees or disagrees with a uniform moral rectitude is an ulterior object of emotions of approval or disapproval. Though no such deviations can be regarded as involving guilt in such

beings, yet we can not withhold the action of our emotions in regard to such extremes of conduct, often associating such acts with moral agents while our emotions are experienced beyond doubt. (2.) *Deportment* is subject to emotions of approval or disapproval in proportion as they conform to, or deviate from true rectitude. (3.) *Expressions* or sentiments delivered of a moral or immoral nature excite emotions of approval or disapproval. (4.) Moral or immoral *sentiments written* give origin to emotions of moral approval or disapproval.

CHAPTER IV.

SIMPLE PRIMARY MORAL EMOTIONS.

SECTION I.

1. SIMPLE *emotions* are very numerous, yet we shall speak in reference to only those more important. (1.) *Joy* enlivens the spirit and is excited in the mind in the accomplishment or reception of some good. (2.) *It* is a *stronger* emotion, and more uniform in its deep abiding nature than either goodness or cheerfulness. (3.) *Regard* is a primary, simple, moral emotion. It may be called a *motion* of the moral powers in reference to any thing exciting high admiration. (4.) *Reverence* is realized when the moral faculties have been exercised in regard to combinations of superior excellences and moral worth, contrasted with the deep wretchedness and worthlessness of beings. When thoughts arise from a pure heart, in contemplating the perfections of the Divine Being, we experience what is called adoration. (5.) *Surprise* is experienced when some unexpected moral reality or revelation is made known. (6.) *Astonishment* is a strong, vigorous, and decided emotion in regard to sudden realities of surprise.

SECTION II.

1. *Emotions of melancholy* exist in connection with the moral faculties, which may be much influenced by diseased bodily powers. (1.) We experience *dissatisfaction*. (2.) *Distrust* in regard to others. (3.) *Depression* and weariness of life. 2. *Sorrow* is experienced when the spirit is sad or heart-broken. 3. *Grief* arises in reference to the misfortunes and regrets of the past. 4. *Dissatisfaction* takes place, having endured a diversity of disappointments, and nothing contemplated with pleasure or certainty. 5. An *emotion* of displeasure is experienced when the mind strongly disapproves any object or measure. 6. A conscious emotion of *disgust* for any thing mean is common. 7. An emotion of *wonder* is experienced when many seemingly-moral traits, yet conflicting in ultimate tendencies, are presented suddenly to the mind. 8. The emotion of *delight* is closely connected with cheerfulness, but is stronger. 9. The emotion of *gladness* is more closely connected with the moral nature than delight. 10. The emotion of *modesty* is lovely within itself, and heavenly in its influence and tendency. 11. The emotion of *shame* is experienced when we are involved in wrong. The soul, with pure motive, and always under happy emotions, travels with triumph over all of sin; its spiritual course sweeps the fiery wake of departing time, unharmed by any war of elements or crash of worlds.

DIVISION SIXTH.

CHAPTER I.

SECONDARY MORAL EMOTIONS.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS of *moral beauty* arise in connection with the existence and condition of moral elements, and the primary moral emotions are regarded as being more closely connected with such elements, while *secondary* emotions are more remote. 2. *Mental emotions* are not "natural," while moral ones are subordinate, inferior, or unnatural. For the latter is as natural to the mind as the former. 3. The *objects* of the emotions of moral beauty may exist within the mind's states in meditation, reflection, and contemplation. 4. The *affirmation* of *moral beauty* implies a negative, which is tested by experience. The strength and vividness of moral emotions of beauty vary with the constitutional aptness of different minds to readily apprehend moral objects involving the lustral attractions of purity. 5. The *perception* of *that* which excites emotions of moral beauty is a source of happiness. 6. The contemplation of the *virtue* and *benevolent* acts of others gives origin to emotions of moral beauty, imparting real happiness. 7. The contem-

plation of a *pure act* or *heart* adorned with the sweet graces of heaven never fails to awake emotions of moral beauty, and increases the happiness of the soul.

SECTION II.

1. A *pure* mind can not contemplate the holy nature of angels with their acts of love without *experiencing* emotions of moral beauty. 2. *Moral beauty* is made known to the mind by moral emotions, or only by them can it be fully known as a source of happiness. 3. *These* emotions of pleasure are as a celestial fountain of joy and light, swelling in proportion to the degree of its purity and brightness, elevating the soul, while all objects of earth recede and fade in the evening of temporal life. 4. We *experience* such emotions in contemplating the character of the Divine Being. (1.) By the *internal* vision, perception, or feeling of the soul. The love of God, revealed to the heart of a sinner saved, gives origin to emotions which flow as a river, or roll as waves of the sea. (2.) In *contemplating* Divine wisdom and goodness, as impressed and typed in the works of creation, and made known through the medium of the senses, we *experience* emotions of moral beauty. The devout soul can not look abroad upon the verdant earth, range the silent paths, or watch the flight of innumerable worlds brightening in the mingling rays of mellow light, without realizing an onward wafting of pure, beautiful, and heavenly emotions.

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS OF MORAL BEAUTY FROM ASSOCIATED OBJECTS.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS *of moral beauty* are natural to mind, and arise in connection with the moral powers. 2. A *single object* may be beautiful within itself, and capable of giving origin to emotions of beauty, and if decomposed, each element or quality may cause an emotion of beauty. 3. *Objects* may become beautiful only by association. While listening to the full tones of spirited music, when unnatural semi-tones are sounded we experience an unpleasant emotion; but on hearing the same applauded by one in whose taste and judgment we have full confidence, then the associations of the effect in such a mind, and the other parts of the music, often create emotions of beauty. 4. In walking down from the Temple walls, in Jerusalem, to survey sad Gethsemane, though the ground, the lonely palm, the city and Mount of Olives, are all wreathed in clouds of gloom, or exist as mere thunder-scathed sentinels of desolation, yet the *association* of the purity and love of Him who there once suffered to recover a revolted world from death, even the solitary rocks and waste places surrounding be-

come morally grand and lovely, exciting *emotion-waves* of moral beauty, filling the soul with boundless gratitude. 5. And on *revisiting* the place where the depressed and despairing spirit was first freed from moral death, realizing the joys of heavenly day, all surrounding objects associated in the remembrance of the event give origin to emotions of beauty and happiness.

SECTION II.

1. The *capacity* of the human mind to *enjoy* emotions caused by associated objects of beauty is extensive and of positive reality. Such associated objects form almost innumerable *sources* of pleasing emotions and joy, which are essential to true and enduring happiness. 2. *Moral purity* is not only an element of, but causes emotions of moral beauty. 3. *Such purity*, existing in moral beings, their lives, acts, and influences, and made known to us through the medium of the senses, give origin to emotions of beauty. 4. *Moral purity*, as internally apprehended, realized, and felt, in connection with spiritual and holy influences affecting our conscious being, create pure and sacred emotions of peace and happiness. 5. *Emotions of moral beauty* arising from associated objects, impart happiness as from thousands of combinations. Such emotions are inseparably connected with the soul made pure, whether in time or vast eternity.

CHAPTER III.

EMOTIONS OF MORAL SUBLIMITY.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS *of moral sublimity* refer to those motions or feelings of moral grandeur, elevated in character and consisting of a pleasing union of astonishment, awe, and gratitude in contemplating great realities and influences of pure moral excellence. 2. *That* which excites emotions of moral sublimity must be good and true. Waves gently undulating the placid surface of ocean may be called beautiful, but as increasing action swells them higher before the rising storm, the scene hightens into sublimity. So the moral emotions of the soul may rise into the fullness of sublimity. 3. *Fortitude* in *sustaining right*, amid peril, danger, and death, creates emotions of moral sublimity. A certain princess about to be unjustly beheaded, a friend advanced, saying, "I will die in her place." This touched the feelings of the emperor, who caused both to be released. A nobleman remarked, "Did you see the emperor? was not that a great act saving your life?" She replied, "I saw no emperor, nor did I so much as think whether any emperor was present, I only saw and thought of that man, who said he *would die for me.*" Such an

act would give rise to emotions of moral sublimity.

4. A *calm* and *unyielding purpose* to do good to friends and enemies, enkindles ennobling feelings morally grand and overwhelming. 5. But the *persecuted* and *storm-tried* Christian, driven from home, the graves of a loved ancestry, and all sacred associations, yet dares to die on the road to duty, causes emotions of moral excellence. 6. We are capable of *internal* emotions of moral sublimity, in connection with the mind's states and acts, moved only by spiritual influences, dwelling upon contemplated happiness.

SECTION II.

1. *Knowledge* of emotions of moral sublimity depends much upon the moral condition of the heart. When the heart is pure and in the love of God, almost every thing in the chain of moral and inert existences appears to glow with Divine goodness, and from them emotions can not be withheld. 2. An *impure heart* or *conscience* will realize perceptions followed by emotions, or feelings, which are fearful or of terrific sublimity. 3. But the soul filled with the *indwelling peace* of heaven can experience emotions of moral sublimity from all objects of grandeur, combinations of facts, or elements bearing the impress of Divine goodness or moral worth.

CHAPTER IV.

NATURE OF EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS *of the ludicrous* are not wholly moral emotions, yet they are closely connected with the distinctive condition of our moral powers. 2. *They* can not exist when the moral faculties are depressed with grief or veiled in clouds of gloom. They only exist when the conscience is free from remorse and the heart light. 3. Such emotions follow our *perception* of something peculiar, or incongruous, in the saying, appearance, or person attracting attention. 4. *They* may arise in connection with our internal thoughts and feelings, being wholly immaterial, or from what we witness in *external objects*—some peculiarity or unsuitableness. 5. *Such emotions* may arise with a cheerful state of mind or in playful delight, when some uncouthness suddenly discovered gives intense excitement. 6. *They* are *involuntary* when the mind is free from any expected excitement. The mortification of some sudden and uncouth failure in an eager effort at refined achievement, may fill the soul with emotions of the ludicrous. 7. *Emotions of the ludicrous*, properly guarded, are of practical utility. (1.) *Lively emotions* are important to the healthy

action of mental powers. (2.) *Lively or cheerful feelings* are essential to healthy action of the physical powers. (3.) The *spirit of ridicule*, improperly exercised, is revolting, but, if properly guarded, can operate as one of the most effectual checks and remedies of thoughtless, inconsistent, and egotistic conduct. We need something to expel gloom and counteract feelings of despair.

SECTION II.

1. Though *wit*, in some respects, may resemble the nature of emotions of the ludicrous, yet it is more closely connected with the nature of genius, and to some extent included with the power of the understanding. 2. It is the *power* of associating ideas in a new and unexpected manner. It excites the mind in connection with such associations, producing surprise joined with pleasure. 3. *It* is closely connected with the *nature* of humor, satire, irony, and burlesque. Wit has, when guarded, an important influence upon mental action; yet, if not restrained, dissipation is inevitable. 4. *Humor* is less vivid and poignant than wit; yet it is far more agreeable. The latter, directed against folly and egotism, often gives offense and excites resentment; while the former is agreeable, making us ashamed of our follies. 5. It is evidence of a pleasant disposition and kind heart. Its vividness and life-inspiring influence depends much upon the condition of the moral elements. When properly guarded, it has a happy influence upon the

soul in sustaining an animated spirit of progression. 6. *Levity* is connected with the lively emotions and feelings of the mind. But when the heart is sad or crushed with grief, it is suspended; hence the state of the moral powers determines its vivacity. 7. It is an *extravagance* of mirthful emotions, or lightness of mind, which should always be governed by judgment and checked by moral restraint. 8. It not only tends to *dissipation*, but *fickleness*, inconstancy, and the banishment of moral seriousness and worth. If not guarded, its extremes are followed by loss of confidence and gloom without hope.

CHAPTER V.

LANGUOR.

SECTION I.

1. LANGUOR, in its general acceptation, refers to lassitude or feebleness of both body and mind. 2. *Intense and continued* mental effort often overpowers and prostrates the nervous system, producing languor in regard to physical and mental action. 3. But when the *organs* of the *senses* and *nerves* connected are enfeebled by disease mental action is often stupefied and imperfect. 4. *Languor* properly arises in connection with the diseased or prostrated condition of the bodily powers, for all our conceptions of mind abstractly force the belief, that of and within itself there can be no such thing as spirit-languor.

SECTION II.

1. When we speak of *languor* as belonging to the manifestations of mind, we can not mean, that the *essence* of mind, uninfluenced by physical powers, is capable of immaterial loss or enfeebleness. 2. Then *languor* is caused by the peculiar state or diseased condition of the physical powers or organs of the senses through which mind acts. Beyond the grave the soul can have no languid emotion. 3. *Languor*

may serve as a prudent check to delusive or ill-founded joys, or of hope in regard to inaccessible objects of pursuit. 4. It may follow us down to death, but can not travel beyond. At the sound of the last trump, both soul and body will be free from such influence, whatever may be our condition in other points of real character.

DIVISION SEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

PRIMARY EMOTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE EXISTENCE, ACTION, AND INFLUENCE OF THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS *of beauty* are made known by consciousness, and are more fully tested when brought under the inspection of the mind. But they are so numerous we can only speak in regard to those most important. 2. *Objects* of emotions may exist in the external world, or wholly within the operations of mind itself. 3. *Primary* emotions exist in connection with intellectual and moral powers. 4. *Emotions of beauty* are always interesting, enlivening, and pleasing. They can not apply to unpleasant mental states of feelings, neither can the term beauty refer to any thing unpleasant. 5. We have *conscious knowledge* of emotions of beauty excited by external things, and are equally as conscious of emotions of beauty excited by internal spiritual influences. 6. *Emotions change* with our perceptions. Being subsequent to intellections or internal conscious distinctions, and dependent

on such realities, they vary with our perceptions. Objects of a beautiful scenery may be intercepted, the relations of beauty disturbed, and the emotions become unpleasant. But they are perfectly restored when the obstructions are removed. 7. There are great *varieties* in *objects* and *qualities* calculated to excite emotions of beauty. And these within themselves are called beautiful. Our feelings in regard to certain entities are indifferent, and there are other realities which excite decidedly-unpleasant sensations.

SECTION II.

1. A BEAUTIFUL *object* possesses something within itself calculated to cause emotions of beauty, and from this fact we call them beautiful. Such objects are distinguished from others, and are known to differ from them by something within themselves, an inherent trait or original quality. 2. *Some objects of beauty* possess something like an awe of grandeur. The dawn of the far-spreading light of morn, the golden glow of the setting sun, the majesty of the silvery moon traveling in the heavens, together with millions of worlds, as bright sentinels bounding the Saharas of immensity, all are beautiful and move in the awe of grandeur. 3. But there is a *milder* and *sweeter* class of emotions, in regard to immediate objects of beauty, composed of more brilliant qualities and finer texture. In looking out upon blooming flowers, waving forests, and verdant plains, we are excited by a different class of feelings. 4. The

grounds or *occasions* of emotions of beauty have caused some diversity of opinion. Yet they have many sources or causes. (1.) *Beauty* connected with and wholly in the mind, is one and indivisible. (2.) *Such emotions* may be excited in the mind by *other* spiritual influences, or in connection with the impressions of spirit upon spirit. (3.) *They* may be *caused* by objects of the external world. It is absurd to say that in qualities and objects of beauty there is only "*one common quality*," which is the ground or cause of internal emotions. Beauty is not only in the perception of relation, and of a fitness or utility, but is experienced in connection with these, while the internal power knowing such facts may, in some way, receive influences corresponding to the cause.

CHAPTER II.

PRIMARY EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY CONNECTED
WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL
ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. THE mind is *capable* of emotions of beauty *within itself*, and are often experienced when no definite cause is known. But the presence of a beautiful object excites pleasing emotions, strong or passive in proportion to the degree of beauty it contains. 2. But an object, *beautiful within itself*, may delight the mind at one time under certain circumstances, and at another time, and under different circumstances, would cause unpleasant emotions. The change may not be in the object so much as in the condition of the mind itself. 3. The *falling cascade* with its *romantic scenery* fills us with pleasing emotions. But if, while standing upon the lofty bank of evergreen, a loved friend falls into the ruinous abyss below, ever afterward this same scenery would appear sad and gloomy, giving rise to unpleasant emotions. 4. Though there be *no identity* or *oneness* in the almost endlessly-diversified external causes of emotions of beauty, yet they affect one and the same internal power.

SECTION II.

1. We will now turn to the examination of *objects which excite* emotions of beauty, giving rise to almost numerous emotions and varying in condition, intensity, or passiveness. 2. *Strong emotions* are apt to arise in contemplating some material object. Mountains, valleys, groves, rivers, seas, and oceans, all excite intense emotions of beauty. They fill the soul as we look out upon the perfections of Deity. See him empurpling the east with the breaking light of the rising king of day, and wheeling the orb on which we live! Behold him throwing the mantle of darkness over me in the evening, and kindling the skies into radiance by unvailing suns and innumerable worlds! We must feel as we see glowing tints in the flower, with shade melting into shade, infinitely above any combination of colors art can produce. 3. *We feel emotions of beauty* in contemplating the majesty of nature. From the summit of some lofty mountain watch the rising cloud, and observe the evening spread her gray and dusky mantle over the mellow features of the landscape, till lost in earth's cone of night. Our feelings arouse as the eye rests with delight on the stars as they break, one by one, through the increasing obscurity. What fountains of pleasure fill the soul as contemplation rises from the sweet flower in the valley to waving forests, and from the mighty globe to the glory of innumerable planets and burning suns! 4. *That* which has been called *intrinsic*

beauty, exists in the *forms* of objects, and is essential to the very nature of their existence. (1.) *Objects* which are *oval or circular* are regarded as possessing original beauty. The surface of a ball has something interesting, and especially when there are many contrasted of different magnitudes. (2.) There is beauty in circles, the orbicular form of the earth, together with that of the heavenly bodies, mingling in harmony, yet differing in size and appearance. (3.) There is *intrinsic beauty* in circular forms, or that which is a curvature in form or action—the windings of the tender vine, the flowing stream or rolling river, the waving grain or bending forests, or the still more graceful curves of the weeping willow. If orators wish to have graceful, easy, and impressive gestures, let them imitate the curvatures of willow branches waving to an increasing breeze. (4.) There is *beauty in motion*. The sparkling brook and majestic river are beautiful, because their waters are restless, rolling on forever. Each flying bird, loitering cloud, running horse, and racing cars, together with rolling ocean waves, crowned with moving ships, bearing onward a mighty commerce, thrill and stir the soul with exciting emotions. 5. *Elements* of beauty are connected with *reasoning*. Feelings of pleasure and delight are experienced in pursuing argumentation, or a perfect and unbroken train of thought. 6. The mathematician *realizes* pleasing delight in axioms, numbers, propositions, and theorems. 7. We have *pleasing emotions* in tracing vivid lines of *poetry*, the living descriptions

and boldness of thought can not fail to interest. 8. The painter admires the beauty in the appearance and execution of the picture, and feels an enkindled animation. 9. There is *beauty in music*, and every lover of sweet melody not only has emotions pleasing, but feels that such vary with the character of the music. There are any number of variations and degrees in sounds, ranging from the natural, deep tones of the murmuring sea, to the mellow sweetness of the Æolian harp. 10. *Beauty in sound* is original with savages. It calms the rage of war and delights with pleasing emotions. 11. It is original with some kinds of brutes. It can not arise from association; nevertheless, they are often tamed in the wild woods, and evince delight at the sound of music.

SECTION III.

1. Of *objects* called *beautiful* it is acknowledged that the *intelligent beings* of earth surpass all besides, and properly command a higher regard than other existences. An immortal being, with a refined intellect, pure heart, and neat appearance, always possesses attractions, moral worth, and beauty, from which the approving feelings of the soul can neither be indifferent nor withheld. 2. *Man* in his *proper character* is not only noble and impressive in appearance, but gives origin to emotions of approval and admiration. The thought of that noble form, possessing an immortal spirit, capable of almost an endless research and knowledge, consecrated to the will of

God, creates delight. 3. Such *moral worth*, characterizing and adorning the soul, and conditioning it with a calm, thoughtful, and agreeable disposition, together with an unyielding determination to be right, and to act in accordance with the will of his Creator, and the true honor and dignity of his high calling and destiny, attracts the confidence and love of the intelligences of both earth and heaven. Dignified in purity of purpose, he adorns human nature, is a defense to the helpless, a counselor of safety, and a waylight to happiness. The heavenly serenity of his countenance with kind expression, his noble appearance and majestic movements possess intrinsic beauty. He is worthy the attractions, affections, and love so justly inspired and willingly bestowed. He should dare to be wise and good, carrying the confidence and affections, if possible, of gathering thousands to the acme of wisdom, the Cross of Christ, and the brightening hopes of eternal joys. 4. *Correct mental analysis evolves no evidence* that the *mind of woman*, abstractly or within itself, is in any way naturally inferior to that of the other sex. The only difference is in the condition and character of its *manifestations*. Such modulations or conditioned action are influenced by the physical organs of the senses upon which mind is dependent, as there can be no natural defect in spirit itself. The opinion that there is such defect or weakness in the spiritual nature of the female mind, lying back of any influence from the condition of the physical organs of sense, is contrary to

all reliable facts in the nature of mind. 5. *Woman of high mental and moral attainments* is worthy the sacred confidence and pure regard of earthly intelligences. Of pious heart, generous in feeling and kind in spirit, with a love to promote the happiness of all within her influence, she is, in a moral light, beautiful, an angel of mercy, loved on earth and in heaven. Such attractions are increased in manifested cheerfulness, sympathy, and love, as she administers relief to the aged, infirm, and dries the lonely orphan's tears. Of neat appearance, graceful in form and action, sympathetic, kind, affectionate, and confiding till death, a high and holy destiny awaits her. By general consent she is regarded as the most beautiful of God's creation on earth. True amiability of mind, the loveliness of a sweet and affectionate spirit, should always be sacred to faith and protection, and he who is reckless to either is an outlaw and unworthy of notice.

CHAPTER III.

SECONDARY EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY CONNECTED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. SECONDARY *emotions of beauty* are not distinct in origin and nature from those we have just been describing, but are regarded as more ulterior in intensity or influence. 2. We have *conscious power* to experience either class of emotions, and though in nature can not be defined, yet their existence must be admitted. They arise in connection with reasoning, fanciful descriptions, and the sweet melody of music. 3. *They* do not arise in regard to *all objects*, for there are almost any variety calculated to produce disagreeable feelings. Those agreeable are called beautiful, but they may vary, as all persons are not affected alike; hence their power to give origin to secondary emotions of beauty. 4. The *beauty of forms* may be very vivid and impressive; the simple or combined cause may exist in those more indistinct, or as faded traces of light. The glowing features which refresh innumerable waving flowers may imperceptibly impress us with delight, but the peculiar forms of objects, singly or in contrast, impart pleasing feelings

of pleasure. 5. There is *beauty* in the *contrast* of straight and angular forms. Various winding, angular, and serpentine forms fill the mind with peculiar feelings in common with general blendings of the mass. The delicate flower of the vale, or running vine at our feet, possesses interest and beauty. The oak which rises up before us in majestic form, spreading broad a green arch over our heads and waving its tall head on high, can cause lively admiration. 6. The *changing seasons*, in contrast, cause emotions of pleasure. Look out upon the world; see the wide-spread desolation of Winter. Old Boreas lets loose his northern car—fountains, streams, and rivers are chained with ice; the surrounding hills and summits of distant mountains are brightly mantled with descending snow. Soon all is changed. The bland air of Spring and Summer blows gently on nature—forests wave in the emerald of smiling Summer. Then come the frosts, murky sky, and falling leaves of Autumn.

SECTION II.

1. The *mathematician* sees beauty in the form of the circle, the square, or the cubical and triangular. That which is useful in science and for practical purposes becomes beautiful from such considerations. 2. There is *beauty* connected with the various kinds of architecture. Each style has admirers; but the blending of the distinctive differences fills the mind with emotions calculated to interest and please. The walls, buildings, and streets of Jerusalem, though broken,

gloomy with age and a thousand sad remembrances, yet such time-honored witnesses of the greatest events of earth render them morally grand and beautiful. 3. There is *beauty* in the *relative* existence and blendings of colors. As innumerable varieties pass through the field of vision, we experience pleasing sensations. Though the pleasure in beholding them appears intuitive, as the early notice of childhood will demonstrate, yet our love of colors may be so increased by cultivation. Color will gain the attention of a child, from intuitive inclination, while every other connected property, however good, will be unnoticed. 4. *Beauty* in colors is evidenced in the conduct and preferences of savage tribes. They try to appear in colors of artificial beauty, and wreath the crowns of taste and fame with flowers which bloom on the wild banks of distant murmuring brooks. It is innocent to cultivate a love for flowers, and right and wise to admire beauties of God's creation. The tendency of such love refines the condition and feelings of the heart. If we can not admire, with a pure heart, the innocent beauties of earth, we shall be illy prepared to feel at home amid the fadeless glories of heaven. 5. It has been stated that persons *blind* from their birth, on being suddenly restored to sight, have become more delighted with the colors of objects than any other reality, and the effect is very invigorating. 6. There is *beauty* in *motion*. An extended valley or plain of flowers, though motionless, fills the mind with pleasure; but when they begin to

wave to the passing breeze, the scene becomes beautiful and grand. The distant roar of a cascade may create secondary emotions, but they increase when we see a foaming sheet of water breaking out from the mountain summit and plunging into the depths below. The majesty of rolling clouds, yon waving forest of pine, with the flow of earth's mighty waters, all create feelings of delight.

SECTION III.

1. Our *emotions of beauty* are affected by the *character* of motion. (1.) *Motion* in a *direct* line is pleasing, but not so free and natural as vibrations or undulations. The cycloidal flight of birds, the rocking ship under sail, together with the undulations of waves, or sheets of flame, impart pleasure. (2.) *Regular motion* is more pleasant than that which is irregular. For the latter creates extra mental effort, soon attended with weariness. (3.) *Motion* uniformly accelerated is very agreeable. A stone rolled from the summit of a mountain accumulates interest as its velocity increases. (4.) The agreeableness of motion varies with quickness and slowness; yet, in either case, if long continued, the interest abates. (5.) Continued *slowness of motion* retards the natural ease and activity of our perceptions; hence, impatience and loss of interest follows. 2. *Objects* exciting emotions of beauty may be *wholly intellectual*. With all possible interest connected with materiality, all inert nature is much like a beautiful corpse—the spirit fled. All the

sweetness and beauty of the human countenance, if contemplated without the idea of a soul, would cause very slight emotions of beauty. But if the countenance expresses the presence of a rational soul, amiable, persevering, and full of intellectual light, it is regarded as beautiful, independent of its physical appearance. 3. The mind's *contemplations within itself* of spiritual realities and influences give pleasing emotions. 4. *Moral objects* in the spiritual universe give internal pleasure. He who seeks and obtains a pure heart, is as conscious of the change as he can be of self-reality, and the emotions of happiness felt are beyond description. 5. *The power* of the soul to know the reality of pleasing emotions, is in the primary elements of its being. This power and the knowledge of such emotions can not cease to be.

CHAPTER IV.

ASSOCIATED OBJECTS OF BEAUTY IN THE PHYSICAL, SPIRITUAL, AND MORAL WORLDS.

SECTION I.

1. THE *material universe* contains an innumerable variety of objects of beauty. The properties associated in each compound may be beautiful in abstract entities, but far more delightful when blended together. 2. A *single sound* in music has intrinsic beauty; but associated tones, skillfully played, produce the most exciting emotions of pleasure. 3. A *single color* of the most beautiful flower possesses beauty; but when the various hues and glowing tints are associated, we realize feelings of thrilling delight. 4. The *bright luster* of a Spring morning, and the mellow radiance of a Summer evening, without the golden clouds, undulated earth, living trees, and blooming flowers, would fail to please. But our feelings rise higher as we associate the earth with the sun, moon, and stars, which fill the vast of infinity.

SECTION II.

1. The soul has *internal power* to know the reality of spiritual and physical entities. It looks out upon the beauties of nature by means of physical organs. The

latter, doomed to disease and decay, can add no power to the former, for we shall see when separated from them. 2. *Intellectual facts* in the mind are objects not only of contemplation, but cause pleasure, in regard to either simple thought or associated realities. 3. The mind has not only *power* within itself to enjoy truths stored in memory, but can force investigative thought into new fields of science and arrange beautiful facts, images, and plans, either plain or complicated, with continued delight. 4. Of nothing are we more conscious than that we experience *moral feelings* or *emotions* of beauty. They can *arise* in connection with the influence exerted upon the mind by external moral agents, in their appearance, conduct, and movements. 5. A *simple thought* has some influence, but the contents of a letter from a friend have more. The contemplation of *heaven*, to the pure in heart, is overwhelming, but in adding an endless variety in scenery and influences, together with innumerable holy and happy beings, we are lost in wonder and praise. 6. If lost in a wilderness, and the arrival of midnight is made terrific by mingling elements of the passing storm, the conscious belief that an *Infinite Power* throws protection around us is agreeable. 7. The *revelation* of Almighty Goodness to our spirits gives happiness in prosperity or the wane of life. When the angry cloud throws its brow of night over the face of a troubled sea, and mountain waves roll on the highway of ruin, we feel that the Infinite Power controlling all things is our Father.

CHAPTER V.

PRIMARY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CONNECTED WITH THE MENTAL AND MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. EMOTIONS *of sublimity* are important to knowledge and happiness. We are naturally inclined and attached to things great and elevated. A sublime object or thought can affect us even to transport of feeling; and many such objects or thoughts associated impart still greater force. Physical, intellectual, and moral objects often cause emotions of sublimity, as they separately and suddenly break upon our perception, independently of all trains of thought or any associating process. But this belongs more properly to purely-intellectual states and thoughts than to emotions. The latter do not rise in trains like thoughts, but governed by different laws. 2. *Emotions of sublimity differ* from those of *beauty*. The latter are always pleasant and agreeable, and characterized by gentleness, mildness, and sweet attractiveness; but the former, with strong and overwhelming emotions of the sublime. The sweet waters of limpid streams meandering among the hills and through green groves are beautiful; the flowing river moves with

grandeur, but the pouring of its mighty current into the immensity of ocean gives origin to emotions of sublimity; and such emotions are beyond description, as a world of waves rise up before us, rolling on forever. 3. An *emotion of sublimity* may be regarded as an excited and elevated feeling, consisting of a union of astonishment and awe at the contemplation of great scenes and objects. 4. An *orator* may easily carry his audience with vivid, beautiful, and thrilling descriptions. But when the internal fires of genius begin to burn out in lofty sentiment, free and impressive with boldness of thought and description, then emotions of sublimity move the whole empire of spirit around him.

SECTION II.

1. *Emotions of sublimity* are the *direct* subjects of consciousness; though not clearly definable, yet we are not ignorant of their nature. (1.) The contemplation of *great height* causes emotions of sublimity. That vast mountain rising in massive form before us, lifting its nightless head far above the storm-cloud's path, or lightning vale of the thunder's home, commands every thought, exciting intense feelings of sublimity. (2.) The *action* and *power* of great objects create such emotions. While standing upon the banks of Niagara Falls the mind is startled in contemplating the rapidity and mighty power of the descending flood plunging into the abyss below. The trembling earth, rising cloud, foaming waves, with the thunder

of its power, excite the soul with vivid and intense emotions of sublimity. (3.) *They* are originated by *great depth*. If, stationed upon the top of some lofty mountain, we look into the vast plain below, our feelings will be affected. And he who rides in his balloon through the heavens, can not look upon the vast globe rolling beneath without strong feelings of sublimity.

2. *They* are caused by *colors in terrific objects*—the mingling hues of flame, smoke, and lava, amid the darkness of night. We are affected in looking upon the augmenting gloom and blackness of the rising storm.

3. There is sublimity in *motion*—the lapse of a mighty river overflowing its banks, or leaping down a precipice, the rapid travel of the hurricane

with uplifted forests shaking the everlasting hills in its highway of desolation.

4. There is a sublimity in *sound*. The deep, solemn peals of the organ, the

thunder of the cataract, the distant roar of high winds, and the perpetual tones of the murmuring sea, all waft emotions of sublimity over the soul.

CHAPTER VI.

SECONDARY EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY CONNECTED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. PRIMARY emotions of sublimity arise almost entirely from *natural* susceptibility, and those called *secondary*, more properly, from *association*. The uncultivated mind experiences primary emotions of the sublime, on witnessing the cloud and lightning of approaching storm; while the investigative intellect has secondary emotions from distant associated facts.

2. We understand *such secondary emotions* to be caused by ulterior considerations, requiring a greater voluntary or intentional act of mind, and involves consideration and contrast in association.

3. A *simple* sound may excite but little emotion, till its peculiar character recalls associations imparting intense feelings. The sound of a cannon can excite such emotions, to a limited extent; but when it calls up the victory of the battle-field, with all the associated facts of triumph, the feelings become strong and exciting.

SECTION II.

1. The *appearance* of a *lone star*, giving origin to emotions of sublimity, may be only slightly percepti-

ble from original susceptibility; but when other orbs are associated with it, till the whole heavens, filled with innumerable worlds, glow in the field of contemplation, our feelings are vivid and intense. 2. The *rumbling* of a wagon often suggests the sublimity of thunder, clouds of darkness, livid lightning, and hastening rain. And the distant thunder brings to remembrance the mighty earthquake, from which our feelings can not be withheld. 3. If standing on the top of Mount Sinai, such *emotions* might be *slight*; but when we contemplate the Almighty, in infinite glory and majesty, descending the parting heavens on bending pavement of clouds mingled with fire, the earth shaking as the mountain is clothed with terror and death, the soul is overpowered with emotions of a scene so sublime.

CHAPTER VII.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OBJECTS OF EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY, INFLUENCING THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL STATES OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. PRIMARY *objects* of emotions of sublimity must be regarded as of sufficient importance to wake up and affect the natural susceptibility of the mind to vivid or intense feelings in regard to them. 2. *There are objects* originally sublime—vast extent, great height or depth, with rapid motion or great power. A child will intuitively evidence feelings of awe and admiration when a primary object is suddenly presented, such as a house in flames at night. 3. *Secondary objects* of sublimity affecting our intellectual states and causing emotions, may be regarded as very numerous, and enter into combinations and associations, so as to excite feelings of sublimity.

SECTION II.

1. There are *primary objects* giving origin to emotions of *moral* sublimity. Sympathy and benevolence under exciting and trying circumstances may cause feelings of moral sublimity. That man who has

pledged his life and services to right, and rather than deny his Lord, submits to the curling flames of martyrdom, evidences moral worth and dignity, which can not fail moving the heart. 2. *Objects* of moral sublimity may exist wholly in the mind. Spiritual influences and simple trains of thought may so accumulate in meditation and contemplation as to excite us. 3. *Secondary* emotions of moral sublimity can be excited by objects of various kinds. An extended notice and action of the mind, connected with a simple fact, may apprehend associated constellations of majestic thoughts and sublime realities. 4. If the *contemplation* of an angel or a saint in the spirit-world moves the feelings of a pure heart, such feelings will increase as multiplied millions of such beings throng the field of the mind's view. But a greater scene opens, as we contemplate innumerable saints and angels gathering around the final Judge and great white throne, descending, with clouds of infinite glory, to the waking of the dead and renewing of the world.

CHAPTER VIII.

SPLENDOR, MAJESTY, AND GRANDEUR.

SECTION I.

1. SPLENDOR refers the mind to the distinctive qualities, condition, or appearance of objects. That which is magnificent, of brilliant luster and great show of elegance, is splendid in consequence of its superior charms and attractions. 2. Our *feelings* are *excited* in contemplating, or reviewing the great and magnanimous acts of mighty warriors, who from necessity have saved peaceable cities, kingdoms, and empires, when all advantages appeared against them. 3. The light of the rising sun, breaking along the hemisphere of night, possesses *natural splendor*, and our emotions correspond to the brilliancy of the scene. The mellow light of the setting sun, spreading on the horizon, and withdrawing from receding valleys, hills, and mountains, enraptures the mind. The golden clouds hung high and glowing around the descending king of day only add splendor to the scene. 4. We are capable of *internal moral* feelings under the approval of Divine Goodness, and in contemplating the splendor of that light which fills the moral universe.

SECTION II.

1. *Majesty* is connected with greatness and dignity in the appearance of an object, and feelings of awe or reverence inspired in the mind of the beholder. 2. A *great general*, honored with the victories of many battle-fields in contending for pure liberty, graceful in motion, and of lofty air, neat in form and bold in appearance, is said to be majestic in nature and action. And when we associate such noble acts and achievements with the man, we can not contemplate them without distinct emotions in regard to the same. 3. True *dignity* of character and elevation in honors, as those of a queen, king, or emperor, give rise to a peculiar class of feelings connected with majestic objects. 4. The lofty blue sky, vaulting the heavens and filled with bright stars, is majestic, and enkindles feelings corresponding to the same. 5. In the *moral world*, while contemplating the lofty heavenly home of the just, the majesty of that Being who fills immensity with light and love, our emotions are intense.

SECTION III.

1. *Grandeur* differs from the loftiness and awing boldness of majesty; is more agreeable and not so brilliant and vivid in its effects upon our feelings as influences connected with splendor. (1.) We experience *emotions of beauty* as we watch the crystal fountain rolling over its pebbly bed and hastening from its banks enameled with flowers—now each drop

sparkles in the light of the sun, and then shaded with green foliage overhanging its onward course. (2.) And we have *emotions of grandeur* as the same stream deepens and expands into a mighty river, dividing strong empires—its banks ranged with verdant groves, fruitful hills and valleys, with almost innumerable villages and cities bestudding the winding borders of its opposing shores, while its silvery bosom bears the passing commerce of nations. 3. But we have *emotions of sublimity* as this majestic river rolls its mighty waters into the wide extent and depth of illimitable ocean, heaving and rocking in all the pride of natural independence, hanging its waves in the clouds of storm; now dashing the thunder of its strength against the distant shore, and then burying in its dark depths the rival navies of the world—the scene is overwhelming; we are wrapped in emotions beyond description. There is *moral grandeur* in the pure achievements and attainments of moral agents, the life of holy song, and the stirring vigor of choral anthems, connected with the purity of Almighty Goodness.

DIVISION EIGHTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE DESIRES.

SECTION I.

1. A DESIRE is a motion, passion, or excitement of the mind directed to some attainment or attracting object. It is the conscious feeling or uneasiness experienced in want of an object believed to possess something pleasurable. 2. The *power to desire* arises in connection with original elements, otherwise they would be either accidents or inane; but we have conscious power to know their real existence and distinctive nature. 3. *They* are *evidenced*, not only in appetency, inclination, and craving, but in wishing for and coveting the possession and enjoyment of an object, with a greater or less degree of earnestness. 4. *Desires* are so closely connected with the influence of affection, propensity, and appetite, that they can not be regarded as wholly abstract realities. Their distinctive character in origin and action is determined by conscious knowledge. 5. *They* have power and influence to invoke mental action, but never can compel such action. 6. *Desires* are not *ulterior* in origin to emotions, and wholly dependent upon them. The

latter may become vivid and then subside; but the former, though often counteracted, remains strong and undiminished. 7. They are said to be *voluntary* when arising in connection with repeated examinations of objects, and in efforts to admire that which is beautiful, till it becomes attracting and we desire its possession. 8. They are wholly *involuntary* when arising either spontaneously or without any volitive mental effort.

SECTION II.

1. From the *instinctive* character of *desire* it is independent of any antecedent emotion as its cause. Desire for safety and food exists in the minds of brutes, and we can not say it is based only on emotions or voluntary mental states. 2. The *character of desires* evidence a definite permanency of their nature. Emotions may come and go as waves of the sea; such action is violent, gentle, or gradual, in proportion to the degrees of strength in the affecting power. But desires are not subject to such changes; they are strong and more abiding. 3. The effect of *despair* upon emotions and desires is evidence that the latter are too closely connected with intuition to originate only with emotions. The exile on some rocky isle of the sea, or mariner on a sinking ship, has strong and unyielding desires for life and to see his distant home and friends, while his emotions are in ruins. 4. *Desires* vary in degrees of strength. Such variations may arise, (1.) In connection with

the *degree* or *extent* of our conscious want in regard to that which is desired. (2.) They may arise in connection with the *degrees* of vividness and strength in the action of the emotions. (3.) *They* arise in connection with the condition of the perception and understanding. In proportion as we correctly perceive and understand an object of interest, may be the strength of desires. 5. Though they can not be said to truly exist without *implying an object*, yet the *power* of desires can be real without any object. They have power to excite us and induce action, but can never be the "motive state" of the mind. 6. Objects of *pleasure* are desired, but evil is gained by will. We may desire pleasure which will be followed by remorse, but we can not desire a positive injury, only to deprecate a worse calamity, which is inevitable, if the less be not chosen. 7. The mind can become so debased as to *desire* evil objects and advantages, only to gratify a malicious selfishness and revenge in regard to others.

CHAPTER II.

PRIMARY OR IMMEDIATE DESIRES.

SECTION I.

1. PRIMARY *or immediate* desires are closely connected with mental states. They must be of self-origin, or arise in connection with some other power. But it is clear that desire has its origin with the very elements of the soul. 2. *Its power* is in the mind, and its action can be the object of consciousness, whether we are immediately conscious of the presence of a cause or not. 3. An *instinctive desire*, whether arising in the human mind or in the soul of the brute, must be regarded as primary.

SECTION II.

1. We *desire to exist*, and that such existence be perpetuated. This is experienced independently of any reference to either the hope or expectation of continued life. 2. Such desire is *natural* and *spontaneous*, is almost universal, and we can not create its origin. 3. *The desire* of existence is *intuitive*, yet becoming stronger in meditating upon the bright hope and expectations which illumine the future. 4. *The preciousness* of life attaches us to existence, and the danger of losing it gives origin to an additional tie of endearment.

CHAPTER III.

SECONDARY OR RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE DESIRES.

SECTION I.

1. RETROSPECTIVE *desires* refer to past events or realities in some way. It is natural to desire that many things had been different, and we would recall them, if possible, to make changes for better and happier results. The remembrance of our wicked acts is followed with a desire to have them changed. 2. *Prospective desires* refer to facts or events ranging the future. (1.) The *desire of society* is inseparably connected with the nature of our being. The constitutional existence of man evidences that Heaven formed and designed him for society. Such attachments to society exist, not only in his wants, affectionate relations of dependence, but by social and natural instincts and desires. It is not a result of education, but arises out of his essential nature, independent of either convenience or interest. (2.) *There* is an *internal principle* of social union, vivid and strong. We are the offspring of social ties; and had we been created without kind sympathies, this single fact would have been proof that God had not created us in mercy and did not intend our happiness. We

instinctively sigh for the friendship, love, and communion of our fellow-beings. If exiled to a lonely death they are not destroyed. They live in the highest degrees of virtue, and will not die in the lowest extremes of vice. (3.) The *desire of knowledge* is natural. Heaven created us to know, and such inclination can never be abated. It seeks all that may be known, involving the facts, variations, and grandeur of universal being; then ranges the infinite field of possibilities and imagination.

SECTION II.

1. The *desire of esteem* belongs to human nature. It appears to be a want of the soul, but should be guarded. It always causes a reciprocal action of kindness for kindness. Here is a power, which, if connected with pure motive, can mature from simple kindness into respect, then into regard, affection, and the glow of confidence and devoted love. Our feelings can never be withheld from cherishing the wellbeing of those who love us and have our esteem. Could we be conscious that we had not the esteem of any, then our social existence would be without the light of hope, and suddenly would all happiness end.

2. The *desire of emulation* is connected with the soul, and may be either good or bad. A wish to excel in the accomplishment of good, only increases happiness; but if for superiority, regardless of the rights and claims of others, it is selfish and unholy. The full throes of a sanctified ambition electrify mind,

move the world, and would scale obstructing mountains of opposing impossibilities. 3. A *desire of pleasure* belongs to mind, and nothing not inconsistent with moral rectitude and purity has Heaven withheld from us. To the pure mind there is a universe of pure objects calculated to delight and please. 4. A *desire of fame* applies to mind, and in some way or degree is possessed by all. It is natural to wish the attention and regard of others. When free from selfish and improper motives, the mind is quickened and roused to action. Unholy desires only gravitate to death; but when pure, they inspire the soul with holy and lofty efforts to accomplish good. 5. The *desire of glory* is natural to mind, and is harmless in arriving at distinction while we would carry all the world with us to superior excellence. But the moment we would detract from others, in order to rise, we are sinful and on the way to ruin. Such feelings differ from envy and jealousy. It is right to wish to excel by promoting the happiness of others. How just the remark, "It is much better to deserve distinction, without having it, than to have it without deserving it!" 6. The *desire of power* invests every human mind to some extent. We are naturally fond of influence and wish to attract the attention and regard of others. It is as original with the slave as the king or conqueror of nations. Its inspiring utility is evidenced in view of the vast amount of good it secures to our race, and the unbounded happiness it confers. But if misdirected or incumbered with vile

motives, ruin is the result. Thus poor mortality, as numbering cycles move on, is doomed to hopeless wretchedness.

CHAPTER IV.

HOPE AND FEAR.

SECTION I.

1. HOPE in the mind is a power capable of active influence, and possesses anxiety with solicitous looking to some good, accompanied with a slight expectation of obtaining it, or faint belief that it may be obtained. 2. It is *that* which has power, and furnishes in the mind the ground of expectation, and promises such desired good or reality sought. 3. It is never *retrospective*, and can not extend to things in the past, but always looks to the future, and that which is separate from the reality of self. It can not apply to possession or any fact connected with self-consciousness, without ceasing to exist, as faith and conscious knowledge embrace present possession. 4. It *differs* from *wish* and *desire* in that it implies some expectation of obtaining the good sought; while desire may remain firm and unchanged without any expectation of obtaining its object. The latter may extend to past events, but hope can not. Hope always gives pleasure or joy; but desire may extend to that which causes the reverse. The latter may excite to an effort for impossibilities—the former can not. 5. Hope *differs* from faith. The latter embraces abiding pos-

session or conscious-felt and known facts, feelings, and influences in the soul; while the former can never apply to what we now possess or experience. If we hope for an object, we have it not; it is still in the future.

SECTION II.

1. *Fear* is a painful emotion or passion excited in the mind by the expectation of evil, or the apprehension of impending danger. It is active when we feel a painful apprehension of impending calamities causing solicitude, awe, or alarm. 2. *Dread* often follows fear, differing in the increased degrees of apprehending alarm. And *terror* or *fright* are connected with a still more sudden, strong, and vivid apprehension of evil or danger. 3. *Fear* may be examined in two points of light. (1.) A *filial* fear involves pleasing obedience, in which a tender regard, affection, and love are connected with an awe declining every thing that would mar or offend. (2.) A *slavish* fear, if continued, ends in dismay, terror, and death. Casual gleams of hope are as livid lightning in the turbid storm of midnight, leaving the scene in augmented darkness. 4. We may *hope* for some future good, but *fear* it is not to be obtained. It may be *desired*, but possession can be defeated by loss of confidence. 5. *Fear* involves two essential elements—the apprehension of evil, and the *wish* or *desire* to avoid it. In this way it becomes a ground of safety in waking up the mind to a vivid sense of danger and in warning against evil. Yet it may be a medium of sorrow and

wretchedness. 6. There appears to be a *difference* in the *susceptibility* of fear. Some are easily excited, while others remain unmoved. The former are always apprehending danger; but the latter are apt to be in danger without being alarmed. An extreme in excited passion, may suppress the voice of conscience and bewilder conformity to moral rectitude. 7. *It* causes the *imagination* to be too vivid, extravagant, and wild, and often produces prostration and despair.

CHAPTER V.

EXPECTATION, ANTICIPATION, CONFIDENCE,
AND TRUST.

SECTION I.

1. THE *mind* is said to be in a state of *expectancy* when we look to future events, believing that they will take place. (1.) *Expectation* differs from *hope* and *desire*. We can desire an impossibility, and hope for that which is almost impossible, but expectation is founded in conscious reasons which render or cause the probable event to be looked for with less inclination to doubt. (2.) We can not *desire* evil; and *hope* can only be directed to some good; while *expectation* can be directed to both good and evil, and may exist in connection with both hope and fear. 2. *Anticipation* differs from expectation, involving a peculiar mental condition, or state, which assumes or is impressed with conviction of that which is coming to pass. 3. It is said to be a *previous feeling* or impression of what is to take place. They may arise from casualties, but often appear spontaneous. 4. They are of *immense value*, and form a basis of protection in aiding to foresee evil and hide from it.

SECTION II.

1. *Confidence* is a reliance in true and abiding realities, and is the mind's assurance. It may involve a belief in self-competency or power to accomplish desired results in opposition to distrust. (1.) It may be regarded as *that* in which belief rests, involving the reliance of others, and our dependence upon associated truths. (2.) It should be guarded, or, connected with some constitutions, it may lead to boldness of an excessive character, both vain and reckless, if not egotistic presumption. But with proper restrictions it is of incalculable value. 2. *Trust differs* from confidence in that it is more pointed, settled, and unyielding. The latter involves the idea of reliance upon associated facts tested; while the former concentrating, fastens upon and holds some prominent good, or reality. 3. *It* takes hold of, or enters an approved object as part of the mind's possession and enjoyment. 4. The *power to trust* is in the mind. Such motion or action fastens upon the mercy of Heaven, while *faith* is present in realizing the influence of spirit upon spirit in pardon, peace, and joy. It holds its object without inclination of release. 5. *It* may become a *law of action*; and though false objects, causing deep anguish, sorrow, and disappointment, have to be torn away, yet the vastness of universal being, pure and holy, sustains and imparts happiness to the confiding soul.

CHAPTER VI.

INSTINCTS.

SECTION I.

1. INSTINCT refers to that kind of motion, animation, or excitement which belongs only to immateriality. It is the *natural* inclination and spontaneous action of spirit, independent of all materiality. 2. The *dead body* of a brute has no more self-action or instinctive distinctions than a lump of clay, or rock slumbering in the mountain. But while living, it differed in self-motion, natural inclination for sustenance and comfort, with a knowledge of courses and sense of self-protection, together with power of choosing the best and quickest way of escape from danger. Therefore, instinct, in all orders of existences, is connected only with spirit, and clearly proves that brutes have souls with more than simple action. (1.) The *brute* breathes, the blood flows, and, on examination, we find the stomach has *natural* power to extract qualities and strength from food to supply the body; this is called *vital power*. And though it acts naturally without mental effort, yet such active power can never take place where matter is not animated with a soul. This order of vital power is not called instinctive, but is below, though connected with the basis of

an instinctive nature. (2.) Contemplate the *whole animal* frame in motion. It goes from place to place and from one desired object of food to another. It seeks out and chooses that which is suited to taste, and adapted, in nature and quality, to its stomach and nourishment, evidencing not only inclination, but power of distinction and choice. (3.) The degree of *wisdom*, activity, choice, comparison, care, and judgment, which some animals possess, is worthy of being called *instinctive intelligence*.

SECTION II.

1. *Instincts* in the human mind are not varied and so numerous as those connected with the brute. (1.) A little child, before it can reason, gives instinctive evidence of fear when falling, by throwing up its arms, and the agitated expression of its face. (2.) It *instinctively* seeks nourishment and receives the same without being taught. By the same power it gives evidence of pain or suffering. 2. The *origin* of efforts in self-preservation is instinctive. We instinctively repel the sudden blow of a robber, check ourselves from falling, and close the eyelids on near approach of objects, before reason can come to our relief. 3. We can experience *instinctive resentment* by immediate feelings in regard to the cause of affliction, and when reading of sudden and cruel tortures imposed upon a dear friend. A child naturally resents an injury when the cause is wholly inert. Signs of pain, joy, or sorrow are often instinctive evidences, and

excite corresponding emotions and action upon the part of beholders. They are natural, and designed to protect us, before reason can possibly come to our relief. They are a part of the mental constitution, and upon them we are dependent for safety. 4. The *mental process* of man differs from the *spirit acts* of the brute. When the former perceives objects, reason satisfies him in regard to such phenomena, and the judgment decides upon the same. But the brute, without reason and judgment, has an instinctive apprehension of that which is desirable or to be feared. The former often acts from natural inclination, and not from reason. The latter has instinctive action in connection with natural inclination, and not from reason. 5. The *maritime navigator*, with all his knowledge and skill, often becomes unsuccessful in reaching his desired destination, and, through timidity or want of knowing his position, becomes bewildered and lost at sea. But the migratory bird is triumphant. He bounds through trackless fields of air, spreads his wing to the rising breeze, encounters storms, passes seas, lakes, and lands unknown, and then returns without mistake or failure. 6. The *wisdom* and *skill* of the bee and the ant evidence instinctive intelligence, in putting forth efforts to accomplish certain results.

SECTION III.

1. *Man* is *scientific* and capable of almost boundless knowledge. He can analyze the laws and nature

of existences, forcing investigative thought in exploring hidden fields of natural truths. But the brute, without these, never seeks an explanation of what he sees. 2. *Man* is progressive by means of self-application and effort, gathering items from all objects around him; but the brute has no power of self-progress in knowledge. 3. *Man* is a *moral agent*, has a conscience admonishing of evil and influencing him to do right. But the brute has none of these; his emotions give no evidence of gladness, happiness, or fear, as involved by moral relationship and rectitude; yet they may have feelings varying with their temporal condition and kindness received. 4. *Their action* is both voluntary and involuntary. To say they have no liberty or exercise of will is absurd, but they are principally influenced by natural inclination. Some of them give evidence of comparison and judgment. 5. *Brute memory* is without doubt. They who deny it say, "When the brute has been affected in a given manner in given circumstances, the same sensations are reproduced in him when he comes into similar circumstances again, and hence the same actions are repeated." But such "sensations" must be either mind or matter. If the latter, they can never be reproduced; and if mind, they can not be reproduced by such "circumstantial" causes, unless they have power to know such causes are present and differ from all others. This would involve both memory and comparison.

CHAPTER VII.

APPETITES.

SECTION I.

1. APPETITES arise in connection with certain *feelings* of *uneasiness* or *want* natural to the physical organization and spiritual self. Such feelings always precede appetites, the latter being a known maturity of the former. 2. They divide into two general heads—*hunger* and *thirst*. Yet there are branches differing both in character and origin. Though they arise in connection with the physical functions, yet they apply, to some extent, to the condition and states of the mind. 3. *Hunger* or *desire* for food arises in connection with the natural condition of the physical powers in want or craving demands. 4. *Thirst*, or desire for drink, is an uneasy necessity or demand, arising in the peculiar wants of our physical nature. 5. Though *appetites* arise in connection with bodily organization, yet they never take place with material elements or compounds in the entire absence of spirit. They are common both to man and brute. 6. *Action* is intuitively connected with appetite. Hunger in an infant instinctively prompts seeking and receiving appropriate supplies.

SECTION II.

1. *Animals* moved by hunger *instinctively* seek supplies, and of the proper kind and quality. If wearied, rest is an instinctive inclination. 2. *Appetites* are necessary to our preservation. They enable us to properly observe the laws of health, avoiding danger and even death. Reason and experience might give us knowledge of the necessity of food, but it remains only for appetite to give the time of eating, and the quality and quantity required. 3. *Animals* may have this information by nature, but it remains for *instinct* to guide them in choosing good from that which is poisonous, and direct them to that which they should take in health, as well as that they should use in sickness, or to counteract poison. 4. In its original or instinctive nature appetite is innocent. Aided by it we not only adapt elements to health, but detect that which produces affliction and death. 5. When an *artificial* appetite is acquired for inebriating liquors or intoxicating drugs, it is immoral and sinful. 6. A *natural* appetite, properly guarded, is very important in guiding to safety and the attainment of health. It is a source of great enjoyment and happiness. 7. It not only applies to the physical nature, but extends to that peculiar uneasiness called *mental hunger or thirst* for learning, or moral spiritual good. But when the mind is wholly abandoned to vitiated appetites and propensities, both body and soul are soon in ruins.

CHAPTER VIII.

TASTE CONSIDERED AS CONNECTED WITH
OUR PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, AND
MORAL NATURES.

SECTION I.

1. TASTE, as connected with our *physical* nature, is caused by contact with material entities, and refers to the natural power of perceiving by means of the mouth, and experiencing certain sensations in consequence of something applied to the tongue. It is not only to taste or try, but to relish or have enjoyment. 2. This implies an *intrinsic* or connected, discriminating or distinguishing *power* in regard to properties and qualities of objects, receiving the agreeable and pleasurable, and rejecting the disagreeable and pernicious. 3. *Taste* is closely connected with the appetites, or the peculiar natural condition or want of the physical organs on the one hand, and the sensations and affected states of the mind on the other. It was designed as a medium of relief to the one and of enjoyment to the other, and should only promote happiness.

SECTION II.

1. *Intellectual taste* is very extensive, and is the *feeling* or *experiencing* of sensations. It implies the

presence of perception, apprehension, and judgment. Connected with such feelings is the relishing of true excellences, and the discerning of beauty, symmetry, and grandeur. 2. *It is the sensibility* of the mind by which we cognize both the beauties and deformities of universal existences—a prelude power in receiving and of relishing pleasure from the former, and of admitting suffering, pain, or sorrow from the latter. 3. *It differs* from mere feeling or quickness of feeling, yet is so closely connected that the absence of the latter would be fatal to the former. 4. There are *degrees of taste*, varying with different mental constitutions. That which is beautiful to one does not so appear to another. Taste, with some, is developed as a prominent feature connected with perception and quick discrimination, while others pass over fields of beauties almost wholly unaffected. Though it is natural, yet it is capable of a high degree of cultivation in comparing pleasing or beautiful objects with those deformed. And in comparing objects we think beautiful, with those selected by others, our power of discrimination becomes more acute. 5. While *taste*, to some degree, is regarded as *universal*, and all minds with this endowment are affected by a great variety of objects, yet they do not recognize the same quality of beauty in the same object; neither are all conscious of the same degree of emotion. 6. *Three men* travel through a section of country; one is delighted with the beauty of nature, another by the beauty or taste manifested in the improvements or works of art,

and the third with the cultivated taste and manners of the inhabitants. But all have *conscious* emotions with distinct differences, looking upon the darkening brow of the rising storm rapidly vaulting the heavens. Light in contrast with darkness, and clouds mingling in the lightning-flash, all vary our emotions and taste corresponding to such objects. 7. *Taste varies* with the same mind as we advance to old age. Gay or bright colors are pleasant and attracting to youth, causing vivid excitement. But our pleasure in age is derived from that which is more important, weighty, and grave. 8. *It* extends to objects exciting emotions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, yet differs from *desires*. It may extend to islands of ice upon rolling seas, glittering before the rising sun, or the descending flood of Niagara, yet we could not desire to own them.

SECTION III.

1. *Colors* examined separately involve the power of taste; but the mingling hues of flowers or rainbow excite intense feelings of delight. 2. *Colors* are not only beautiful, but in some instances possess grandeur and sublimity. The varying shades of living green spread over a thousand waving forests, or reflected from sun-lighted seas and oceans, together with vivid lightning-traces upon midnight darkness, all involve elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity. 3. *Symmetry* can influence taste. There is something pleasing in the correct proportions of the several parts of a body to each other, with a conform-

ity of the members of the whole work in unison and harmony. 4. *Form, uniformity, magnitude, and motion*, all influence the power of taste. Form involves endless diversity and variety. Uniformity extends regularity and harmony. Magnitude inspires with the idea of vastness, as sight ranges immense mountains, lifting their wild forms and lofty heads as if to gaze perpetually into the face of the sun-extended oceans, heaving and tossing in all the natural pride of unconquered independence: all cause emotions, with elements of beauty and grandeur. Motion is pleasing, if slow—quick motion is sublime. A train of cars in motion possesses elements of grandeur; but when at rest, the interest is abated. 5. *Taste* extends to causes of sound affecting the ear, and more abstractly to the beauty of sound within itself. It is beautiful, and taste is present in detecting the character and relation of tones. In this way discord is distinguished from concord. A mellow, soothing sound is beautiful; but the sound of a cannon or peal of thunder awakens emotions of sublimity or fear.

SECTION IV.

1. *Taste* extends to *immaterial* objects and qualities. Interesting, beautiful, and lovely *characteristics* or *traits* of minds around us, excite pleasing feelings. Affection and kindness manifested by others toward us, always produce grateful emotions. 2. *Vivid* and *correct* displays of intellectual power, whether spoken or written, come under the rules of taste which har-

monize with the general feelings of mankind. 3. *A correct taste* is closely connected with the moral elements of mind; and moral objects, together with the fitness and character of moral acts, come directly under its laws. 4. *Taste differs from conscience.* The former, in an important sense, is dependent upon and is influenced by the latter. Conscience decides upon right, or in regard to wrong. Taste directs the mind to that which is agreeable and pleasant. 5. *It differs from imagination.* By the latter we form conceptions, pictures, and combinations; and by the former we are led to decide upon the beauty, fitness, and utility. 6. *It differs from moral emotions.* The latter excites in regard to right or wrong—conformity or refusal to comply with rectitude. But the former merely cognizes fitness and beauty without reference to moral obligation. 7. *Taste extends to the moral condition, feelings, and happiness of a pure soul, in contemplating eternal life.* The spangled heavens above, the rolling earth beneath, flying clouds and changing seasons; the sound of the rain, murmur of the rill, and thunder of the cataract; the flight of armies, sweet songs of birds, or the wild scream of the eagle; the still home of the lily or the highway of the hurricane—all excite the mind with either pleasure or awe, pain or happiness.

CHAPTER IX.

RELATION OF MUSCULAR ACTION TO THE
MENTAL AND MORAL POWERS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. *MUSCULAR action* refers to those muscles in the physical system which are *organs of motion*, consisting of fibers or bundles of fibers delicately arranged. But their action is connected with and dependent on the mind. 2. *Such action is instinctive*, as we naturally flinch or draw back from sudden puncture, pain, or danger; yet it may be both involuntary and voluntary. 3. Our *hands* can be trained to almost an endless variety of work which is not of instinctive skill. 4. *The art* of painting or writing requires a special training of the muscles, and the work when done varies in accordance with such education or habits, as well as taste or judgment. 5. *Injuries* may affect, or even suspend such action. If the spinal cord be broken, all below the injury must perish.

SECTION II:

1. *Muscular action* may be of *instinctive* origin; yet it can not take place where there is no vitality or presence of mind. 2. *Such action* may be involuntary or take place in regard to something outside of

that in which the mind is wholly absorbed at the time.

3. But *such action* is principally voluntary, or caused by the mandatory power of the will. 4. When *voluntary* action accords with moral rectitude, it is harmless; but when vile, we are sinful.

DIVISION NINTH.

CHAPTER I.

PROPENSITIES.

SECTION I.

1. PROPENSITIES refer to a great variety of manifestations, inclinations, or influences connected with mental phenomena. A propensity is a natural turn or bent of mind, arising in connection with the existence and action of the intellectual and moral powers: 2. It has been called a *natural bias* or proclivity—an influence toward an object with an invoked readiness in regard to the same. But it may be regarded as a proneness arising in the nature of mental states; yet it is a natural inclination connected with mind of which we are conscious. 3. *Propensities* may be divided into four different orders or classes. (1.) *Natural propensities* are spontaneous in origin and inseparably connected with mental elements. We are conscious of such influences, and of the way the mind is affected by the same, but know very little of their essential nature. (2.) *Acquired propensities* appear to be educated, and are results of mental effort. When attention is turned repeatedly and long to an object, new influences often arise in

connection with such mental action. (3.) *Evil propensities* are very common, and arise under the influence of a depraved nature; but they are increased with desire for, and advance in, crime. Natural propensities to evil are restricted to the simple liberty of depravity in our first departure from innocence, while acquired strength or maturity leads to, and ends in, ruin. (4.) *Pure moral propensities* are inclined only to that which is right, or is in accordance with moral rectitude. They are connected with pure motive, a righteous conscience, and correct decisions of mind.

SECTION II.

1. *Propensities differing from appetites* are of higher order and of more importance, being less dependent upon the physical functions. They possess something of curiosity, sociality, self-preservation, and desire of knowledge and happiness. The idea of long life is pleasing, but that of annihilation is inexpressibly horrible. 2. We are *intuitively prone* to desire an immortality of happy existence, for no one could wish for more sorrow than he experiences at the present time. A natural inclination to appear respectable and share universal friendship, is common to man. 3. A *natural longing* for life is both instinctive and voluntary. The origin of efforts to escape from sudden danger, the spreading of the hands to avoid falling, is instinctive, preceding any act of reason; but existing in connection with reason they are voluntary. 4. We have a *propensive inclination* to investigate truths and

acquire knowledge, and in regard to that which is truth the action of the mind can not be withheld. Curiosity is not only natural to, but excites to investigative action with peculiar delight. 5. *Curiosity* inspires action, ever adding new interest to investigation, and is essential to thrilling and affecting oratory. The continued newness in which facts and figures are thrown together and presented, looms up in living vividness, and as with the wild grandeur of lofty mountain scenery, naturally excites as to what lies beyond. 6. Much of the *fresh* vividness of poetic effusions and descriptive romance, is connected with a desire to know the facts and beauty of nature, and we are naturally inclined to conform to that which we see and admire in others.

SECTION III.

1. We have a *mental inclination* to conform to the laws of taste, and there is something unseemly in violating or neglecting them. The mind is naturally inclined to imitation, as is evidenced in the acts of children. There is almost an unconquerable disposition to follow in the steps of a beloved friend, and whether their instruction be good or bad, it is with great difficulty we can depart from it. 2. The mind is *prone* to adhere to the rules of common law, consisting of those maxims, sayings, and traditions generally received and gainsayed by none. Therefore the importance of correct early training, as the first facts and impressions received by the mind will bias its

action in some way for life. 3. An *inclination* to seek fame exists in the mind, and with proper checks serves to rouse the powers to action; but if such restrictions are thrown off, the soul is soon wrecked on the strand of despair. 4. The *proneness* to self-esteem and desire of esteem are apt to increase. In nature they are innocent, but if indulged the mind is ruined. It is natural to love applause, but we should only wish to have the righteous and continued approval of others. A desire of *power* may be *natural* or *acquired*. The former may be harmless, but the latter vicious, having been cultivated with impure motive. 6. We are naturally inclined to utter and love truth, and if this is ruled out of the soul, it is by impurity in some way. 7. The propensity to eat and sleep is natural, which should be indulged with thankfulness, but to indulge in extremes is injurious. 8. The mind is *naturally disposed* to friendship. We have an internal fondness for peace, and it is unnatural not to love sweet tones of music. Not satisfied with the present moment, we anxiously look for change. Watching the seasons of rolling years, we sigh for the fullness of coming joys.

DIVISION TENTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE FEELINGS.

SECTION I.

1. FEELING may be defined to be that power which belongs to, and is naturally connected with, original mental elements, capable of great sensibility. 2. *Feelings* may refer to the variety of ways in which such power may be affected, or to the distinctive differences in their nature or manifestations. They are not only the basis, but the origin of the passions. 3. *They move*, and such ability to act is proof of their power to affect and be affected. Then there is something capable of being thus influenced, for non-existence can not be affected in any way. Therefore, feelings, from their very nature, are essential to the existence of the soul, and real knowledge of such reality. 4. The *power of feeling* is original with mind, and is not only a susceptibility, but a sensibility inseparably connected with the existence and nature of mental elements, and without which we could have no real knowledge of self. 5. We can not say that self is real only as we *consciously feel* such existence to be true; and till then we can have no belief in such

entity as positive. 6. If I experience pain or joy, it is only because I *feel* them; and I am just as conscious of the *feelings* as I can be of the emotion felt. Therefore, we have internal conscious power to feel self as real, and upon this depends the origin of such knowledge.

SECTION II.

1. The old scholastic and skeptical theory, that we arrive at a *knowledge* of self-existence from external facts affecting the organs of the senses, is false; unless such objects have conscious being and power to impart to us, by self-action, a knowledge of our existence; but this is impossible. 2. We must have an *internal conscious* knowledge of self before we can know any reality beyond. An object impressed upon the optic nerve may by the sensation imparted be felt as well as seen. All power to know external facts refers back to an internal feeling, intuition, or conscious self-power of knowledge. 3. *Feeling differs* from perception: being the sense of, or is perceiving by the touch. Perception is in part dependent upon feeling, for sensation or feeling must be experienced in order to the origin of perceiving affecting causes. 4. *It differs* in one respect from sensation. The latter may follow affected organs of sense, or perception, and be dependent upon them; but the *power* of feeling lies back of these, and is connected with the origin of such influences. 5. *Feelings differ* from affections, as the latter are more closely connected with emotions, may be caused by impingement, then

subside; while feeling is essential in the origin of the knowledge of such influences. 6. *Feeling* differs from *passion*. The latter is no more than an intense excitement of the former, which may soon disappear, while the power of feeling is not diminished. 7. If we could contemplate a soul *always destitute of feeling*, it would be without knowledge, for the origin of knowledge can not arise only as we have conscious feeling of such reality. 8. *Feeling* exists in the origin of the known differences distinguishing the mental and moral states of mind. And by means of the same we are led to determine sensations in the physical system and as to what part is affected. By feeling we are led to determine between mental and moral joy. I positively know I am right only when I have conscience-feeling in regard to right. Otherwise we can have no certain knowledge as to when we have arrived at the standard of moral rectitude.

CHAPTER II.

BENEVOLENT FEELINGS.

SECTION I.

1. BENEVOLENT *feelings* refer to those classes conditioned with kindness and love to our race. When controlled by them, our efforts are to do good, relieve sufferings, and console the broken-hearted. How sweet the light of affection and love that spreads joy over the depressed and dying! 2. *Such feelings* are always connected with a pure moral nature. Vicious desires do not belong to a pure heart, for sin can only impart that which is sinful and destructive. 3. *Feelings* connected with the *mental states* are impure when the moral powers are evil, in condition and inclination; yet no element of mind is in self-nature evil. Its condition and moral relationship became so by either permitted or intentional alienation. 4. *Feeling* is not only, in one sense, the moral *perceiving* of the mind, but is a present, sensible, and experimental realization, which can not be dispensed with without destroying all pure knowledge. A righteous soul is always filled with benevolent feelings; any heart destitute of them is impure, and, assuming to be righteous, is deceived and should awake to sudden alarm. The

power of Christianity can not dwell in an unfeeling and selfish heart.

SECTION II.

1. Though *love* be regarded as an *emotion* or *affection*, yet these can not exist independent of feelings. The love of existence is interwoven with feelings of fondness, in which we prefer life to death. The love of self is connected with feelings which continue a natural preference for our position in society to do good and be respected. But egotism is connected with feelings of pride, ambition, and selfishness. 2. The *last state* of egotism is mental alienation or partial insanity. When self becomes the one idea of the mind, with feeling of great satisfaction and approval, danger is inevitable. The only certain remedy is to suppress the first appearing of such feelings and appeal to conscience and reason. 3. *Love* for our race exists in connection with *benevolent feelings*, which are irresistibly joined in the nature of our being and coextensive with the existence of mind itself. Such feelings may be destroyed by sinful acts; yet destruction implies the reality of that which is capable of being destroyed. 4. *Domestic love* involves *that* of husband and wife, parents and children, and exists only in connection with benevolent feelings. To speak of love without these, is only to speak of selfishness, which never can render the domestic circle happy. Magnanimous feelings must not only be cherished and cultivated, but sent abroad, far beyond the

material limits of the heart. A niggardly soul answers no purpose of Infinite Wisdom, not worthy of life, and disqualified for the future. As the love we have for each other is innate, therefore benevolent feelings are essential to our being. 5. We experience feelings of *humility* in which we possess humbleness of mind. And in a *moral* point of light such feelings are blended with lowliness of heart, assuming no self-claim, but realizing a deep sense of unworthiness and dependence in the sight of God. 6. *Feelings of awe* may extend to fear or terror; but in a moral sense they include filial fear mingled with admiration and reverence. And reverence inspires sensations of respect? and esteem, with emotions of veneration.

SECTION III.

1. *Philanthropic feelings* possess general benevolence, and are connected with the origin of good will toward all men. 2. *Magnanimous feelings* characterize a great, honorable, and brave mind, seemingly disinterested, and of elevated sentiment. 3. *Patriotic feelings* and *love* of country arise in connection with the welfare of the land of home, containing the graves of a beloved ancestry. 4. *Feelings of friendship* are natural to our being and are known to be real. And feelings of compassion refer to our capability and sensitive suffering with others. 5. *Piety* refers to the condition and relation of the moral powers in which we have proper and pure feelings of veneration and reverence of the Supreme Being, with love of his

character. We know self to be real only because we feel such reality. This *feeling, I or self*, being spirit, is adapted to, and has as much power to realize the presence and influence of the Infinite Spirit, as it can have of self-reality. 6. It is natural for us to experience feelings of *gratitude or joy*; for a conscious difference between pleasant and unpleasant feelings can not be doubted. 7. *Love* of saints, of angels, and to God, involves distinct classes of feelings of which we are capable of knowing, and to doubt them is impossible. The moral condition of our feelings depends upon the influence of Divine power over them. 8. *Correct feelings* check every ambitious desire to lower the position of either angels or men. A pure heart can not wish to be less useful, but cheerfully desires the prosperity and success of all others. He who can not bear to see others rise and surpass himself in doing good, must either change in feelings, or consent to descend, shorn of influence, to a gloomy death, while society suffers no essential loss.

CHAPTER III.

MALEVOLENT FEELINGS.

SECTION I.

1. MALEVOLENT *feelings* belong and enter into that disposition of mind called evil. An evil disposition in regard to others involves a certain condition of our mental nature. On becoming intensely excited we experience feelings of a malevolent character, made known to us by consciousness. 2. *Dislike or disapproval* involves contrariety of feelings. This may take place from want of kindness, attention, or affection. And it may be the result of some intentional act or wrong influence upon us. 3. *Resentment* is common to a depraved nature, and often takes place without thought; but such feelings may be increased or diminished under the power of the will. Instinctive resentment arises from a depraved nature before the affecting cause has been brought under the test of reason. 4. The *moral character* of resentment involves the degree of such sensitive dispositions. (1.) *Intuitive resentment*, before reason can be consulted, may be harmless if the whole mind, before such injury received, was peaceful and seeking the welfare of the cause or person offending. (2.) But all *intentional resentment* is wrong, unless some good to the parties

was intended with pure motive, and more good accomplished by it than evil. 5. *Resistance* in regard to evil, and all evil, is not only right, but duty. The kindness of others should be resisted, if containing any thing of intended wrong. All efforts to harm us should be resisted; and when a malicious attack, wholly unprovoked, is made upon our life and peaceable escape impossible, we are justifiable in defending life, regardless of the fate of our foe.

SECTION II.

1. *Hatred* is wholly impious, and its highest degree of strength is criminal. *Envy* involves excited feelings at the prosperity of others, with hatred and destructiveness. But *gloom* refers to heaviness, sorrow, or sadness of mind. 2. *Anger* is a violent passion excited by some real or supposed injury. Stormy feelings of wrath, fury, indignation, and revenge, are immoral and can be controlled. The susceptibility to become angry may serve to wake the slumbering energies from stupor, but should always be under moral restraint. 3. *Jealousy* is founded in feelings arising from a fear of rivalry, and is ruinous to peace and happiness wherever its desolating touch sweeps the chords of affection. 4. *Pride* arises in connection with feelings of inordinate self-esteem, a high and haughty opinion of self-superiority in accomplishments, beauty, talents, or wealth. Such feelings disqualify for usefulness and tend to ruin. (1.) *Its higher degrees* lead to insolent exultation and rude

treatment of others. (2.) A *modification* of pride may cause us to speak only as of neatness or taste—the Summer's pride, pride of the lily, or pride of beauty. 5. *Impatience* includes feelings of uneasiness, sufferings, or restlessness. *Peevishness* refers to an unsettled or irritable disposition. *Revenge* possesses greater intimations of maliciousness. 6. We are capable of *feelings of remorse*, in which the mind appears to experience keen pain or anguish excited by a sense of guilt. It is compunction of conscience for crimes committed, with but little hope of release or pardon. 7. The soul is *capable* of feelings of *despair*. This is realized in hopeless loss.

CHAPTER IV.

EXISTENCE AND MORAL RELATION OF SYMPATHY, ATTACHMENT, AND BELIEF.

SECTION I.

1. SYMPATHY may be regarded as that quality of mental disposition capable of being affected by the sad condition or sorrows of another, and involves feelings correspondent in kind, and, in some instances, in degree. 2. In another point of light it *possesses* and *assumes* a peculiar agreement of affections or inclinations, in which there is a conformity of natural temperament, causing persons to be pleased with one another, and feel an interest in each other's sufferings and triumphs. 3. The *power* of sympathy is inseparably connected with the *moral* elements, extending to involuntary sympathetic feelings on the sudden appearance of suffering. This power is intuitive, yet can be much increased by reason, association, and imagination. 4. *It* is not based upon *imagination* for existence, yet internal sympathetic feelings may be increased when we begin to imagine ourselves in the place of those who suffer. 5. The *importance* of sympathy is essential to commiseration, tenderness, and condolence—an angelic quality blending the hopes and happiness of our race.

SECTION II.

1. The *power* of attachment is connected with moral elements of mind. We have conscious knowledge of its reality, and of its active power in binding heart to heart. 2. *Vile attachment* is realized in connection with the heart given up to wickedness. 3. *True and pure attachment* is essential to happiness, the harmony of society and governments. 4. The *power* of *belief* is connected with the *nature* of mind. Without power to believe in realities, all certainty of knowledge is gone forever; but with it facts are received and known to be true. 5. It is not only a *persuasion* of, *assent* to, or *declaration* of truth upon the ground of evidence, but is a *concluded* persuasion of truth, and of that which should be done to fill the claims of religion. 6. It *includes*, to some degree, credence, trust, and confidence.

CHAPTER V.

FEELINGS CONNECTED WITH THE PHYSICAL NATURE.

SECTION I.

1. WHEN speaking of *physical sensation or feeling* we only refer to it as connected with a spiritual nature; for all sensations and feelings are properly in the mind, though apparently in the nerves and muscles; yet all matter is inert. 2. The *origin* of our knowledge of physical self is connected with conscious feeling, and without this we can know nothing of external facts. 3. If *feeling* is natural to mind, it is natural to our bodily existence so long as the soul is connected with it. 4. We know our physical nature exists from a *conscious feeling* of such reality, and this ends all unbelief.

SECTION II.

1. We have nervous and muscular *sensitiveness or feeling*, and as such is connected with the mind, then the soul has power to feel in regard to the origin of all knowledge. 2. The *moral relation* of feelings immediately connected with the nervous system or physical nature, is determined by the purity or impurity of the heart and the intention of the mind. 3. *Moral*

accountability does not appear to extend to any minds but such as have reason, judgment, and conscience, and to some extent a correct exercise of the same. All rational beings are accountable. 4. When *reason* is paralyzed, thoughts suspended, and the judgment dethroned, the mind is deranged, and thought to be not accountable.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PASSIONS—HOW RELATED TO THE
PHYSICAL NATURE, THE MENTAL AND
MORAL ELEMENTS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. PASSION is a sensitive impression or effect produced by external objects or causes upon the body, or perceived by the mind through the medium of the senses. 2. The *term passions* includes much that belongs to feelings, with variations corresponding to the different kinds of influences called passions, together with their degrees of strength. 3. It is a *susceptibility* of influences or impressions from external causes affecting the mind; and in another point of light is a sensitive feeling or sensible excitement from impressions, which arise often very hastily and with great intensity of action. 4. *It differs* from feelings in violent agitation, acting without consideration or judgment in regard to injuries received. Feeling is natural to mind and abiding, while passion may soon subside. 5. *Physical* elements, abstractly, possess no passion in any way. We often hear persons speak of “animal passions or propensities,” as though inertness could possess these! All such influences belong to, and are part of, mind, the purity or impurity of

which must be charged to the heart and conscience. Though their origin may be realized in connection with them, yet such passion belongs to immateriality, so that no impurity can take place in regard to them, morally, unless willingly granted by the moral powers. 6. All kinds of *dissipation*, both of the mental and physical natures, deviating from moral rectitude, begin in the heart. So apologizing for crime, charging the natural physical disposition or propensities with such responsibility, is absurd. With the moral condition of the heart voluntary action must correspond.

SECTION II.

1. *Passion*, as connected with the mental elements, may be increased. And in proportion as the brain and nerves become very sensitive, mental action is increased. Such physical organs, if taxed too much, are in danger of increasing sensitiveness till paralysis ensues, then mental alienation or insanity is apt to be the result. 2. A *modification* of passion is regarded as pleasing and healthful. It tends to enliven and invigorate, as pleasing objects of beauty rise up before us, or make up scenes of far-spreading grandeur. 3. When we speak of *passions* interwoven with the *moral* powers, we not only acknowledge their entity, but are led to classify them as either good or bad. They are not only harmless when in conformity with propriety and moral rectitude, but pure if the heart is holy. 4. When either *theologians* or *philosophers* speak of "Divine truths," in religious excite-

ments, "working only on the vulgar passions, causing many to profess religion," they either speak of that of which they are profoundly ignorant, or have intentionally failed to examine the nature and laws of mind. Vulgar passions are pure when the heart attains true purity. Divine truths can not affect them without first moving the conscience or heart. All true reformation must begin in the moral nature of the soul. (1.) It will not do to say that such "truths" must *first* affect the *physical powers* in order to excite the passions. (2.) For then the *passions* must have self-power to determine on a partial reform. This conclusion is inevitable and perfectly absurd. 5. All the *passions* and *propensities* are subject to the voice of conscience, flow out from it, and without its consent and action can never reform in whole or in part.

DIVISION ELEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE AFFECTIONS.

SECTION I.

1. AFFECTIONS refer to and involve a *state of being affected*. This sensitive change conditioning the mind is made known by consciousness. 2. The mind is capable of *affecting, affection*, or of being *affected*. It can originate action, and in connection with this, feeling and affection are inseparable. This internal world of distinctive changes can fill the mind with either unutterable joys or sadness. 3. We can be *affected* by physical realities or influences within and beyond the identity of self. 4. *Affections* differ from *disposition*. The former refer more properly to the activity of certain mental tendencies, while the latter to the manner of certain inclinations as completed or conformed to uniformity. 5. They *differ* from *passion* involving the motion or gradual change of the mind, while the other is suddenly excited. 6. They *differ* from *emotion*; when once formed are not easily broken or diminished, while the latter may arise and diminish like waves of the sea. 7. They *differ* from

desires in distinctive variations of a higher and more pleasing position in our esteem.

SECTION II.

1. *Natural affection* applies to *that* which is connected with our essential being and of generous or humane character in counter-distinction with any thing like selfishness of sensibility, calmly extending to the welfare of our race. 2. The mind is said to be *affected mentally*, when such elements are moved or excited in some way by surrounding objects adapted to intellectual action. We have evidence of this in tracing the different branches of learning. 3. *Beauty affects* the mind as we look out upon wide and far-spreading scenery filled with beautiful objects, varying in qualities and contrasted excellences. And objects of grandeur and sublimity only add vigor to our feelings. 4. We are capable of *moral affections* referring to influences in connection with the moral nature, in which we are conscious of the difference between right and wrong. 5. We are not only *affected* by our condition in innocence, but are influenced by the *moral* condition and acts of those living holy lives around us; the presence of saints or the thought of angels enkindles new joys. 6. We are *inspired* while contemplating the pure and holy state and associations of coming eternity.

CHAPTER II.

PURE AFFECTIONS HARMONIZING WITH
MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE.

SECTION I.

1. THE *affections* imply, not only a power capable of moving or of being excited, but involve the distinguishing character as to purity or impurity. 2. Of nothing are we more conscious than that we can be affected in regard to the *perpetuity* of self-existence and happiness, and we can not withhold our feelings from desired possession and enjoyment of the same. 3. Our *affection* for mankind is *innate* or *natural*, but is capable of cultivation and of degrees. (1.) In regard to *natural* things, a vast variety of objects may skirt the field of vision—we have no affection for some, but others are very desirable. (2.) *Acquired* affections arise in connection with continued attention to objects, till something interesting attracts the mind. 4. *Parental* affection is original in a natural disposition or feeling dependent on the principle of love which parents possess for their offspring. Thus influenced they have good will for and cherish their children with protection and care, and efforts to preserve their natural lives should never suppress the fond desire to conform them to the will of God, and

train them for happy immortality. 5. *Maternal* affection, though naturally mild, is sacred and unyielding. Its vital flame glows through life, and continues burning in the soul amid the mourning drapery of the dark valley and shadow of death. 6. The *affection* of *children* for their parents, though natural, depends very much upon the love extended to them in early life by their parents. Yet sons or daughters who abandon, despise, and abuse their parents, are unworthy of life, and death would be revolting. But if parents, by intention or neglect, permit a child to form a dislike or hatred for them, they must not feel disappointed if abandoned to want and suffering in old age. It is natural to love our parents, and feel unutterable grief when the cold hand of death gathers them to the grave. Still the love of a faithful child pursues the flight of such spirits, and sighs for the associations of a bright immortality. 7. They are clearly *involuntary*, often realized before will-action is real, though they may be cultivated to some extent. 8. *Voluntary* affection can not be called original, but arises in connection with volitive attention to objects, till something becomes attractive.

SECTION II.

1. We are *naturally* inclined to stronger affections in regard to consanguineous persons, than those of foreign nations. 2. *Filial affection* is not so strong as that of parental. The latter is universal, intense, and undying, while the former is natural, though not

so intense, but is universally experienced where the heart is ruled by moral principle. 3. *Fraternal affections* involve the attachment of brothers, which is natural. Family association may tend to strengthen such feelings, but can not implant them in our nature. 4. *Secondary affections* may arise in connection with associated objects, yet they are based upon the implanted power of affections. 5. *Domestic affections* refer to the home circle, where many endearing interests unite. Home is sweet. Consecrated to holy feelings and tender regard, it is the dearest spot on earth. Happiness at home is an unbounded source of consolation. With such retreat, the maddening fury of earth is unheeded, though breaking in thunder-peals all around us. But if home-confidence, cradled in storms, is rocked by the violence of internal restlessness or rage, life is imbittered, hope flies, and despair often invokes death and the night of the tomb. The moral character of such influences is sustained and continued by the purity of the heart. The offspring of every domestic circle should always be dedicated to the will of Heaven. 6. *Voluntary affections* take place in connection with continued attention to some object or objects. But *involuntary affections* are natural, existing in connection with instinctive powers. 7. *They* may be created by kindness. And *affections* of friendship differ from any thing of hatred. 8. *They* may exist in regard to *pity*, being instinctive in origin, amiable, and virtuous. The same is true of affections of *sympathy*. All such

influences enter into the minds of the great and good.

9. *Affections of gratitude*, as well as those caused by sudden deliverance from death, include emotions of delight and joy, combined with a desire of good toward the cause of such deliverance.

CHAPTER III.

EVIL AFFECTIONS, OR THOSE DEVIATING
FROM MORAL PURITY AND RECTITUDE.

SECTION I.

1. AFFECTIONS are pure or impure, corresponding to the moral or immoral condition of the heart. They are regarded as pure in their instinctive origin, or when conformed to the dictates of an enlightened and correct conscience. But when the heart willingly indulges in evil the affections are alienated and impure. 2. *Resentment* is a departure from right. Self-protection is allowable, but the returning of evil for evil is sinful. 3. *Instinctive resentment* has been regarded as innocent, from the fact that it arises suddenly and acts without thought or reflection. Such action within itself is wrong, and the question of guilt turns upon whether the mind has been properly disciplined and guarded against injury continuously. The power of such resentment, as implanted in the mind, is useful as a source of immediate protection, though unguarded action may be wrong while the intention was good. 4. To say that "*instinctive resentment* has no moral character" is absurd, unless it is distinct from and superior to mind. But it belongs to mind which has moral character, and can not be regarded as superior. 5. *Involuntary resentment*

refers to that which is instinctive in origin. This is called harmless, but should be guarded. 6. *Voluntary resentment* is evil, as it takes into the account not only the sufferings inflicted, but the intention of the agent. If good can not be intended to both parties the act is wrong. 7. *Anger* is a violent affection or passion excited by some real or supposed cause, usually involving a propensity to take vengeance or obtain satisfaction of the offender. It may increase to indignation, rage, or wrath. Such excess of feeling is wrong, and tends to the destruction of both body and mind. It is harmless only when free from any violation of right. (1.) *Excessive* anger renders the judgment incapable of deciding according to the weight of testimony, the purity or impurity of the offender's motive, together with the degree of intended wrong. (2.) *It* is liable to deceive us, exciting perceptions of things which never existed. (3.) The *existence* of the *power* to become angry or aroused in resisting evil, with pure intention to injure no one, but to put down sin and rescue the offenders, may be called harmless.

SECTION II.

1. *Anger* in *nature* is not a selfish passion, but may become such by continued efforts. Being a natural mental affection, it appears to have been designed to excite to vigorous self-defense in emergencies and lettered attainment. 2. *It* includes elements of *benevolence*, interesting us in the defense of others when

injured or cruelly abused. Such influences, within proper limits and only exerted in securing the general good, are not only allowable but praiseworthy. It appears that Heaven has armed the bosom of every man with such feelings to be prudently exercised in correcting evil and wrong, and without them individuals and society would be almost without protection. A thunderbolt in the hands of a crowd without nerve or power to launch it would be bereft of dreaded power. 3. *This excitement* in others or the masses, by injury sustained upon the part of some one, or a feeble minority, is more properly styled *indignation*, being an element of sympathetic character. 4. *This affection* becomes evil when abused or misdirected. It may be too sudden, violent, and blind. If continued too long it degenerates into *malice*. The remedy is to cultivate kind feelings for all, and especially our enemies. 5. *Envy* is a peculiar kind of affection which often takes place in contemplating the superiority of those superior to self. It is too hateful to allow further description. All such influences fall like mildew upon the freshness of the rose. 6. *Hatred*, being enmity or ill-will, is ruinous to self and others, and can only be harmless when indulged against sin as an abstract reality. 7. *Jealousy* involves a painful emotion caused by some *loved* object, arising out of a feeling or suspicion of rivalry. It is often attended with an evil desire toward the object of love, if there is any evidence that others may be preferred. It is supported by egotism and love of

fame. It ranges from simple distrust to unkindness and violence. 8. *Revenge* involves a desire to return injury for injury, and often leads in deliberate and premeditated plans of crime. 9. *Fear* can only be regarded as evil, when we yield to loss of confidence, give up to despair, contented to die, inactive as to duty, and risk the consequences of the future, without an effort to inquire after and do that which is right. 10. *Malice* may be regarded as extreme and fixed enmity of heart, disposed to afflict and injure others without a cause. The soul is miserable within itself, and unworthy the confidence of any being whatever.

SECTION III.

1. The *disordered action* of the affections may be caused in different ways. (1.) *Natural defects* in the organs of sense influence the correctness of mental states and feelings. (2.) The *influence of disease* often destroys the capability of being affected in a uniform way, and mental states are apt to change with the increase of debilitation. (3.) The *effect* of a blow or fall often changes the character of mental manifestations. Age can not change the nature of mental elements, but affects their manifestations. 2. An *unhealthy nervous* constitution influences the character of mental action. If reason is suspended or the judgment biased our feelings vary. 3. *Neatness and cleanliness*, with chaste mental sentiment and purity of purpose, have a happy effect in correcting such disordered action of the affections.

CHAPTER IV.

LOVE.

SECTION I.

1. THE *power to love* is connected with the sensitive, natural susceptibilities and elements of the soul. This power is realized in the mind's peculiar action in regard to beauty and worth of any kind. 2. *It* has been called an *affection*, which is true in one sense; but affection has no power of self-origin. If the cause of such affection be pure, attracting beauty or worth, the origin of such motion is sustained to a certain extent by the power of love, which is more closely identified with our inherent mental nature. 3. *Love* is frequently called an *emotion*, but is stronger, more abiding, and extends to the very nature of the moral constitution. The one may arise and subside, while the other continues. Emotion is without any element of desire; but an unyielding desire for an object loved will continue while its attractions remain without change. 4. It is the *susceptibility* and *capability* of mind to be excited and moved by beauty and worth, differing from mere *affection* by involving strong desire. 5. *It* is opposed to dislike and hatred, pure and sacred within its self-nature. It appears to have been intended to be holy, and inspiring to the

mind, and without it happiness would be in ruins. 6. It *involves* a fondness for, or attachment to our country, the land of a beloved ancestry and containing the graves of friends departed.

SECTION II:

1. *Love* between the sexes has been regarded as a "compound affection, consisting of esteem, benevolence, and animal desire." Though it may have an element in, or influence with these, yet we can not regard them as correctly analyzing its true nature. It is an implanted power, natural to the essential elements of the soul. 2. *It* enters into the *basis* of benevolence, in which we possess a disposition to kindly esteem others, and accompanied with a desire to promote their happiness. Friendship is dependent upon it, otherwise we could not bestow kindness in any way upon an object of hatred, as a spontaneous act of the heart, unaided by the power of Christianity. 3. It supports *tenderness* of heart and feelings. In proportion as such power is diminished, dislike or hatred is apt to be increased, and the latter can never form a basis of kindness. 4. *Delight* and *joy* can not arise in any heart destitute of love; and in proportion as we love purity and pure objects is happiness increased. 5. *Parental love* of children is often so manifested as to prove its implanted nature, and in many instances operates *instinctively*. This is evident when it acts before reason and without premeditated purpose. Such action is involuntary, and is

voluntary when arising with deliberate attention and processes of reasoning. 6. *Love* for the human race is implanted and natural. We are naturally either wholly indifferent to the welfare of our fellow-beings, or have natural care and regard for them, which can only arise from this basis.

SECTION III.

1. *It* may be said to be *innate*, from the universal conduct of nations, found in their certain rules and laws securing mutual union, happiness, and protection. This springs out of love for each other. It lives and glows in the light of science, civilization, and religion. There is no cloud on heathen mountains so dark as to hide all traits of natural affection and love. 2. Man is *created* with power to love his Creator, of which he has conscious knowledge. If any love not God, it is by reason of sin. If he is love, which truth is evidenced in universal being, and man was created in the image of his Maker, then he was so typed, originally, to the Divine Goodness as to possess the principle of love. It is naturally in our power to love God, and to refuse is unnatural and sinful. A pure heart not only loves God, but loves angels, and all that is holy in time and the coming vast of eternity. The opposites of love and hope are hatred and remorse. 3. It is capable of *degrees* and *modifications*, increasing from regard to friendship, and from fond to fixed feelings of devoted attachment. The diversity extends not only to degree, but to kind. Love in

friendship varies from that of relations or country. 4. It is *complexed* in nature, involving assumed excellences in that which is loved, with a desire of good to the same. When confident our affections are justly and worthily bestowed, the emotion is strong, delightful, and exalted. 5. It appears to *proceed* with perception and pleasurable sensations, and can not be selfish. 6. The *happy results* of this affection, in every form of government and social organizations, embracing the casualties of individual fortune and destiny of nations, are of the utmost importance. It is implanted in the soul, and tends to unite with ties of sacred regard and happiness the whole world, and reflects the beneficence of a merciful Creator.

DIVISION TWELFTH.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND POWER OF CONSCIENCE IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINC- TIONS AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

SECTION I.

1. HAVING *defined conscience* in another place, we wish to add something more upon its nature and power in the knowledge of moral distinctions and obligations. 2. It appears to *rule* the moral elements of the soul, and is a *primary power* in the origin of the knowledge of moral distinctions and obligation, which, by the will, is brought under the inspection of the mind. 3. In Revelation it is appealed to as that *faculty* which, by the assistance of Divine Grace, sees at one and the same time. (1.) *Our own* tempers, dispositions, propensities, and lives; the real nature and quality of our feelings, thoughts, words, and actions. (2.) It is regarded as the *rule* whereby we are to be directed, having superior, if not exclusive, power to dictate in regard to right or wrong. 4. Heaven appears to have bestowed upon it the *power* of *perceiving* in reference to moral agreement or disagreement. (1.) It is a *faculty* entering into the

knowledge of self, discerning, both in general and in particular, tempers, feelings, thoughts, and actions. (2.) It is a *knowledge of the* moral rule of duty—our appeal in doubt, and ground of happiness in deliverance.

SECTION II.

1. A *correct* conscience implies a knowledge that all our thoughts and acts conform to the will of Heaven, as contained in Revelation. 2. A *good* conscience possesses a sacred awe in adhering to the will of Heaven, and an internal satisfaction and pleasure in regard to the same. 3. Some of the Greek fathers said, "*Conscience* is a Divine principle, and is by God himself implanted in our souls." Though subject to spiritual influences and holy impressions, yet it can not be a Divine principle in nature. 4. The term *conscience*, compounded of *con*, *together* or *with*, and *scio*, *to know*, evidences its province in knowledge or in influencing, convincing, or dictating. 5. A *righteous* conscience is, through infinite mercy, acquitted of guilt, and willingly conformed to moral obligation and rectitude. 6. A *bad* or *evil* conscience implies the connected presence and influence of guilt, with alienated propensities. 7. A *tender* conscience is realized under the mild influence and light of Divine Grace moving us to duty and happiness. 8. A *darkened* or *hardened* conscience refers to the condition of our moral nature when the light and peace of Heaven is withdrawn, and the feelings become indifferent or vicious. 9. A *seared* conscience belongs to the soul

abandoned to crime and ruin. This moral principle should always be kept pure, ever mellowing the feelings of the heart under the radiance of the Cross.

CHAPTER II.

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SENSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND MORAL ELEMENTS.

SECTION I.

1. SENSIBILITY is a susceptibility of impressions or peculiar power capable of being affected and extending to the physical organs of the senses. It is not feeling exclusively, but, being easily affected, gives origin to sensations or feelings which may be increased or prolonged. 2. *Sensibility*, when applied to the physical nature, does not convey the idea that matter has such susceptibility, but we are simply referred to the delicate or exquisite acuteness of the physical organs of the senses, where sensations appear to arise. 3. Though *feeling* is immediately connected with sensibility, yet the latter may be called the *susceptible power*, and the former such power in *action*. The impression upon the sensibility may subside, while feeling may be prolonged, increased, or varied.

SECTION II.

1. *Sensibility* as connected with the mental elements refers to the peculiar power of our spiritual

nature susceptible of impressions, which can exist either with or without any connected materiality. 2. We have seen that *sensibility* differs from *feeling*. Capability to act when affected differs from action experienced. Yet with this power of feeling is the known origin that affection has taken place, but such impression must precede it. 3. *Sensibility* connected with the moral element of the soul, refers us, not only to the susceptibility of impressions, but to our conscious power in distinguishing moral influences from those which are purely mental, whether of internal or external origin. 4. Words *spoken*, or that which we *read*, may appeal to our moral nature and stir the emotions. 5. The *extent* of such affection varies with different constitutions. The feelings may be saddened or excited with joy. Now we laugh—in a moment weep; now lively with hope, but immediately filled with despair.

CHAPTER III.

EXISTENCE OF FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

SECTION I.

1. THE *power* of feeling is essential to mind, not only extending to the organs of sense, but to affected motion experienced in the soul. 2. *Moral feelings* arise in connection with moral elements, and make their appeal to conscience. 3. *Feelings of moral obligation* possess a sense of binding force or power, with reference to action and right. They differ from those of approval and disapproval—the latter referring to the agreement or disagreement of conscience, sanctioned by the judgment; the former looks more to requirement and penalty in regard to actions. 4. We have only to appeal to *consciousness* in order to know both the existence and nature of obligatory feelings, experiencing a peculiar restraint in reference to what ought or ought not to be done. 5. It is not true that “*moral sensibilities*” is conscience; neither is it constituted of “*moral emotions and feelings of moral obligation.*” These arise in connection with the moral nature, and imply such existing power capable of supporting them and giving their moral distinctions, as they can not create their own being and character.

6. *Moral obligation* is evidenced in conscious convictions of duty; also from our desires, hopes, and fears in regard to right. 7. We can *act*, from a sense of moral duty, independently of self-interest, in securing the welfare and happiness of even our enemies, and feel that we have done right.

SECTION II.

1. The *care* of man for his fellow-man, and our race in general, appears natural, and evolves a conscious, realized sense of obligation. 2. *Such feelings* arise with our conscious care for the moral condition and safety of self and others, that no one be lost. 3. In an important sense such *obligatory feelings* are universal. The rules and laws of nations involve an important element of care for the security and safety of the people. The words and language of leading spirits in different ages of the world and under various forms of government, indicate deep, heart-felt regard for *truth* and *right*.

CHAPTER IV.

NATURE AND DISTINCTION OF OBLIGATORY
FEELINGS.

SECTION I.

1. FEELINGS of *obligation* are simple in experience, but undefinable in nature. We have origin to the knowledge of feelings only by feeling. The power to feel, and of feeling, is essential to mind. Could it be wholly without such power, it would be either matter or non-existence. 2. I know the existence of self only because I *feel* it to be real—myself and not another. Consciousness of the *feeling I or self* equals the certainty of the emotion felt. It enters into the basis of consciousness. 3. *Moral obligatory feelings* refer to the peculiar character of some contrasted with others. They may possess modulations or degrees, from slight to strong inducement, and from imperfect to perfect obligation.

SECTION II.

1. They are *authoritative* in regard to that which should be done, yet proper action may be intentionally withheld. We can feel no conscious moral obligation to do wrong. And that which is conferred by Divine Goodness can impose no wrong, and can not

mislead us. 2. They *differ* from moral approval and disapproval. The latter may arise suddenly and retire, while the former continues so long as we feel such obligation upon us. 3. *Such feelings* involve a sense of obligation and duty in regard to self, others, and the boundless future.

CHAPTER V.

UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL FEELINGS—HOW CONDITIONED.

SECTION I.

1. UNIFORMITY in the *action* of moral feelings conforms principally to the power and influence of conscience, which has much to do in conditioning the distinctions in the character of feelings. 2. Such *uniformity of action* implies the existence of some law or court capable of influence and decisions, not exclusively intellectual, but properly belonging to the decisions of our moral nature. 3. The *first law* of this court is found in *principle*, to which our moral nature is inclined to adhere. A heart without principle is only prepared to do mischief. 4. In *conscience* is the associated power of uniformity—the grand center of monitory moral power, arranged by Infinite Wisdom; to and from which, aided by the heart, ebb and flow the moral pulsations of our world. *Here* is the basis of moral action moving the empire of spirit in all parts of the globe. Its voice is the same, whether uttered in Christendom or some silvan shade of heathenism—in the valley or on the mountain, upon the wide waste of ocean or nature's distant, wildest shore. 5. The *nature* of conscience evidences

not only its co-natural power in constituting the soul, but is realized in the character of uniform action. Its variations in decisions can not take place in regard to the reality of self, nor of purity. 6. The *variations* of such decisions are not only allowable from self-nature, but are real, and may occur in one and the same mind. They may arise in connection with a moral proposition, involving many varying facts. The first one may influence and effect a decision, but the weight of other truths may cause a decision varying from the first, and all the facts may vary a third decision, while the moral principle is unchanged.

SECTION II.

1. *Differences* in intellectual powers may vary such decisions. A moral question or duty, under certain circumstances, may by one be regarded as right, while another believes it wrong. The actions may differ while motive in both is pure. One is influenced often by ulterior facts, while another looks only to the present time. 2. *Conscience* within itself, as a *moral* principle, changes not, yet we can be so influenced by facts as to vary action. Degrees in knowledge may vary moral action and not change such internal nature. 3. *Feelings* and decisions change with the *force* and *character* of minds. The force of one is comparison; a second, accuracy of judgment; while a third has memory. All these tend to vary action, and we are left to the correctness of the moral powers for real satisfaction. 4. The *intention* and *moral action*

of a heathen may be harmless, compared with an enlightened mind, being only guided by the light of nature. 5. The *doctrine* that "our moral nature is always changing, and that conscience is *wholly* a creature of education," is false. Education can not originate that which is to be taught; then there must be something capable of being educated, and we have seen that the moral nature can not change within itself. 6. In the whole race of man conscience has *spontaneous dictation*, and, untrammelled by other powers, is inclined to conform to right. All experience feelings in regard to right and wrong. It tells us of loss sustained, prompts to worship universally, and leads us to sigh for peace, rest, and immortality.

CHAPTER VI.

RELATION OF THE JUDGMENT TO OUR MORAL NATURE—HOW VARIED.

SECTION I.

1. THOUGH conscience in *nature* can not change, yet the judgment often *varies* in regard to moral realities. The former may be trammelled by ulterior influences, but is unchanged in nature. The latter is influenced by other mental powers and the great diversity of facts brought under consideration, some hastily examined, and others overlooked or valued too highly. 2. *Men vary* in judgment about the same thing. One decides against certain moral governments, having detected some features in them very defective and tolerating evil. The second approves of the same, as they accomplish an incalculable amount of good; yet both are equally opposed to evil. 3. Objectors say if conscience were *real*, evil would be universally condemned; yet falsehood, with some nations, is not punished; and with others, theft is not criminal. This is no proof that conscience is inactive, but that the judgment is improperly influenced in regard to proper decisions. 4. The fact that heathens can be *taught* the value of property, the difference between right and wrong, is evidence of a

moral nature. The mind naturally revolts at the idea of assassination. The first murderous act is attended with unspeakable horror, but this subsides as conscience becomes subdued by increased crime. And the heart must become hardened before such crime can be committed, which evidences departure from its first acuteness, and alienation of judgment. 5. All *cruel* acts are advanced to by degrees, which is in violation to the moral checks upon us, being overruled by the propensities and incorrect judgment.

SECTION II.

1. The *cruel laws* of nations are results of minds removed from original righteousness. They arise with blinded judgment, and do not flow from innocent, pure hearts. If there were no moral nature, old sinners would always have been so, as there could be no innocence from which to depart. 2. Almost abandoned sinners retain some *conscious feeling*. Thieves and robbers evidence kindness among themselves, and take care of each other in extreme sufferings. Pledges made are kept inviolate. 3. All *savage tribes* have forms of worship, wholly the promptings of conscience, but the judgment is at fault in carrying out rules of right. 4. The *mass* of mankind are not *lawless* offenders. There is a moral influence, to some extent, connected with the councils and intellectual march of earth's millions. And without it the whole world would be a scene of blood and carnage. Speculative theories may vary the judgment,

but the moral nature is uniform. 5. The *judgment* of Christians may *vary* on doctrines, while the moral feelings and purpose are uniform and abiding. 6. The *associations* of early life often vary the judgment. That which is learned first has great force in controlling the judgment, but can not destroy the moral nature.

DIVISION THIRTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

MORAL RECTITUDE.

SECTION I.

1. MORAL *rectitude* embraces *correctness* or *rightness* of principle. And principle refers to the nature of intuitive power as conditioned by the influence of conscience, when the mind is self-possessed or contemplating good or bad results, connected with which we feel a sense of right. 2. It leads us to inquire as to *what is right*. God has a nature changeless from all eternity. Being absolute in perfection and holiness, is intrinsically right. Any change from what he is would be evil. Whatever he approves is right, and whatever he disapproves is wrong. As we adhere to the light of his Spirit and become restored to his moral image, we instinctively approve that which he approves, and disapprove such things as he disapproves. With this condition of intuition we experience convictions of good and evil, right and wrong. 3. *It* extends to *practice*. The thought or influence in the origin of action must arise in connection with this internal basis and conform to the righteousness of external laws, whether human or Divine, and must

be in exact agreement with truth, and to the utter exclusion of error or falsehood. 4. The *rules* for *moral conduct* harmonize with a conscious sense of purity, and correspond with the correctness of external truths and righteous laws. 5. The mind's *satisfaction* in regard to uprightness must agree with and conform to the principles of honesty and justice. 6. *Integrity* refers to that abiding fixedness which holds the mind to uniformity of purpose and purity of motive. 7. *Honesty* involves an upright disposition and moral rectitude of heart, conforming to justice and pure principles of truth.

SECTION II.

1. A *true* standard of rectitude exists in connection with the power to know right and wrong. We approve or disapprove certain actions, feeling the difference between right and wrong. 2. *Moral rectitude* is evidenced in the common conformity and action of all minds. An individual mind is inclined to form ideas, rules, and laws, distinguishing between right and wrong. The masses naturally harmonize and unite upon general rules and principles, discriminating between good and bad. 3. This is evidenced in the *nature* and arrangement of the *laws* of nations. 4. It *extends* to *rewards* and *punishments*, entering into the condition of our feelings in regard to the propriety of approval or disapproval, acquittal or punishment. 5. *It enters* into the government of the Supreme Being. He is just and righteous. The

doctrine that Deity "has taken the ground, not only that the principles of rectitude are eternal and immutable, but that he himself, with all his transcendent excellences, is *amenable*, and *desires* to be considered amenable to them," is incorrect and very unfortunate language. It implies that he is amenable or controlled by rectitude or law superior to himself. He who would limit the absolute existence, perfect and infinite attributes of the great First Cause, would do well to turn back to first principles and be satisfied to profess humble attainments.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

SECTION I.

1. *THOUGH distinction* is the *act* of separating or distinguishing, yet differences are often very apparent in realities causing mental action. The power to know moral distinctions begins with the moral nature by which we approve or disapprove. 2. The *power* of knowing right from wrong can not originate with the senses. It is not an object of either tangibility or sight. 3. That *moral distinctions*, in every respect, "are immutable," is incorrect. No immutability of right or righteousness can exist as inherent and limitless in mind fallen. 4. Our *moral nature*, under grace and a sense of righteousness, can determine on that which is correct, but in self-nature there can be no positive law of immutable moral distinctions. But the mind always possesses the power of moral distinctions or of arriving at that which is correct in its constitutional being and relationship. This is not of infinite law in the necessity of things. 5. *Immutability* belongs to Deity, but is not the law of the human mind nor the moral condition of the soul.

SECTION II.

1. *Heaven* gave us conscience with *intuitive* convictions of right, capable of disapproving evil. This guide, originally intended to be true, may be stultified or varied by degrees of crime. But so long as conscience exists it has some power to approve right and disapprove wrong. 2. The *power* of approval and disapproval appears to be essential to the existence of the moral nature. Without this, if we could have moral decisions, they would be either accidental or ruinous. But to attribute such power to know moral distinctions to an "immutable law in the infinite necessity of things," to which both man and Deity "are amenable," is not only beyond the field of philosophical inquiries, but ends in conjectural confusion. 3. An effort to prove an *immutable* law in the necessity of things, asserted that Deity can not will wrong right nor right wrong; hence the distinction has been settled by an "anterior immutable law of necessity." Then such necessity being anterior to any volitions of Deity must be superior to him. This is not only materialism, but atheism in the worst form. 4. The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong appears to be *instinctive*, as the mind often acts correctly before reason can be called into action.

CHAPTER III.

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL POWERS.

SECTION I.

1. THE *moral nature* has power to discriminate and approve or disapprove in regard to right and wrong, but may be so overwhelmed by sin and evil propensities as to crush its vivacity, yet without wholly destroying moral dictation. 2. With the *moral nature* wholly depraved and removed from Divine mercy and restraints, we are not capable of desiring the society of holy saints or angels, either on earth or in heaven. We might desire relief and approve right, but to desire moral change would be doubtful, when the soul would be incapable of hope. 3. *Moral derangement* takes place when the moral nature is overwhelmed by vicious purposes and acts, and the voice of conscience unheeded. 4. *Disordered action* is affected by various causes calculated to hush or repress the remonstrances of conscience, which, if withdrawn from moral desire or hope of happiness, must live in the certainty of self, right and wrong. To say that conscience can be "annihilated" by sin, is impossible, so long as the soul has immateriality and immortality. Even devils have knowledge of good and evil, without

hope of relief. 5. *Such action* is voluntary when wrong is intended. The moral powers may, and often do, yield to the action of the will and force of the propensities. The mind loses sight of vicious results till the remonstrances of conscience are almost unnoticed. A life filled with heinous crimes is the result of repeated efforts from slight offenses to those of dark deeds of horror or death. If conscience could be annihilated by sin, and such sinner could be converted, he could not be repossessed with kind feelings or love for Heaven or his race.

SECTION II.

1. *Involuntary* disordered moral action takes place when principle and admonitions of conscience are regarded with reckless indifference, while evil propensities and emotions carry us into neglect of duty and unintentional crime. 2. *Such action* is natural when resulting from imperfect mental organization or insanity. The doctrine that we can come into the world "without a conscience," as readily as to exist without "reason," is absurd. The inactivity of conscience in some instances, has been attributed to a species of moral insanity, in which its vigor has been suppressed. 3. In all grades of insanity the *action* of conscience is more uniform than any other faculty. Such superiority is the bestowment of Infinite Wisdom, upon which shines most successfully the guiding light of Heaven. 4. We are morally *accountable* for all wicked acts, even though conscience should, at the

time, appear withdrawn, provided our vicious course in life tended to stupefy and render such moral remonstrances inactive. 5. We are *accountable* for all acts committed in the absence of reason, when knowingly or intentionally we destroy reason, as in drunkenness or fits of delirium tremens. By placing ourselves in a condition to do wrong, together with the act, we are guilty as though possessed of reason. 6. In *proportion* as the mind becomes insane, without intentional effort, our moral accountability is ameliorated. But all efforts to clear criminals upon the ground of insanity without positive and well-defined mental ruin, only aggravates the claims of the moral law which holds them guilty unto the decisions of the great day.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ACTION OF OUR MORAL NATURE VARIED
BY THE DISORDERED INFLUENCE OF THE
APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES.

SECTION I.

1. DISORDERED *action* of the appetites influences and varies the action of the moral powers, but can not totally destroy any essential element of their existence. They continue to strengthen by repeated indulgence, and though the remonstrance of conscience and decisions of the judgment are opposed, yet there is a yielding, and we begin to seek for something justifying such indulgence. 2. *Appetite*, when vitiated, wars more successfully against judgment and our conscious sense of propriety and right, than any disposition or propensity. The sight of the eye may be overcome, the sense of hearing may be avoided, and the love of sport and gambling can be subdued, but a false or vitiated appetite, in some instances, can not be destroyed. 3. The drunkard may *abstain* from intoxication, but his appetite is only slumbering, and may awake, rending all hope of success. 4. The *indulgence* of an inordinate appetite leads to disease, and can affect the whole system so as to produce insanity. The resolves of an inebriate often broken,

result in loss of confidence and ruin. 5. The *social* propensity may affect moral action. If deprived of society, and especially those loved, the anxiety and intense misery ensuing, in many cases, have created disease and mental alienation, in which former objects of love are hated and scorned with revengeful madness.

SECTION II.

1. *Love* of home, when disappointed, frequently produces derangement of our moral feelings, and so intense may such desires become as to be followed by disease, mental alienation, and death. 2. The *principle* of self-preservation may be varied or weakened by repeated trials or disappointments. That which induces melancholy often contributes to diminishing the desire of life. 3. The *possessory* principle may be improperly influenced, and in proportion as the miser accumulates wealth is his covetousness increased. Soon all thought is absorbed in money, gain, and how to save from loss. 4. The *possessory* principle resulting in theft or stealing, is neither congenital nor constitutional, unless such is of natural necessity or infinite law. If so, such minds are incapable of blame or punishment. 5. *Disordered action* takes place in regard to self-preservation. Under the natural desire of continued existence we begin to multiply supposed dangers till the mind becomes filled with terror, causing physical prostration and disease. 6. The *principle* of veracity may be varied. The moral powers may have always been repressed,

the judgment and memory defective, which will cause confused action in narrating correctly. 7. *Love* of esteem exalts self, but depreciates worth in others.

CHAPTER V.

IMITATION.

SECTION I.

1. THE mind is possessed with an internal *disposition* or principle, giving origin to imitation. There is a natural inclination to imitate those we admire. We are attracted by the intellectual gifts and attainments of those whose reach of thought and gaze of fire kindles new interest as the mind investigates extended fields of science. All laudable, great, and mighty mental acts naturally inspire assimilation. 2. *Ambition* causes inclinations to imitate great and noble acts; but care should be exercised or ruin is inevitable. 3. *Moral imitation* refers to the action of the moral powers and connected disposition to conform to rectitude qualifying elements of happiness. It is involved not only in a conscious relation to right, but to the great First Cause, in which we feel interested in that which is innocent, magnanimous, and honorable. 4. *All objects* of moral beauty are calculated to gain our attention, and instill desires of assimilation in some way. However opposed by malevolent feelings, yet we experience a rising preference for purity, and to acknowledge and honor the right. 5. In recalling the past, we *experience* great satisfaction in having

imitated perfections which were just and approved of conscience and heaven. And in contemplating the future, we can not resist the desire to conform to truth, that we may be happy.

SECTION II.

1. *Sympathetic imitation* may extend to the feelings of many persons, involving the influence of spirit upon spirit, under peculiar and intense excitement, in which one is affected by the condition of others. 2. The countenance and feelings *change* with circumstances. In looking upon a mirthful or sad face, our feelings and expression naturally change correspondingly. The mangled form of one just fallen from an upper window creates involuntary sadness. 3. *The same* is true of children; if one becomes sad and weeps, those associated often become affected and weep. 4. The *shout of victory* on the field of battle fills the whole army with joy. But the signal to surrender spreads universal dismay. The cloud of despair arching the commander's brow soon gathers upon the feelings of battling warriors. Loss of confidence yields to the thunders of an advancing foe. 5. We are apt to imitate the *defects* of orators first. If great men have uncouth expressions or actions, natural or from habit, they are often copied by those who admire such illustrious giants in knowledge, while their excellences are not imitated.

CHAPTER VI.

SPIRITUALISM.

SECTION I.

1. SPIRITUALISM, though not a mental element, belongs to mind, is opposed to materialism, and once taught that all existences are spirit. We have seen the absurdity of materialism, and that all realities are spirit or soul is equally untrue. 2. *Spinoza*, near the middle of the seventeenth century, attempted the reconciliation of these extremes, by assuming only *one substance* in nature, and that the same was endued with an infinite variety of attributes, embracing solidity, extension, and cogitation; and that all bodies in the universe are modifications of this one substance; that all souls of men are modifications of the same; and that God is an infinitely-perfect Being—cause of all things; yet there is but one being or nature, however endlessly diversified in distinctions. Such absurdity is atheism, and needs no comment. 3. In proportion as the mind is withdrawn from the physical organs of sense, is its action perfected. By so far as diseased bodily organs tend to inertness, is mind trammelled in action. 4. But *modern spiritualism* is of extensive application, embracing the power of spirit to affect spirit, either directly or by means of physical

organs. The living converse with the dead. From the nature and relation of spirit to matter, if a departed soul can not move the organs of its own dead body to communicate with us, how can it have power to move the inert powers of another medium already in the possession of a spiritual nature? All such affirmations are averse to the nature and laws of mind and matter, and are absurd. Our physical natures can not be mediums for the departed, unless such spirits first move our spirits to act in conveying their thoughts, then our minds must first receive such thoughts before they can be made known. 5. From the *natural* adaptation and *moral* fitness of things, a holy message from a holy world can never come to us through vile or impure mediums. Deity does not employ wicked persons as mediums of his mercy and pleasure; neither can saint or angel use such agencies. Therefore, the unrighteous heart, if capable of being a medium, or physical organs connected with it, they can only be used by unholy beings of the spirit-world, and we have a right to reject their messages. 6. It appears that finite spirits may be *moved* by the influence of Satanic power, performing feats of a miraculous character; but all such are denounced by Divine authority.

SECTION II.

1. The Scriptures furnish examples of *spiritual influences*, but they are always characterized as either good or bad, right or wrong. All such influences,

approved of God, are holy; and those unholy, are condemned. 2. *Necromancy* is the art of revealing coming events by pretended communication with the dead. This practice arose in Egypt, the mother of occult sciences, and was carried by the Israelites through all the East. Whether conversing with the dead is true or false, was unsettled in past ages. If true, it was grounded upon diabolical agencies and denounced by the law of God with the penalty of death. "A man or a woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death." Persons under the influence of their *demon* were said to become greatly inflated, giving answers in frenzy. As souls have been possessed with devils, we know not how far we may place ourselves under their power. 3. *Soothsaying* was distinguished from prophecy in assuming power to foretell future events without Divine aid or authority, which, if true, can only be evil. 4. *Astrology*, though mystified by the Chaldeans and Egyptians, embraced nothing more than assumed science of foretelling events by the situation and influence of the stars. 5. *Enchantment* embraced fascinations, charms, or spells, in order to deceive, which is opposed to every idea of right and purity. 6. *Magic*, as practiced by the magicians, was of the spirit of Python, claiming nothing of higher purity. Moses punished them with death. Daniel speaks of them among the Chaldeans, as averse to righteousness, evidently founded on imposture and devilism.

SECTION III.

1. *Witchcraft* is a supernatural power, which persons were supposed to obtain in compact with Satan. It was not till God had forsaken Saul, that he resorted to the Witch of Endor, one of the very class he had been legally destroying throughout the whole land. Bewildered in apostasy, he desired first to see the Lord's prophet. The pythoness, in calling Samuel, doubtless expected only her familiar spirit, as she was more astonished than Saul at what she saw; not regarding it as the prophet, she exclaimed, "I saw gods ascending out of the earth." It appears that the Lord, at that time, saw fit to send Samuel, not in obedience to, but contrary to her expectation, to tell Saul his awful fate. 2. *This power*, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in Europe, yielded to the alchemists, who claimed to turn base metals into silver and fine gold, saying that Satan is a friend to every one wishing to be skilled in the occult arts. 3. *Demonology*, in the same way, must be regarded as the basis of such spiritual influences and acts, not approved by Heaven. Though the magicians of Egypt, by enchantment, appeared to turn rods into serpents, yet it was opposed to the order and will of Deity. 4. *That kind of spiritualism* in which the Spirit of God influences and renews our spirits to a life of righteousness, is beyond the possibility of doubt. But confidence in the influence and communications of finite spirits with each other, can only safely exist where the medium is holy or desiring to conform to rectitude and purity,

CHAPTER VII.

G E N I U S .

SECTION I.

1. GENIUS may be regarded as a peculiar structure of mind, natural and essential to every intellect investigating science and successful in lettered attainment. It has been called a natural disposition or bent of mind which belongs, in some degree, to all rational beings, qualifying them for a peculiar or specific work.

2. It is a peculiar *natural susceptibility, power, or aptitude* for a particular study or branch of science, quickening the mind with energy and vividness. It imparts a love for the intricate and mysterious, and inspires a determination to conquer. It is an active strength developing uncommon manifestations of intellectual power, and particularly that of investigation.

3. *It naturally* gives condition, disposition, and character to mind, in which it loves activity, penetrates and explores hidden fields of science. Its internal fires kindle as we range universal facts, ever attracted by the displays of infinite skill and wisdom. As the travel of a star thought sweeps the rising future, still onward, as with seraphic reach of perception and gaze of fire, peering into the mysterious vast of coming eternity.

4. It is closely connected with

originality. The latter embraces the basis or realities, while the former leads to an examination of them, in which arises the apprehension of distinctions and force in knowledge. The latter furnishes materials or facts, but genius carries them to the court of inspection and investigation, evolving new features of pleasing discovery. 5. *Primary* or *absolute* originality belongs only to Deity. He created all matter and mind in which arises every idea and thought. Finites may change, but can neither create nor annihilate the smallest atom. We may change or pervert ideas, but can not make them; yet genius renders investigation delightful. 6. The *vast universe* is the great *source* of ideas created by Infinite Wisdom, and only such can we know, but can use ideas which have or have not been possessed by other finite minds, and such be called original. The examination of these causes the internal fires of genius to glow, sending out to every mental capability thrills of delight.

SECTION II.

1. *Genius* is involved in the origin and perfecting of investigations and inventions. Mind inspired by it dares to be wise and useful. Put out its fires and intellectual effort is paralyzed. Its pulsations shake a slumbering world; waking fondest expectancy, while thought ranges universal truths with pleasing imperishability. 2. It is present in *decomposing* and *recombining* in the alteration of the relation and properties of realities, giving new applications when dis-

coveries are made. 3. It not only aids in the discrimination and suitable arrangement of facts, but produces mental *animation*. This depends upon the interest felt or inspired by genius. It exerts a favorable influence upon memory in fixing the attention upon every desired fact. 4. *Imagination* receives aid from the strength of genius in exciting mental action. It exerts a favorable influence upon the judgment, penetrating facts, and evolving their relative importance. 5. It is almost indispensable to true *eloquence*, conferring clearness of thought and expression. It excites the orator in clearly comprehending and enforcing the truths of his message.

DIVISION FOURTEENTH.

CHAPTER I.

MORAL EDUCATION.

SECTION I.

1. THE *term education* implies something capable of being instructed, and that such entity belongs to and is natural to mind. We are informed or enlightened by receiving principles of the arts, science, morals, and religion. 2. *Mental education* refers to the cultivation of the intellectual powers, and moral education to the cultivation of the *moral* elements of mind. The former is essential in acquiring knowledge, and the latter is indispensable to usefulness and true happiness. The former without the latter only capacitates the soul for increasing shades of crime and ruin. 3. The *mind*, with high intellectual culture, and pure moral powers, controlled by the will of God, is a star burning in the moral firmament, attracting and fadeless. 4. In proportion as we adhere to the intimations of the moral elements and dictates of conscience, we are apt to be biased and directed to right in opposition to wrong. They can discriminate and be influenced by good and bad, but will be ever occupied by either right or evil. 5. *Education* may be said to begin with the first

rational notice of a child, and synchronizing with such notice, it naturally detects something of the difference between smiles of parental approval and frowning expressions of disapproval. The former affects a consciousness of peace, love, and rising intuitions of right, while the latter saddens the feelings and affects consciousness of dissatisfaction or wrong.

6. As the *faith* of the parent is received for the child while incapable of knowing right from wrong, there is no period of such existence when it should not be wholly consecrated to the will of God, and that without reserve forever. This, followed by correct moral training, confiding in the faithfulness of Heaven to save our offspring, would not fail, and universally adopted, earth's teeming millions would soon proclaim the millennium arrived.

SECTION II.

1. *Perceptive action* is first, but immediately successive is sensitive action. The latter may develop or mature more rapidly than the former. Youthful persons properly instructed have a clearer sense of moral obligation and duty, than of scientific truths at the same age. An early disregard to such conscious sense of right is the beginning of ruin.

2. It is the *deseccration* and *departure* of the moral powers and intention which constitutes the vagabond and lawless transgressor. The present and future happiness of the soul depends upon the cultivation of the moral powers, conforming them to the will of God, and is

more essential than intellectual education. 3. The *first truths* imparted to youthful minds should be moral and religious. That which is first learned is last forgotten, and those facts received during the first ten years of life, generally give direction and character to our being. Parents often weep over their offspring ruined, when half the concern and care at the right time would have saved them. 4. *Moral education* must include instruction in reference to the existence and character of the Supreme Being, and those religious duties we owe to him, to ourselves and one another. Without moral *susceptibility* and *religious discipline* thrones would fall, governments dissolve, and the whole earth present continued scenes of blood and carnage. 5. The highest state of man consists in his *purity* as a moral being. He must look to this in preparing for temporal usefulness and happiness in the coming future. The longings of the soul dissatisfied with earthly things soar beyond the scenes of sensible things, finding no object filling such capacity till resting in the contemplation of Deity. 6. Our *only safety* is in constantly watching over and investigating the character of our intellectual and moral condition, guarding our feelings, desires, attachments, and our antipathies. Moral purity must control the heart. Without this the mind may range the highest attainments in science, measure the earth, silently step the zodiac, travel with the stars, and shout to the varying flight of distant rolling worlds. Yet, without God in the soul all is but loss. 7. With-

out *moral influence* and power the faculties are wrecked and soul ruined. It is the moral nature that gives origin to ideas of right, obligation, and duty, harmonizing warring elements affecting the throes of the great heart. It invokes the will to mighty conflict, evil is overruled, and devils fly. The first perception or idea of right possessed by a little child, in moral worth, surpasses angels fallen. The latter, though understanding the mysteries of heaven and earth, the history of created worlds, and obtained all knowledge, yet without a sense of right to guide in purity, love, and happiness, all would sink into insignificance. 8. *How painful* to contemplate a man deprived of vision, hearing, or action; but still more awful to watch the retiring of reason and memory; yet we can love such an object. But if self-government is gone, the light of conscience extinct, and all power to love right, men, angels, and God wholly destroyed, though the intellect kindle with the brilliancy of a thousand suns, the soul is lost. But vivid thought, with true moral purity, outstrips the lightning, compasses space, scales heaven, fathoms hell, and fills the soul with holy and blissful emotions.

CHAPTER II.

WELL-BALANCED INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL
POWERS OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. WELL-BALANCED intellectual and moral elements of mind, refer to the perfectness of their essential existence and relative activity or force in manifestation. 2. As the *physical organs* change the action of the different powers of mind often vary, as in youth and age, sickness and health. 3. The *wisest* and *safest* man is he whose mind is well-balanced in the proper exercise of all its faculties, and not so intensely as to paralyze any of the organs on which manifestations depend. 4. The *succession* of our thoughts should be guarded with exactness, and controlled with an intention to conquer. 5. Our *entire* attention should be devoted to the single object under consideration, but when weariness begins we should in that moment turn to some other fact.

SECTION II.

1. There are *classes of objects* involving purely-intellectual action, in which beauty, sublimity, and grandeur excite an eager reach of thought and delightful range of facts, without reading the presence

of Infinite Goodness and Wisdom. 2. *Moral facts* support the devout mind, while holy emotions inspire confidence, love, and praise. Though outer worlds glow in the light of unending sublimity, the world within outvies them all, centered in life and enjoyment without restriction. 3. We should be careful to call into *action all* the faculties of the soul; each one in its proper office and force of power allowed by natural being and endowment. 4. To become perfect, the mind must *know* and *love* purity, and that God is the center and circumference of all knowledge, and our souls should rest in him. Every ray of moral and scientific light traced upward and downward, toward the unchanging north or distant south, farthest east or remotest west, proves there is but one infinite fullness—the Eternal One.

CHAPTER III.

THE SOUL.

SECTION I.

1. THE *doctrine* of the *soul* was regarded by some schools of antiquity as embodying more than mind; the latter comprehending mere faculties of thought, reason, and power of knowledge, while the former involved the idea of the entire spiritual nature. It is spirit in essence, not subject to age or annihilation; the oneness of mind and soul distinct from the body, and imperishable. 2. It is the *vital* part or power of existence; thinks, reasons, and constitutes man a moral, intellectual, and immortal being, capable of the glorious government of God. 3. In considering the *soul*, we assume that every human being possesses a conviction and consciousness, of which we can not rid ourselves, that the sentient principle within is real, one and indivisible. We can not resist the persuasion of self-reality and absolute individuality, opposed to all ulterior facts and every thing like plurality, an uncompromising sense of unalterable oneness. This *felt* unity is contradictory to any possible supposition that feeling and thought owe their existence and character to multiplied thousands of varying particles, with different affinities toward each other, and

coexisting in the same body. 4. As all *portions* of *matter* are infinitely divisible, and as each must hold an independent existence in all compounds, then thought and feeling, results of these, must be infinitely divisible, tangible, and extended. Our feelings would be made up of lines, circles, triangles, and squares; and as all things must conform to the laws of materiality, each element of mind must be as divisible and destructible as matter. 5. If the *soul* be a *result* of either material entities or laws, it must conform to the condition of relative particles and the composition of thought. This would compel our contemplation of the same to stumble at every step upon the monstrous and absurd. A feeling would have form, weight, and extension. We would meet with the half of a belief, the quarter of a doubt, the tenth part of an idea, a square hope, an angular action, a conic feeling, the north corner of a feeling, a circular remembrance, or the south-west corner of an emotion. As foolish as this may appear, nevertheless mind must conform to the nature of matter if it is causative. But if mind is a mere accident of material organization, it has only a relative and no absolute existence.

SECTION II.

1. The *term life* may be applied to the growth of rocks, the maturing of the coral, or advance of petrifications, which is the first law of motion in matter, differing from that of impinging influences. But it is without sensitive or instinctive action. 2. It has

been assumed that the *instinct* and *sensitiveness* of vegetable life indicates as much contrivance as that of animals, and if instinct be referred to mind in the latter it must in the former. Vegetable life is inanimate, without sensitive feelings, and different from that of animals. 3. *Arguments* against the spiritual nature or soul, have been founded upon the acknowledged *instinct* and *sagacity* of the brute creation. But reason in man and instinct in animals differ in sources, character, and nature. The former must be guided by judgment, which involves apprehension and contrast, and extends to the present, past, and future. The latter is a feeling in nature, founded in aptitudes or inclinations. 4. If *mind* is a mere *accident*, then virtue and vice are accidents, incapable of rewards or punishment; man is a machine, and such accidents bear no relationship to him. 5. We are *positive* that no part of the physical nature is *essential* to consciousness. The loss of parts or members of such nature can not diminish consciousness of self. We intuitively and irresistibly feel an internal power which neither time nor death can destroy.

CHAPTER IV.

EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S IMMORTALITY.

SECTION I.

1. THE doctrine of the soul's *immortality* is full of interest, and never fails to excite with fondest hope, attracting vivid and pleasing inquiries. The idea of annihilation is horrible. He who holds such belief becomes a fearful spectacle to his race, his society is avoided, and his deportment and spirit is cold, unkind, and heartless. His home appears shaded with gloom, and the winds of heaven passing over his grave sing requiems of doleful despair. 2. The soul, in *original nature*, is independent of the changes and accidents of matter. It is the great immaterial source, the imperishable fountain of feeling, thought, emotion, and knowledge. A simple, uncompounded essence, it received from God the elements of incorruptibility, and its constituted being is immortality. 3. In the creation of the *soul* Deity either intended its immortality or that, at some epoch subsequent, it should *cease to be*. If the latter be true, then it is mortal and must cease to exist; for such purposes in its creation are changeless.

SECTION II.

1. But if God *purposed* in its creation life forever, then it is naturally, essentially, and necessarily immortal; for such purpose, in this respect, is the law of its being, and, extending to immortality, secures its indestructibility. 2. The *creation, nature, powers, relations, and internal aspirings* of the soul, in which it anxiously moves to the future, and struggles for greater liberty, knowledge, and bliss, all impress us of an open door to coming boundlessness, and an infinite perspective of being. 3. A deep, *conscious* conviction and feeling, unobstructedly force the persuasion of our immortality. This feeling appears to have naturally possessed the soul in every nation and condition of man. 4. *Heathen nations*, beneath murky skies of confusion, with all their superstition and prejudice, give evidence of a conviction and longing for life in the future. Such feelings are always offering homage to virtue, and hopes of happiness unending. 5. The *vast capacities*, boundless desires, and great improvements of the soul evidence its adaptation to, and the reality of being where all can be satisfied. We feel a dissatisfaction with the present time and state, and desire a suitable preparation that we may avoid every thing like disappointment in eternity.

CHAPTER V.

EVIDENCES OF THE SOUL'S VALUE.

SECTION I.

1. ALL evidence favors the doctrine of the *soul's immortality*. An act of omnipotence was necessary to create it, and nothing less than the same power can cause its non-existence. 2. By *intuition* and *consciousness* we are impressed of its indestructibility. We *feel* and *know* that we are immortal. Nature never gravitates to naught. Her intuitive lessons, aside and apart from sin and its influence, are imperishable truth. 3. It is the *soul* that tests the truthfulness and power of revealed religion, in conformation of the religion of nature. In the latter it reads the revelation of a God, and by the former experiences his presence and approval. So full is the burden of testimony, that to be an atheist implies a previous qualification of being a fool. 4. Its *value* is increased by original feelings and notions of *virtue*. We experience an involuntary and indefinable drifting to moral preferences and rectitude. 5. *It* has contemplative and active powers, understanding, conscience and the will, suggestion, thought, and feeling, all indispensable to knowledge, and without these what is man? 6. It is the *world of thought* within

that presents elements, affinities, and relations, stupendous in wisdom and worth, and powerful in action and appeal. It contemplates the higher principles of our destiny, resolves knowledge into constituent parts, tracing to original sources, and evolves the fact that the laws of mind, to some extent, become the laws of every science.

SECTION II.

1. The influence of *thought* upon language is found in the nature and laws of mind, a knowledge of which being necessary to the best systems of rhetoric and logic known. 2. *Taste* evidences the *value* of mind. The importance of the rippling rill is lost as the soul surveys the mighty Ganges or Amazon, rolling a broad wave through cities, plains, forests, hills, and mountains, bearing a mighty commerce to the heaving bosom of ocean independence. In the mind arises the contrast between the bird sporting in the bower, and the eagle now spreading his wing to the hastening storm—then burning in the sun. 3. *Mind* gives *value* to special and national laws; and without this, the management of the world is a failure, and millions of our race have been doomed to hopeless wretchedness. It is the only *real wealth* of nations. 4. The *value* of the soul is supported by the fact that intellectual and moral resources are our principal and most boundless store of enjoyment. It is the wealth of the beggar and the triumph of the mighty. 5. Its *value* is implied from the fact that the neglect of proper mental and moral culture did for cycles of

ages rob man of both liberty and happiness. But when genius awoke from the slumber of more than a thousand years, despotism began to vanish at the coming tread of indignant millions. Enlightened by Revelation, it threw radiance over the empire of spirit, linking our energies to the improvement of this world and the happy reversions of life eternal. 6. The *value* of the soul is exalted, when all other orders of earth are contrasted with its active elaborations of thought. Enter this interior temple of nature; range the scenes of unrivaled magnificence; look upon the conscious altars, covered with light, and the sacred curtain woven by the finger of God, with indwelling aspirations for a holy immortality; and mind absorbs all thought, carrying accumulating knowledge that would weigh down the inert bosom of a thousand Jupiters. 7. The soul is *above* valuation. Its salvation embraces self, and to be lost is the ruin of ourselves. It has interested heaven from all eternity. For thousands of years mercy has pleaded our cause. Earth has rolled her boundless resources to supply our wants; and hell exerts all its fiendish toil for our destruction. 8. If it was great to speak a world from naught, but greater to redeem, how shall we weigh its value? Creation is by the word of power, but redemption involved the highest gift of Almighty Goodness; price all price beyond. 9. *Nature*, at the crucifixion, gave evidence of the soul's value, in consternation and inversion of her laws—the darkened heavens, shaking earth, rending vail, the breaking rocks and rising dead.

CHAPTER VI.

IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE NATURE AND
POWERS OF THE SOUL, AS THE GREAT
AND SUPERIOR SCIENCE.

SECTION I.

1. MIND is the *science* of our being, and all knowledge in regard to the works of art and nature is indebted to this study. And it gives tact, keenness of perception, laying bare the great field of thought. It brings to view the elements of the moral universe. By the condition of the world within, the central source of distinction is the character of outward action. 2. The *study* of mind seeks knowledge of every element of being, and if its powers be unknown, how shall the wants of our spiritual being be supplied? Every correct system of education must embrace physical, intellectual, and moral discipline. 3. This *study* discovers the foundation elements of natural religion, which appears in the existence, beauty, and design of nature. 4. *Man* is intuitively instructed from self and his Creator. He receives it through the works of creation, the ever-unfolding wisdom of Providence and never-failing goodness.

SECTION II.

1. The *study* of mind is not properly esteemed by the masses. Many capable of stepping an unexplored

zodiac, tracing worlds rolling on high, and of throwing burning thought upon the plain of endless life, all alive with the approach of heaven, turn away wholly absorbed in the fight of two chickens, or the fleetness of two mules contending in a race. 2. In proportion as *mental culture* is neglected, despotism is extended. Often when the latter was not intended, fetters have been riveted upon the people and unborn generations crushed by misguided rulers, intending good but not knowing how it should be attained. 3. It is mental and moral *improvement* that gives liberty and stability to government, otherwise cannons, fleets, and armies, with extended seas or lofty Alps, must forever fail. 4. *Philosophical genius* refers directly to the study of our intellectual and moral powers. A total neglect is connected with a mind weak or in ruins. The mind must think in the right way, and upon true and pure subjects, in order to be wise and good. It must be able to turn in upon itself without disgust, and find there the vivid activity and pure objects for which we were created.

CHAPTER VII.

MUTUAL RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
ANTHROPOLOGY, EVOLVING THE CON-
DITION AND CHARACTER OF
THE SOUL IN TIME.

SECTION I.

1. It is impossible to define the mysterious *ties uniting* the soul and body. But we can not deny the fact that spirit and matter compose our real being. 2. *These two natures* influence each other, and either can be affected by the other. The bodily organs should be perfect and in vigorous health, in order to correct mental action. 3. *Natural defects* often constitute idiots, and frequently trammel correct reasoning. 4. A *paralysis* of the delicate *nerves* connected and sympathizing with the brain, often destroys correct mental action. 5. *Disease* or *general* debility will affect the mind in some way, and often to mental alienation.

SECTION II.

1. The *mind* exerts a very strong influence over the *body*. A uniform, cheerful, and happy class of feelings will contribute to the vigor and health of the body. 2. A *troubled, depressed, or gloomy* class of feelings, or wretched state of mind, will impair the health and bring us to a premature grave. 3. The

remorse of the murderer will hastily devour his energies and terminate life. 4. We are comforted in the belief that all minds *deprived* of reason in this life will be rational on leaving the body. 5. All *idiots* will be *sane* and happy in heaven, as their innocence banishes all doubt in regard to their future joy.

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CHAPTER VIII.

CULTIVATION OF THE MORAL POWERS, WITH
THE SOUL'S CONFORMITY TO THE WILL
OF GOD, MORE IMPORTANT THAN ONLY
INTELLECTUAL IMPROVEMENT.

SECTION I.

1. THE *soul* is preëminently endued with *conscience* and various moral powers. The innocence and purity of these are essential to virtuous life and continued happiness. 2. *Religion* does not destroy any faculty nor create new ones; but adoption by grace changes the moral condition and relation of the soul to its Creator in light, peace, and joy. 3. Though we could grasp *all* scientific knowledge, and command an angel's thoughts, if we love not God, neither adhere to truth and rectitude, the soul is only capacitated for deeper degrees of unending remorse. 4. *All history* proves that where moral suasion rules the people, and virtue is honored, there is peace and happiness. But where *moral influences* are rejected, mind is vicious and the world mad. Each morning breath is burdened with groans, and the evening dew is blood. True joy can never be derived from the shock of battle or shout of arms.

SECTION II.

1. In *studying* the nature and office of the moral powers, we are impressed and convinced of the com-

mon nature and proper equality of our race. We can not resist the conviction, that all men are equal in their origin, relations, dependence, dissolution, and immortality; and that the various shades, formations, and divisions of society are mere accidents of being, and exist essentially extrinsic of original nature. 2. We are *taught* both by religion and philosophy, that all classes of our race have one Father, who created us for usefulness and happiness. 3. This *study* will enable us to perceive and expel the evils of superstition and skepticism. It qualifies us to penetrate all sources of error, whether political, philosophical, or religious. Our highest emotions and love must be given to Him who is able to save. 4. It is *moral cultivation* that renders mind useful, elevates the world, and saves the soul. And without it, law is powerless, resolution exists in frenzy, and the whole moral heavens are hung in mourning.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SOUL—HOW AFFECTED BY TEMPORAL
DISEASE AND DEATH.

SECTION I.

1. WE have seen that *diseased physical* organs affect mental action. Almost the first lesson should be to study how to promote health. The neglect of one item often affects and maddens the whole system. An impure quality of food or water received into the stomach, sends impure chyle to the *vena cava*, vitiating the nature of the blood, which, on being pumped by the heart to the brain, affects the whole cerebral mass. The connected nerves influence the whole system; we fall sick; the mind becomes flighty and acts imperfectly. 2. The *soul* in its intellectual, sensitive, and moral nature becomes sympathetically affected by reason of its connection with diseased bodily powers. 3. We can only expect perfect *mental action* when free from fallen earthly fetters.

SECTION II.

1. The *death* of the body takes place in the separation of the soul from it. The delicate ties and affinity uniting the two natures being sundered, the body becomes decomposed, without any annihilation of its

essential elements, till the sound of the last trump calls it up a "spiritual body." 2. The *identity* of the soul and its power of action and knowledge, appear undisturbed in such separation; but our being is not entire till soul and body are united again. 3. *Temporal death* appears to have no annihilating power over the soul or its elements.

CHAPTER X.

THE SOUL IN ETERNITY.

SECTION I.

1. REASON, unaided by Revelation, can only follow in the wake of life's brief journey, and leaning upon the tomb, is silent. When all such efforts end, Revelation points out the travel of the soul beyond, entering the opening future. Upon it our helplessness hangs wholly dependent for the certainty of immortality, the reality of heaven, and the character and happiness of the redeemed. 2. We *naturally desire* to contemplate the existence and character of the soul in eternity. We may reason from the nature and analysis of mind, but all positive certainty is found in the revealed will of God to man. 3. We are led to *contemplate* the soul on leaving the body as being *naturally perfect*, whether it has become morally so or not. All its susceptibilities and powers are imperishable and wholly untrammelled by matter. 4. *All items* of knowledge ever stored in memory are imperishable, as we have no proof that any entity can ever cease to be. Fading facts, or traces of immaterialities, will be retained and live with the reality of the essence upon which they were impressed or written. But the remembrance of evil can not annoy the soul saved

from all such impurity. 5. *Memory* being immortal, however varied or trammelled with materiality, every fact impressed upon such immaterial essence never can be erased, as finity has no power of annihilation.

SECTION II.

1. *Perception* can never die. As its power, by means of physical organs, is wholly of and within the mind, it must of necessity exist unimpaired in spiritual vividness, separated from the body. 2. The *power* of vision and hearing belongs to mind, and must continue with it, disembodied. 3. *Feeling* and *emotions* are of mind, and must continue as long as such existence shall endure. 4. We are induced to believe that on the dissolution of the body, the *soul* is *perfected* in development and power of action. It is unfettered on the highway of light and knowledge. 5. A *world* of meaning might fail to describe the immortal throes, the lofty capacity and ability of the soul to know, act, and progress in knowledge when free and happy in eternity. Heaven in tears, all worlds in mourning, may fail to make known to us the full sorrows of the soul lost forever.

SECTION III.

1. A *pure soul* departing from earth enters not a world of dark conjecture or doubt, but of reality, beauty, and happiness. Heaven is adapted to man and calculated to fill every holy desire; as infinite perfection could not be otherwise. 2. *Spirit* must

have spiritual sight or perception of spirits. We shall see our friends and know them in that bright world. Mingled feelings of joy kindle as we look to the extended domain, rolling river, the beautiful city, and waving trees of life. 3. We shall *know* the redeemed. Apostles knew Moses and Elias on the Mount, though they had lived in previous ages. The rich man knew Abraham and Lazarus. It is reasonable to believe that the very inspiration of heaven will reveal the names of those we knew in time, and all the inhabitants of that blessed world. 4. The whole family of Christ in heaven will be *morally one*, in heart, mind, and will. As He is one, so must the redeemed be one, in union, perfectly according with his will and decisions, even against friends who have rejected salvation, and can not give us pain, as our wills and approval will be perfectly absorbed and united in our Savior. What he does will be right and in perfect harmony with purity and happiness. 5. It appears that *all the redeemed* in heaven have but *one* circle, class, or union. The idea of orders, grades, and degrees, as taught by Swedenborg, is contrary to all our conceptions of the nature and character of heaven. If there are grades, circles, and orders, then naturally follows preferences, classification, separations, divisions, and discord. The very moment the union of heaven is broken, it ceases to be heaven. So long as Christ is one and indivisible, his family will constitute one union in perfect happiness forever.

SECTION IV.

1. By so far as one soul may have *done* and *suffered* *more* for Christ and his cause than another, the Lord may bestow upon him more in *quantity* but not in quality or kind, while each one will enjoy a complete fullness. 2. It would seem that the *love* of the saints will be *uniform*. We can do no more than love our parents perfectly and with all the soul; then it is doing them no injustice if we love every other soul saved in the same way. 3. As Christ is *one* and his children are united in him, will not our love for the saints be conformed to, and conditioned by his love for each one saved through his mercy? If so, how can there be natural preferences or partiality? If any contemplate superiority, let him be careful lest he fail entering that holy world. 4. *The life* of the soul in the future is *eternal*. It is imperishable; and though material worlds cease to be, it will live on, light and joy increasing. If permitted to travel out amid distant creations of Deity, it is neither restricted by time nor limited in happiness. 5. The *heart kindles* with unearthly fire as we would summon every power trying to contemplate the soul perfect in heaven. O, eternity! thought stupendous, great, and glorious! home of earth's redeemed! Hail, happy millions, saved by grace, enter with triumphant acclaim, prolonged in the exchanging shout of worlds!

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
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
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


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
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